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In this dissertation, I examine how political environments influence industry 
structure and entrepreneurial opportunities following deregulation.  Though deregulation 
implies a removal of government control, I propose that deregulation remains a political 
process that is shaped by previous regulations and by the state actors responsible for 
implementing and overseeing deregulation.  I test my claims by studying the competitive 
local telephone service industry, which was created by the federal Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.  Regulators within state governments had historically played a large role in 
governing the industry and continued to oversee and implement the federal deregulatory 
policy.  I studied the growth of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) at two 
different levels of analysis:  the state and the firm.  At the state-level, I examined CLEC 
founding rates between 1997 and 2006.  I find that states with more experience with 
incentive-based regulation had higher founding rates and that this effect attenuated with 
time.  Founding rates were also higher for states with new governors throughout the study 
and for states with new commissioners early in the study period.  At the firm-level, I 
examined expansion decisions made by CLECs between 1997 and 2005.  I find that early 
in the study period, CLECs were more likely to enter states that were similar to their 
founding state on dimensions of the political ideology of its electorate and that employed 
the same type of local telephone regulation in 1996.  New governors and a regulatory 





expansion targets.  Finally, states exhibited a strong tendency to grow within the 
boundaries of the dominant incumbent carriers’ territories.  In many respects, this effect 
was as strong as the effect of adjacency.  Thus, even after one policy has been preempted 
by a second policy, effects from the first policy remain.  Together, the studies support my 
argument that a state’s current policy is built upon its previous policies and that changes 
in political leadership can serve as punctuating moments that stimulate competition and 
industry development.  This dissertation provides a basis upon which future research on 
the relationship between political environments and entrepreneurship can build. 
CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION 
A look back on the U.S. since about 1980 shows an unmistakable trend toward a 
push for market forces, rather than government employees, to control aspects of the 
economy that have important societal benefits (Frank, 2000; Harvey, 2005; Prasad, 
2006).  The introduction of auctions for distributing spectrum rights, pollution credits for 
reducing emissions, and the deregulation of industries such as financial services, 
transportation, energy, and communication are some examples that signify an abrupt 
change in ideology.  This symphony of market fundamentalism struck a resounding chord 
in 1996 with two presidential actions only weeks apart.  In his state of the union address 
on January 23, President Clinton, in a statement that ran counter to the typical image of 
the Democratic party, announced that “[t]he era of big government is over.”  Just 16 days 
later, President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act, which introduced 
competition to the local telephone service industry for the first time in nearly 100 years.  
These events helped to signal the country’s faith in markets, a stance that has shown little 
sign of abating. 
In my dissertation, I want to focus on one aspect of this transition:  deregulation.  
In particular, I am interested in the development of its ensuing competition including its 
potential for stimulating entrepreneurship.  Just how does deregulation lead to 
competition?  The implicit theory is that like a magnetic force, entrepreneurs will be 
attracted to compete with incumbents with strength proportional to the unleashed 
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economic opportunities.  Such a conception is, of course, simplified from the arguments 
of most mainstream economists, but even these theories typically do not see states having 
much influence in bringing about competition.  But we have known since at least Polanyi 
(1944/2001) that a market utopia independent of the state does not exist.  The state 
provides the lubricant to smooth the frictions of the market through the use of property 
rights, corporation law, the court system, etc. 
Yet what most of us call deregulation is still different from the typical free market 
activity where the state is merely a supporting structure.  Despite the language of 
withdrawal implied by the prefix “de”, state actors often maintain control over crucial 
elements of the industry:  licensing who can operate where, setting prices, resolving 
disputes between incumbents and new entrants, etc.  Thus, what we term deregulation is 
more accurately re-regulation or liberalization1.  Furthermore, the state actors themselves 
may try to rule and arbitrate neutrally but bring with them “ideological biases and 
institutional capabilities” (Vogel, 1996: 268).  Understanding how entrepreneurs and 
ultimately competition arise following the deregulation of an industry therefore requires 
attention to who these state actors are, what they believe, and under what institutional and 
historical contexts they operate. 
I believe that issues of deregulation and its relationship to entrepreneurship and 
industry evolution are appropriate for an organizational analysis.  I further believe that 
organization theory can be enriched by such studies.  Questions concerning the founding 
of new businesses have long been of interest to organizational ecologists (Hannan & 
                                                 
1 Vogel (1996: 3) defines deregulation as the “reduction or elimination of government regulations” and 
liberalization as “introduction of more competition within a market.”  Though the 1996 
Telecommunications Act clearly did not reduce or eliminate the amount of regulation for the local 
telephone service industry (Crandall, 2005; Neuman, McKnight, & Solomon, 1997), I will use deregulation 
in this document to coincide with what most people mean by the term. 
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Freeman, 1977, 1984) while those related to political environments and regulation have 
traditionally received the attention of institutionalists (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 
2001).  As ecologists began to theorize about the effect of socio-political institutions 
(e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Wholey & Sanchez, 1991) and institutionalists looked toward 
explaining entire histories of populations (e.g., Dobbin & Dowd, 1997), a sub-area 
emerged that some refer to as “institutional ecology” (e.g., Baum & Oliver, 1996; Baum 
& Powell, 1995).  Though most conceptions of policy (including regulation) are related 
to the federal government, recent studies from an institutional ecology perspective have 
significantly advanced our knowledge of how policy within each of the 50 individual 
states creates opportunities for entrepreneurs.  A state’s policy toward competition can 
influence how attractive it is to new entrants (Dobbin & Dowd, 1997) and can even 
influence the entrepreneurial opportunities in different states (Wade, Swaminathan, & 
Saxon, 1998).  For deregulated industries, prior work finds that state policy can enhance 
entrepreneurial opportunities by providing financial support for novel, riskier types of 
technologies and by standardizing parameters in the exchange contracts between 
incumbents and new entrants—provided regulatory agencies’ relationships with 
incumbents are not too cozy (Russo, 2001; Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005). 
Though we have learned much of the role that governments play in fostering 
competition and new businesses, research tends to focus on the effects of current policy.  
Many questions remain about other aspects of the political process, such as the role of 
individual state actors and the lingering effects of the policy that is being replaced.  These 
factors seem particularly relevant for an industry being transformed from monopoly to 
competition.  For instance, if market fundamentalism is indeed a driving force behind 
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federal deregulatory policy, do state-level variations in such ideology lead to state-level 
variations in deregulation outcomes?  How do preexisting conditions within states 
influence the federal deregulation process?  Can new government leaders break the bonds 
between political elites and incumbents that tend to hurt new entrants?  To address these 
and related questions, I will analyze the deregulation of the industry I alluded to 
previously, the local telephone service industry. 
DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
When local telephone service was deregulated as part of the federal 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, it gave rise to a new sector:  competitive local 
telephone service.  The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze how the competitive 
local telephone service industry developed differently across states as a function of state 
political environments.  In particular, I focus on industry growth and study it in two 
different ways.  Consistent with the ecological perspective of studying industry growth, I 
analyze state-level founding rates of competitive local telephone service providers to 
address the question, Why did certain states see more entrepreneurial opportunities for 
competitive local telephone service providers than did other states?  And because many 
competitive providers expanded their service into territories outside their headquarters 
state, I also study industry growth at the firm-level.  I analyze these expansion decisions 
in order to answer the question, Why did competitive providers choose to expand into 
certain states rather than into other states?  Together, they provide a richer view into the 
relationship between state characteristics and industry growth than either could do alone. 
I study five different aspects of a state’s political environment.  First, I examine 
political ideology—that is, the beliefs held by state government officials and by the 
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state’s electorate regarding the role that government should play within society.  I will 
argue that states with a more conservative ideology, which is typically associated with a 
preference for free markets, should see higher levels of industry growth. 
Second, I explore what I am calling a state’s institutional endowment.  Relative to 
this context, this includes the policies that states had in place for regulating the local 
telephone industry before federal deregulation.  I will argue that these policies should 
influence how the new, competitive industry developed after deregulation.  States with a 
history of incentive-based regulation, which was guiding the industry away from 
monopolies and toward competition, should see higher levels of industry growth. 
Third, I consider another way in which previous policy continues to shape an 
industry despite being preempted.  Before deregulation, local telephone providers were 
regional monopolies, in which they were the sole providers for a given geographic 
territory.  The largest incumbent providers covered several states.  Competitive entrants 
were unrestricted about where they could operate, but I will argue that they will be 
influenced by the geographical boundaries of these large incumbents due to both 
transaction costs and to the cognitive conception of markets that this legacy policy of 
geographical restrictions created. 
Fourth, I analyze whether the geographical location where a firm starts its 
operations influences what other states appear to be desirable expansion targets.  I will 
argue that a firm’s founding conditions cause it to structure itself a certain way and to 
take on characteristics that make it a better fit for some states rather than others. 
Fifth, I examine how political regime change helps states make the transition 
from regulating monopolies to regulating competition.  I will argue that new government 
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leadership, both overall and specific to those who oversee the industry, serve as 
punctuating moments that (1) break those ties between incumbents and the political elite 
and (2) stimulate the economy and attract service providers such as competitive local 
telephone service providers.  This should lead to higher levels of industry growth. 
As a final consideration, I analyze how the effect that political environments had 
on industry growth at the state-level may have varied over time.  I will argue that as an 
industry gains legitimacy and as its surrounding context changes, the factors that 
influence its growth and its entrepreneurial opportunities may shift in their level of 
importance.  I explore, then, the extent to which the preceding characteristics varied over 
time. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The goal of my dissertation is to provide a detailed examination of how political 
environments influence industry structure and entrepreneurial opportunities in a 
deregulatory setting.  This contributes to theory in several ways.  In particular, I provide a 
richer, more realistic view of political environments and their influence on organizational 
behavior.  This includes looking at the impact of state governments, considering 
interactions of multiple levels of government (federal deregulation and state 
interpretation and implementation), and considering how new policy becomes enacted 
with respect to the old policy that it replaced.  I also make explicit the fact that policies 
are implemented by actual people who bring with them their own unique histories, 
capabilities, and ideologies.  These ideas, which used to be prevalent in that we now call 
“old” institutional theory of organizations, are typically ignored within the new 
institutional theory domain (Selznick, 1996; Stinchcombe, 1997). 
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Regarding the entrepreneurship literature in particular, I add to the growing 
number of studies that examine the demand-side of entrepreneurship (Why do certain 
areas see more entrepreneurship than other areas?) rather than the supply-side of 
entrepreneurship (Why do certain people become entrepreneurs?).  To use an agricultural 
metaphor, a demand-side approach explores how differences in “soil” cause the “seeds” 
of entrepreneurship to grow at different rates.  Political environments are an aspect of an 
area’s soil that has been understudied. 
More generally, I approach this dissertation with an aim to contribute to our 
understanding and theories of institutional change.  Two elements that I focus on are time 
and transition.  By time, I refer to both the historical conditions upon which changes 
occur as well as the dynamics of the institutionalization process.  New institutional 
forces, such as the policies considered here, become applied within particular contexts.  
The same changes applied to areas with different histories may result in different 
outcomes.  Also, while institutions are often perceived of as static, institutionalization is 
dynamic; it is a process.  As the object of institutional change develops and the 
surrounding context shifts, the effect of institutional forces should also change.  By 
transition, I again refer to the role that individuals play in the process of enacting 
institutional change.  In certain cases, turnover may be a necessary condition for creating 
a break from the past. 
My hope is that this dissertation can provide substantive contributions, too.  
Despite its limitations, the 1996 Telecommunications Act still is cited as landmark 
legislation for changing not only the American economy but American society.  The 
impact of this legislation has been addressed by public policy scholars and economists 
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but is lacking the unique perspective that organization theory can provide.  Furthermore, 
deregulation and its impact remain topics of great interest and debate, especially in areas 
such as the deregulated electricity industry, which has struggled to reach the level of 
competition envisioned by policymakers.  Finally, this research can speak to general 
issues of policy and the economy by addressing the role that the state can play in shaping 
the economy via entrepreneurship, topics that remain at the forefront of public concern.  
This dissertation is one look into this relationship. 
ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
In Chapter II, I review the literature on entrepreneurship to present the theoretical 
foundations for this study.  I pay particular attention to how entrepreneurial opportunities 
vary geographically and to the effects that political environments have on fostering 
entrepreneurship.  In Chapter III, I provide the necessary historical background to the 
local telephone service industry and describe the important role that state governments 
have played, and continue to play, in its development.  Chapter IV is where I present my 
theory and hypotheses.  I develop arguments for why elements of state political 
environments would affect growth of the competitive telephone service industry at both 
state- and firm-levels of analysis.  Chapters V and VI contain research methods and the 
results of my state-level analysis and firm-level analysis, respectively.  In Chapter VIII, I 




CHAPTER II:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the extant literature on entrepreneurship.  
After defining entrepreneurship as I will refer to it in my studies, I review other 
entrepreneurship research.  I start by reviewing entrepreneurship literature conducted at 
an individual level of analysis—the so-called “supply side” of entrepreneurship.  Next, I 
examine studies at the population-level of analysis, or the “demand side” of 
entrepreneurship.  Rather than focusing on entrepreneurs themselves, the latter approach 
shifts attention to entrepreneurial opportunities.  This latter approach is also most 
pertinent to the organization theory literature.  I review litereature on geographical 
heterogeneity of entrepreneurship and focus specifically on the role of political 
environments in creating this heterogeneity.  I conclude by highlighting gaps in this 
literature that I intend to address with this study of the competitive local telephone 
service industry. 
DEFINITION 
No work on entrepreneurship, it seems, is complete without mentioning the lack 
of agreement in defining entrepreneurship.  For some, it is simply the creation of a new 
venture (e.g., Aldrich, 2005; Gartner, 1988; Thornton, 1999).  Others insist that it must 
involve the discovery and exploitation of some innovation that had not previously existed 
(Shane, 2003; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), whether those opportunities be disruptive 
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(Schumpeter, 1934) or incremental (Kirzner, 1973).  The former definition fits the 
popular conception of what an entrepreneur does and is the easier of the two to measure.  
The latter highlights the importance of the entire entrepreneurial process and makes 
explicit the fact that entrepreneurs take action in response to opportunities.  It also 
implies that the entrepreneurial process does not always begin with the absence of a firm.  
Certainly existing firms can behave in ways similar to new firms that provide the same 
benefits that we attribute to entrepreneurship (e.g., innovation, job growth, economic 
development, etc.). 
In this dissertation, my approach toward entrepreneurship is more aligned with the 
latter.  I define entrepreneurship as the process of perceiving and attempting to exploit 
new business opportunities.  In both of my studies, my measures of entrepreneurship will 
be entering a market in a newly created sector.  The companies that do so will tend to be 
very young, and many of the events I examine indeed will involve the founding of a new 
firm.  The behavior of all firms in this dissertation will involve taking risks and trying to 
exploit new opportunities by offering products and services in which they have a 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
RESEARCH 
Individual-Level of Analysis 
Over the years, the dominant approach to studying entrepreneurship has been to 
try to answer questions about entrepreneurs themselves:  Why do some people but not 
others become entrepreneurs?  Why are some people better at identifying entrepreneurial 
opportunities?  In this section, I describe two approaches for answering these questions.  
The first considers the dispositions, or traits, of entrepreneurs that propel them into 
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entrepreneurship, while the second explores the role that an individual’s surrounding 
context has in fostering entrepreneurial behavior. 
Dispositional Approach 
Early writers of entrepreneurship described entrepreneurs as being different from 
everyone else, including others in business.  Schumpeter described entrepreneurs as 
having a “will to compete” and who “delight in ventures” (1934: 93).  For Knight, 
entrepreneurs are those with a “disposition to act” (1921: 269).  Even those who argue of 
the importance of entrepreneurial opportunities note that entrepreneurs utilize intuition to 
perceive and capitalize upon these opportunities (Kirzner, 1973). 
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the earliest entrepreneurship research sought 
to answer the question of “Why do some people become entrepreneurs?” by looking at 
inherent, individual traits.  One of the first efforts, and still one of the most cited works in 
this tradition, is McClelland’s (1961) argument that certain people are motivated to 
become entrepreneurs because they have a high need for achievement.2  These 
individuals, with their high self-expectations and greater risk tolerance, would not be 
placated by becoming another human cog in a large, industrial firm.  In a study of 55 
Wesleyan graduates, McClelland (1965) compared their need for achievement scores at 
the time of graduation with their occupational status approximately 14 years later.  He 
found those in entrepreneurial positions had higher need for achievement scores than 
                                                 
2 Because this research is typically cited now only when critiquing the dispositional approach to 
entrepreneurship, it is ironic that the primary argument of McClelland’s monograph is that need for 
achievement explains national economic development.  He supports this by showing that the rate of 
economic growth between 1925 and 1950 is significantly higher in countries whose children’s stories 
contained more need for achievement themes.  He posits his theory about entrepreneurship later only as a 
middle-range mechanism for the country-level relationship.  Though he comes to describe need for 
achievement as a stable personality characteristic (McClelland, 1965: 392), at least initially he ascribes its 
individual variation to contextual factors, such as cultural norms, religion, family history, and work history. 
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those in other positions and concluded, in language appropriate for the era in which he 
was writing, that high need for achievement “predisposes a young man to seek out an 
entrepreneurial position in which he can, normally, attain more of the achievement 
satisfactions he seeks than in other types of positions” (1965: 390).  Other motivation-
based explanations for entrepreneurial behavior include a need for power (Wainer & 
Rubin, 1969) and a need for independence (Hisrich & Brush, 1984). 
Related to a having a need for achievement is an argument that entrepreneurs 
have a greater propensity to take risks than do non-entrepreneurs.  A meta-analysis of 12 
studies in this literature from the 1980s and 1990s found that the risk propensity of 
entrepreneurs is greater than that of managers, and that among entrepreneurs risk 
propensity is higher for those whose focus is venture creation compared to those 
concerned with producing family income (Stewart & Roth, 2001). 
Part of this greater risk propensity may come from entrepreneurs having an 
inflated sense of optimism about their prospects of success.  In a survey of 2,994 
entrepreneurs who had recently started their own business, Cooper and colleagues 
(Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1988) found that 81% believed their chances of success 
were 70% or higher.  One-third believed that their chances of success were a perfect 10 
out of 10.  When asked to predict the chances of success for other, similar firms, 
respondents were less optimistic.  Only 39% predicted a 70% or better chance of success 
for such other businesses, and 11% were 100% certain of success.  Moore, Oesch, and 
Zietsma (2007) also find that entrepreneurs tend to behave egocentrically.  In a 
multimethod study of actual entrepreneurs, potential entrepreneurs, and experimental 
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participants, they find that respondents were myopically focused on their own abilities at 
the expense of potential competitors. 
Personality has long been a popular explanation for predicting who becomes an 
entrepreneur.  Zhao and Seibert (2006) recently conducted a meta-analysis of the 
literature on the relationship between the “Big 5” personality traits and entrepreneurship.  
Their analysis of 23 studies finds that entrepreneurs, relative to managers, exhibit higher 
degrees of Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience and lower degrees of 
Neuroticism and Agreeableness.  The authors found no difference between entrepreneurs 
and managers on their level of Extraversion. 
Dispositional researchers continue to explore other psychological explanations for 
entrepreneurship behavior.  A burgeoning area is in cognition, with arguments given for 
topics such as biases and heuristics (Busenitz & Barney, 1997), creativity (Ward, 2004), 
regulatory focus (Brockner, Higgins, & Low, 2004), and intelligence (Sternberg, 2004).  
Others dispositional factors recently raised in the literature include affect (Baron, 2008) 
and psychopathology (Hisrich, Langan-Fox, & Grant, 2007). 
Of course, all these dispositional explanations are subject to the classic nature-
nuture, person-situation critique.  One can never been certain how much of the 
entrepreneurial behavior is innate, how much is learned, and how much is context-
specific.  The ultimate test for advancing a dispositional explanation would be to 
investigate the influence of genetics.  Research has begun to explore just that.  Nicolaou 
and colleagues (Nicolaou, Shane, Cherkas, Hunkin, & Spector, 2008) compared 
entrepreneurial activity in 870 pairs of monozygotic twins and 857 pairs of same-sex 
dizygotic twins in the U.K using quantitative genetics techniques.  Using several 
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operationalizations of entrepreneurship, they find a significantly positive effect of 
heritability even controlling for typical demographic explanations of entrepreneurship 
(e.g., gender, age, income, education, marital status, race, and immigrant status).  Though 
this study does not identify the mechanism by which genetics may influence 
entrepreneurship or the specific genes that matter, it is an interesting first step. 
Contextual Approach 
Many argue that research on dispositional characteristics falls far short of 
explaining why some people become entrepreneurs and others do not.  Critiques range 
from the use of cross-sectional studies to neglecting a potential entrepreneur’s 
surroundings (Thornton, 1999).  As Aldrich dismissively writes, “Personal traits, taken 
out of context, simply do not explain very much” (1999: 76). 
Thus, a different body literature has accumulated over the years to examine the 
ways in which a person’s context shapes his or her entrepreneurial propensity.  Some of 
this research involves socially-based demographic attributes, such as religion (Bonacich, 
1973), marital status (Evans & Leighton, 1989), education (Bates, 1995), employment 
status (Ritsila & Tervo, 2002), and income (Amit, Muller, & Cockburn, 1995). 
Another set of explanations points to the effect of one’s relationships or to life-
history characteristics.  Research has found that one’s family history contributes to the 
likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur.  Using archival data from the Wisconsin 
Longitudinal Study, Halaby (2003) finds that higher levels of parental education, 
occupational status, and income in addition to self-employment all lead to a preference 
for entrepreneurial, as opposed to bureaucratic, jobs.  This is consistent with evidence 
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that children whose parents are self-employed are themselves more likely to become self-
employed (Aldrich, Renzulli, & Langton, 1998). 
Research on work history also provides an explanation for why certain individuals 
become entrepreneurs.  In their research on social mobility, Lipset and Bendix (1959) 
note that entrepreneurs, relative to other occupational groups, tend to have a more 
heterogeneous occupational experience.  Experience as an entrepreneur, too, suggests that 
entrepreneurship itself is a self-reinforcing process.  Carroll and Mosakowski (1987) 
analyze survey responses of 2,172 West German respondents and find that the probability 
of becoming self-employed is much higher for those with previous self-employment 
experience. 
Just as the type of work one has done can contribute to entrepreneurial propensity, 
so, too, can where one has worked.  Work environment can influence the entrepreneurial 
spirit of employees in a number of ways.  Dobrev and Barnett (2005) studied the career 
histories of 2,692 alumni of a prestigious U.S. business school and discovered that the 
probability of becoming an entrepreneur decreases as one’s current organization ages and 
grows larger.  Dobrev and Barnett argue that the routinization of old, large firms 
effectively constrains the innovative behavior of individuals.  Sørensen (2007) supports 
this finding of bureaucracy’s effect on entrepreneurship.  Additionally, his data on the 
Danish labor market enables him to examine and dismiss a possible self-selection bias by 
nascent entrepreneurs into small firms.  Having entrepreneurial role models at work also 
matters.  In a study of over 6,000 university biotechnology scientists, Stuart and Ding 
(2006) find that scientists were more likely to become entrepreneurs as more of their 
colleagues and co-authors transitioned to commercial science—particularly when those 
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colleagues and co-authors were prestigious scientists who were well-connected to 
industry.  The actions of others thus gave legitimacy to the act of leaving academia for 
the for-profit world. 
If information is a key ingredient for finding entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane 
& Eckhardt, 2003), one’s network position plays a crucial role in this process (Burt, 
1992).  Social networks play a significant, if not dominant (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986), 
role in determining who becomes an entrepreneur and with what success.  Networks 
contribute to this process via the content that is exchanged between actors, the 
governance mechanisms such relationships yield, and an entrepreneur’s positioning 
within the network structure (for a review, see Hoang & Antoncic, 2003).  As “network” 
has come to be used as much as a verb as a noun, calls have come to revisit the 
endogeneity problem within network research (Stuart & Sorenson, 2007).  Network ties 
are not created at random.  Social actors, including entrepreneurs, most often choose their 
partners and do so strategically.  Future research may turn the focus towards how 
entrepreneurs build their networks (Aldrich & Kim, 2007). 
Population-Level of Analysis 
Up until now, the literature reviewed has been a response to the question, “Why 
do certain people become entrepreneurs?”  To many, the contextual approach improves 
upon the dispositional approach because it makes more explicit the fact that individuals 
operate within dynamic situations.  Yet a contextual approach has an additional benefit.  
Context creates not just the impetus for becoming an entrepreneur, but also the 
opportunity to do so.  By shifting research attention up a level of analysis, from the 
individual to the population, one can examine how context creates or destroys 
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entrepreneurial opportunities.  Many entrepreneurship scholars would argue that this 
approach is even preferable to individual-level research (Gartner, 1988; Thornton, 1999).   
In the organization theory literature, the tradition of examining entrepreneurial 
opportunities at a population-level of analysis is most often traced back to the path-
breaking 1965 essay by Stinchcombe (1965).  Stinchcombe articulated a host of ways in 
which general social processes (e.g., changes in technology, political upheavals, etc.) 
influence organizational behavior, including conditions under which we should see the 
founding of new organizations. 
Building from Stinchcombe’s insights and those of the human ecology literature 
(Hawley, 1950), population ecology arose to argue for a selection-based approach to 
understanding organizations.  Population ecology’s stated purpose was to answer the 
question “Why are there so many kinds of organizations?” through explanations of 
environmental selection, not organizational adaptation (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  In 
doing so, population ecologists became one of the first schools of organizational thought 
to focus almost exclusively on the organizational environment. 
Although population ecology never explicitly focused on entrepreneurship, 
research in this domain contributes to entrepreneurship research for two important 
reasons.  First, ecologists believe it is important to study all firms.  In response to the 
tendency of organizational research to focus on large, industrial firms, they argued that 
firm behavior, including likelihood of survival, depends on size.  By definition, analysis 
of all firms includes those just started.  Second, their object of study is firm vital rates—
both firm foundings and firm failures.  Firm failures can be studied at a firm-level of 
analysis because researchers know all firms are that are at risk of failing.  The same is not 
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true of foundings.  To study when and why firms appear, one must take a higher-level 
approach and consider the founding of an organization as a property of the population to 
which it is added.  In the language of entrepreneurship, an ecological approach to firm 
creation is one focused on entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Two major theories developed to explain population dynamics, including the 
founding of new organizations and thus of entrepreneurial opportunities.  The first is 
resource partitioning theory (Carroll, 1985).  Resource partitioning theory differentiates 
between two types of firms:  generalists (those that target mainstream segments at the 
core of the population) and specialists (those focused on individual, small segments on 
the periphery of the population).  The premise of the theory is that as an industry matures, 
it becomes more concentrated as generalists grow.  Competition among generalists leads 
to the failure of some generalists and the opening of some resource space—and 
entrepreneurial opportunities—for specialists.  Later versions of the theory explained the 
phenomenon more in terms of an identity-based mechanism (Carroll & Swaminathan, 
2000). 
The second dominant ecological theory for explaining entrepreneurial 
opportunities is density dependence theory.  Ecologists argue that a population’s vital 
rates are related to the size of the population by two processes:  legitimation and 
competition (Carroll & Hannan, 1989).  When an industry is in its nascent state, more 
firms within it provide the industry with greater legitimacy.  Increased legitimacy, in turn, 
attracts even more firms and the industry grows.  A point is eventually reached, however, 
when too many firms have entered the industry than can be supported by existing 
resources.  Competition for resources leads to the failure of some firms and discourages 
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new firms from entering the industry.  Firm founding rate, then, follows a ∩-shaped 
relationship with the size, or density, of the population. 
In their basic state, both theories are compelling and general—two qualities of 
good theories.  Yet they are limited by only being able to consider the ecological 
environment (that is, properties of the population itself) and only focusing on a single 
population.  These limitations were soon addressed by revisiting Stinchcombe’s (1965) 
arguments for the influence of social factors and observing variation in social factors 
across time and space.  Arguably the most heavily researched subarea in relation to 
entrepreneurial opportunities is geographical heterogeneity:  comparing firm founding 
rates across regions.  It is within this literature that I will focus my attention next. 
Geographic Heterogeneity 
Just as the observation that entrepreneurs appear to be different from non-
entrepreneurs led researchers to ask, “Why do certain people become entrepreneurs?”, 
seeing geographical variation in where and when businesses are started led to a different 
question:  “Why does entrepreneurship occurs more often in some areas than in other 
areas?”  One immediate explanation is that such variation is due to the location of 
physical resources.  For instance, within the energy industry oil companies are based in 
Texas and Oklahoma and ethanol plants in Iowa and Nebraska because that is where one 
typically finds raw materials for each.  Other reasons given for why entrepreneurs are 
likely to choose one place over another for starting their business include the advantage 
of locating near customers (Smithies, 1941), near transportation and communication 
routes (Chandler, 1977; Weber, 1929), or in areas of economic wealth (Grant, 1996; 
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Mezias & Mezias, 2000; Reynolds, 1994) stability (McMillan & Woodruff, 2002), or 
capital availability (Dobbin & Dowd, 1997). 
Other explanations point not to anything about the area by itself but about what 
the area becomes due to its industrial activity.  Economists have traditionally argued that 
industrial growth is a self-reinforcing process because industrial concentration creates 
externalities that lead to industrial agglomeration, or clustering.  Agglomeration theory 
suggests that such externalities include a pooled market for labor, which increases labor 
specialization and controls costs; the production of nontradable specialized inputs; and 
increased information flows among firms (i.e., knowledge spillovers) (Hoover, 1948; 
Krugman, 1991). 
While the phenomenon of agglomeration remains present across many different 
industries, a number of studies have pointed to different mechanisms for the persistence 
of industrial clustering and have challenged the argument that such clustering is due to 
the economic benefits of positive externalities.  Saxenian, for instance, argues that more 
than the mere presence of similar firms determines whether positive externalities develop.  
In her rich comparative study of Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in 
Massachusetts, Saxenian (1994) finds that despite similar technologies and histories, 
Silicon Valley thrived while Route 128 experienced a continual decline.  Silicon Valley’s 
regional advantage over Route 128 was its industrial structure (network-based and 
interconnected versus isolated and independent) and structure of its firms (decentralized 
and open versus hierarchical and closed). 
Similar to agglomeration theory, Sorenson and Audia, in their study of the U.S. 
footwear production industry between 1940 and 1989, also find that “new foundings tend 
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to reify the existing geographic distribution of production” (2000: 424).  They argue, 
though, that rather than being attracted by a densely-populated region’s economies of 
scale, entrepreneurs are drawn to them because those regions have role models from 
whom they can acquire tacit knowledge and access to social ties.  To support this claim, 
Sorenson and Audia show that states with high local densities had higher founding rates 
but also higher mortality rates—a condition that should not occur if the traditional 
economic explanation for industrial clustering were true. 
The presence and population dynamics of third-party firms can also contribute to 
the waxing and waning of entrepreneurial opportunities across geographic spaces.  Stuart 
and Sorenson (2003) find that in addition to the presence of other similar firms, 
geographical proximity to financing (in this particular case, venture capital firms) 
contributes to geographical heterogeneity in founding rates of biotech firms.  The same 
can be true even for firms outside one’s own industry.  Audia and colleagues (Audia, 
Freeman, & Reynolds, 2006) analyzed the instruments manufacturing sector between 
1976 and 1988 and showed that the founding rate of instruments manufacturers increased 
in labor market areas in proportion to the densities of firms with which they had 
symbiotic (doing business with) and commensalistic (similar to; using the same kind of 
resources) relationships. 
Collectively, these studies add a great deal to our understanding of where 
entrepreneurial opportunities come from and of the entrepreneurship process in its 
entirety.  Going back to the agriculture metaphor for entrepreneurship from the 
introductory chapter, each demonstrates how regional differences in soil (e.g., labor, 
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information, financing, social capital, etc.) can yield different rates of growth for the 
seeds of entrepreneurship. 
Yet other aspects of a region can alter the fertility of its entrepreneurial soil, too.  
One such aspect that I have yet to consider is its political environment.  Quite often this is 
a taken-for-granted aspect of entrepreneurship.  Perhaps due to greater media attention or 
to their inherently greater ‘sex appeal’, knowledge spillovers and venture capital are 
‘hot’; property rights and taxes are not.  Yet the political environment creates the rules of 
the game by which entrepreneurs must operate and can constitute significant barriers to 
entry.  I believe that this is particularly true in the case of a deregulated industry where 
the old world of monopoly and the new world of competition are colliding. 
In the following section, I will review a number of studies in the organization 
literature on the relationship between a region’s political environment and its 
entrepreneurial life chances.  I will then point out the gaps in this literature and state my 
argument for why it is important that these gaps are studied. 
The Political Environment and Entrepreneurship 
Despite classic essays on the importance of considering how political 
environments shape organizational behavior and population dynamics, our knowledge of 
this subject remains limited.  Stinchcombe (1965), as mentioned before, suggested that 
changes in a country’s political environment can affect its citizens’ motivations to start 
new organizations and the likelihood that such organizations will survive.  Carroll and 
colleagues (Carroll, Delacroix, & Goodstein, 1988) considered a wide range of political 
activity (turmoil and revolution, war, institutional structure, and regulation) and 
developed propositions for their effect on the structure and dynamics of a population. 
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Most research in the organizational literature that follows in this tradition focuses 
on the impact of policy (Lindberg, Campbell, & Hollingsworth, 1991; Roy, 1997).  For 
instance, governments may create tax incentives to entrepreneurs.  Swaminathan (1995) 
studied the rise of farm wineries in the U.S. between 1941 and 1990 and found that many 
states passed laws intended to help farm wineries compete with larger firms.  A large 
portion of the support in these laws came in the form of tax benefits.  Swaminathan’s 
analysis showed that founding rates were indeed higher in states where such laws were 
present.  General marginal tax rates, too, have an effect on entrepreneurs; the higher the 
tax rate, the lower the rate of entrepreneurial entry (Blau, 1987; Gentry & Hubbard, 
2000). 
Policy can also be in the form of making resources available to entrepreneurs that 
enable them to start and expand their businesses.  In Dobbin and Dowd’s (1997) study of 
the development of the railroad industry in Massachusetts from the early 19th century to 
the early 20th century, the authors show that public capitalization policy had a significant 
impact on the number of new railroad firms founded.  In the era when public funds in the 
form of bonds, land grants, and loans were made available to enterprising railroaders, 
founding rates soared.  After railroad finance scandals saw Massachusetts and other states 
dramatically reduce the availability of public funds starting in the early 1870s, founding 
rates plummeted. 
Research has pointed to the role that policy plays in constraining the behavior of 
firms.  This is especially true in competition between incumbents and competitors in 
regulated sectors where often the constraints are differentially applied.  One example of 
this is from the first era of competitive local telephony around the turn of the 20th century.  
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As a networked industry, telephone companies should benefit from the positive network 
externalities of large network size.  When a company such as Pittsburgh & Allegheny 
Telephone Company came to serve most of the Pittsburgh market, it seemed only natural 
that the company would grow to serve the rest of the market and effectively suppress the 
opportunities for others to start telephone companies in the area.  Yet this was not the 
case.  Pittsburgh was eventually served by 11 different companies.  Barnett and Carroll 
(1993) state that such outcomes were not uncommon.  They argue that the behavior of 
incumbent firms was constrained by local political boundaries.  Local governments were 
the primary regulator of telephone companies at this time and did so by requiring 
companies to purchase charters that determined their rates, rights-of-way, and acquisition 
behavior.  The more local governments there were in an area, the more fragmented a 
company’s territory was likely to become, and the better was an entrepreneur’s chance to 
enter. 
Sometimes, it is not just what a political environment does for or to the 
organizations within a population that affects the population’s founding rate.  Especially 
in economically and politically stable societies, actors within a political environment are 
able to provide legitimacy to a population.  Heightened legitimacy, in turn, raises 
awareness of an industry and makes it easier to obtain resources (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  
For instance, Baum and Oliver (1992) reported that the founding rate of Toronto-area day 
care centers had a curvilinear relationship with the population’s relational density, which 
they measure as ties to government and community institutions.  At least up to a certain 
point, the more service agreements with the provincial government and the more site-
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sharing arrangements with community organizations (e.g., churches, public schools, etc.) 
collectively held within the population, the more day care centers were founded. 
What makes political environments such a rich, but difficult, domain to study are 
the multiple layers of government found in many countries.  Within a federal system like 
the U.S., for example, one commonly witnesses interactions within levels of analysis 
(state vs. state) and between levels of analysis (state vs. federal).  Organization 
researchers have begun to explore the consequences that multiple political environments 
have on entrepreneurship.  Consider, for example, the effect of prohibition on the 
brewing industry.  Most U.S. citizens are aware of this country’s national Prohibition Era.  
From the passage of the 18th Amendment in 1920 until it was repealed by the 21st 
Amendment in 1933, manufacturing, selling, and transporting alcohol was illegal 
throughout the United States.  Prior to this, though, the decision on whether to ban 
alcohol was left to the states.  As Wade, Swaminathan, and Saxon (1998) document, over 
30 states passed prohibition laws between 1845 and the 18th Amendment.  In addition to 
the variation in which states passed such laws, states also varied according when they 
passed them and for how long the law was in effect (several states experienced multiple 
episodes of prohibition).  This variation had a substantial impact on the life chances of 
breweries.  Not surprisingly, when a state passed prohibition legislation, its industry was 
effectively shuttered.  Yet prohibition in one state led to entrepreneurial opportunities for 
would-be brewers in surrounding, wet states; founding rates in such adjacent states grew.  




Russo (2001) provides an excellent example of how federal and state levels of 
policy can combine to create opportunities for entrepreneurs that vary geographically.  In 
response to the energy crisis plaguing the U.S. in the 1970s, Congress passed a new 
federal energy bill that included the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
(PURPA).  Included in PURPA was an attempt to reduce the U.S.’s dependence on 
foreign oil by requiring electric utilities, which had previously held regional monopolies 
over both the production and distribution of electricity, to purchase power from private 
producers.  Legislators thought that the private producers would be large industrial plants 
that already had the capabilities to generate electricity as a by-product of their production 
process.  Yet the law also created an opportunity for entrepreneurs to build new power 
plants whose sole purpose would be to produce electricity and sell it to utilities.  Thus 
was born at the national level the independent power production industry.  PURPA 
mandated that utilities buy or exchange power with private producers at the “avoided 
costs of generation”—that is, the costs that utilities avoided by not producing the power 
themselves.  Electric utilities remained regulated by states, so it was left to them to set 
these costs and other terms of the exchange.  States that formally defined avoided costs 
and clearly defined the terms of exchange between the utilities and the independent 
power producers experienced higher founding rates of independent producers.  
Furthermore, states whose regulatory commissions had an accommodative relationship 
with their utilities experienced lower founding rates of independent producers.  So while 
the potential entrepreneurial opportunities were the same across states, the effective 
entrepreneurial opportunities varied by state. 
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In a study of the same industry, Sine and colleagues (Sine et al., 2005) also find 
state-level variation in the founding rate of independent power producers as well as in the 
hetereogeneity of the technologies producers used.  Among their findings, the authors 
show that greater financial support from the state and federal court rulings that upheld 
legislation favorable to private producers of power each led to increased founding rates of 
independent power producers.  In particular, founding rates were higher for producers 
using novel, and thus “riskier,” production technology. 
Collectively, these studies raise our knowledge that governments influence 
entrepreneurial behavior in ways that well exceed the fundamentals of property rights and 
taxes.  They also explore the mechanisms by which they do so.  Governments raise and 
lower barriers to entry, provide financial resources, define market boundaries, and 
legitimate an industry or a subset of firms within an industry.  When interactions occur 
between different governments either within or across levels, the results can become 
quite unpredictable. 
Yet there remains much that we still do not know.  As I stated in the introductory 
chapter, little attention is paid to the government officials that create and implement these 
policies, and even less attention is given to the notion that policies are applied with 
respect to the conditions that were already in place—conditions that could influence the 
speed and manner in which the new policy is enacted.  That is, despite an accrual of 
knowledge on the effects of policy, we are missing a sense of the effects of politics—both 
the process by which policy evolves as well as the actual leadership and control of the 
state.  In the chapters ahead, I will address these areas by considering the effect that 
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political ideology, legacy policy, and government official turnover had on the 
development of the competitive local telephone service industry. 
I start this process in the next chapter, in which I trace the history of the local 
telephone service industry from the days of Alexander Graham Bell to the present.  I pay 
special attention to the role played by state governments.  My goal is to illustrate why any 
examination of federal deregulation of the local telephone service industry in 1996 that 
does not consider state government activity both before and after 1996 is incomplete. 
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CHAPTER III:  THE LOCAL TELEPHONE SERVICE INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
Because understanding present-day issues of the local telephone service industry 
involves some knowledge of its past, I will briefly recount the history of the industry and 
the regulation thereof.3  Specifically, I will focus on the role of state regulators and why 
attention on the states is crucial for understanding how entrepreneurs and competition 
arose in response to deregulation.  This overview provides the contextual background 
upon which my theory and hypotheses in the following chapter are based. 
INDUSTRY HISTORY 
The telephony industry dates to 1876 when Alexander Graham Bell was awarded 
the patent for a device that would become known as the telephone.  The Bell Telephone 
Company, soon to emerge as American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T), held 
a patent monopoly over the U.S. telephone system until 1894.  During this time AT&T 
expanded vertically by constructing a long distance network (AT&T Long Lines) and 
acquiring the telephone equipment manufacturer Western Electric.  When patents for the 
transmitter and receiver expired, competitors rushed to fill voids in the Bell system’s 
coverage.  Over 3,000 independent telephone companies were in operation by 1902 
(Brock, 1981). 
                                                 
3 For more detailed histories of local telephone service competition, please see (Woroch, 2002) or 
(Vogelsang & Mitchell, 1997).  For an account of how the telephone industry developed with respect to 
other forms of communications, please see (Brock, 1981). 
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Though competition led to increased availability and lower prices, several 
problems emerged.  First, wherever an independent company and Bell competed directly, 
they did so with two separate telephone systems.  Users of one system could not call 
users of the other system.  The inefficiencies of this dual system fit the type of market 
failure that economists’ term a “natural monopoly.”  Second, because AT&T owned the 
only long distance network in the U.S., the independents were dependent upon their 
competitor.  The fact that AT&T was controlled at this time by J.P. Morgan and George 
F. Baker, dominant U.S. financiers of this era, effectively prevented the independents 
from constructing their own long distance network (Brooks, 1976; Gabel, 1969).  Third, 
with the power of the vertically-integrated AT&T behind it, Bell used predatory pricing 
and growth-by-acquisition strategies to drive away competitors. 
The solution to these problems was regulation.  Local municipalities were the first 
to regulate the industry, with states emerging as the primary regulating force in 1907.  As 
state efforts increased, the federal government threatened anti-trust action over AT&T’s 
abuse of its long distance and equipment holdings.  Shortly thereafter, AT&T began to 
advocate on its own to be regulated.  AT&T executives did so in order to eliminate anti-
trust issues but also to eliminate the threat of competition.  AT&T saw regulation as a 
means to earn guaranteed, stable profits.  This goal was achieved with the signing of the 
Kingsbury Commitment in 1913 and then again with the 1934 Communications Act, 
which created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  For the next several 
decades, AT&T remained the phone company for much of the U.S.  A series of lawsuits 
and rulings by the FCC in the 1950s through 1970s opened the equipment and long 
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distance industries to competition, but local service remained a regulated monopoly.  
Two landmark events changed this. 
The first major shakeup to the local telephone service industry came in 1984.  As 
a provision to the settlement of an anti-trust lawsuit filed by the Department of Justice, 
AT&T agreed to divest its local telephone companies.  AT&T’s 22 Bell Operating 
Companies were grouped into 7 newly created holding companies:  Pacific Telesis, US 
West, Southwestern Bell, Ameritech, BellSouth, Bell Atlantic, and NYNEX.  Together, 
these companies were called the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), or more 
colloquially, “Baby Bells.”  (See Figure 1 for a map of the original RBOC configuration.)  
Upon divestiture, local telephone service remained conceptualized by the architects of the 
settlement as well as by most of the country as a natural monopoly requiring strict 
regulation. 




A second shakeup of the industry occurred just 12 years later and reflects the 
transformation that had developed in conceptualizing this industry.  The purpose of the 
federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to promote competition in every 
telecommunications sector.  Specifically for the local telephone service industry, this 
meant an end to regulated monopoly power for the 7 RBOCs and over 1,400 other local 
service providers; for the first time in almost 100 years, they would have competition.  
The Act set forth broad parameters for how new entrants, called competitive local 
exchange carriers (CLECs), could compete with the incumbent local exchange carriers 
(ILECs).  Certain conditions were crucial for determining how each CLEC would operate 
its business.  ILECs had to interconnect with CLECs’ networks, sell their services to 
CLECs at state-regulated wholesale prices, and unbundle their networks into piecemeal 
elements available to CLECs at state-regulated prices.  This led to 3 types of CLECs:  
those that owned their own network (facilities-based), those that resold ILEC services 
under their own brand (resellers), and those that owned parts of their own networks (e.g., 
switching equipment) and leased other elements (e.g., the local loop into a home or 
business) from the ILEC (hybrid). 
Reaction to the telecom act was swift.  Entrepreneurs and investors alike rushed in 
trying to secure even a sliver of the $100 billion market.  Hundreds of new companies 
offering local service were founded almost immediately and raised billions of dollars in 
capital.  Yet as the stock market fell in early 2000, so too did the hopes of those running 
and investing in the CLECs.  By the end of 2002, scores of CLECs filed for bankruptcy, 
were acquired, or shut down altogether (Crandall, 2005).  Entrepreneurial interest waned 
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at this point, though the industry has survived and has shown signs of renewal as CLECs 
collectively comprise nearly 20% of the local telephone service market (FCC, 2006). 
This is where most accounts of the industry stop.  Yet I contend that a true 
understanding of the transition of the industry requires knowing the role played by state 
regulators and legislators.  More than anything else, I believe that it was their actions that 
led the industry to be deregulated at the federal level and that have shaped the patterns of 
entry and expansion exhibited since. 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
As mentioned previously, states began regulating the industry in earnest in 1907, 
and by 1914 over 75% did so to some degree.  Variation emerged across four major 
forms of regulation (Cohen, 1992).  States (1) controlled the prices that providers could 
charge subscribers; (2) mandated interconnection between the Bell system and the 
independents; (3) adopted anti-discrimination policies so that all who could afford service 
would have equal opportunity to receive it (i.e., providers could not focus exclusively on 
the customers they deemed most profitable); and (4) established separate regulatory 
commissions, usually called public utility commissions (PUCs), to oversee these 
functions. 
The original federal regulation was considered to be very weak, and states 
maintained their previous positions.  This changed when the U.S. Congress passed the 
Communications Act of 1934.  This act pre-empted state policy and left states with few 
responsibilities aside from setting local rates and determining standards for service 
quality.  The principles of universal service and the telephone system as a public good led 
states to set rates higher for businesses rather than for residential consumers and for urban 
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rather than for rural areas, as well as to raise long distance prices in order to subsidize 
local rates (Cohen, 1992). 
The break-up of AT&T marked a rebirth for the role of state regulators.  With 
intrastate and interstate services no longer dominated by a single company, states were 
once again granted much more autonomy and control over regulating local service. 
In chronicling the post-1984 regulatory histories of each state, Abel and Clements 
(1998) describe nine different levels of regulation used by states, ranging from traditional 
ratebase rate-of-return to full deregulation.  Many studies of state regulation of 
telecommunications during this era simplify this typology into 2 classes:  traditional rate-
of-return regulation and incentive regulation (e.g., Ai & Sappington, 2002; Donald & 
Sappington, 1995; Sappington & Weisman, 1996).  Ratebase rate-of-return regulation is 
the most traditional form of regulating utilities.  Regulators set a utility’s prices at a level 
that will cover the utility’s costs plus an amount commensurate with a fair return on the 
utility’s investments.  (For this reason, traditional rate-of-return regulation is sometimes 
referred to as “cost-plus regulation.”)  Traditional rate-of-return regulation therefore all 
but guarantees a fixed return for the utility based on its costs.  There is virtually no 
incentive to the utility for lowering its costs and little incentive to develop new products.  
To address these short comings, regulators introduced incentive-based regulation.  
Through earnings sharing programs, price caps, and pricing flexibility, regulators tried to 
encourage providers to lower costs, improve quality, and introduce new services.   
Following the AT&T divestiture, states were quick to shift away from traditional 
ratebase rate-of-return regulation.  Figure 2 and Figure 3 displays this trend among states 
in the continental U.S.  Iowa was the first state to use a different type of regulation and 
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did so right away in 1984.  Seven more states followed in each of 1985 and 1986.  By 
1987, when 12 more states abandoned the traditional form of regulation, more than half 
the country had done so.  In 1996, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Wyoming 
became the final three states to leave behind traditional ratebase rate-of-return regulation. 
Figure 2. Cumulative number of states that had stopped using traditional ratebase rate-of-return 
regulation for the local telephone service industry, 1984-1996 

















Figure 3. Cartographical representation of when states moved away from traditional ratebase rate-
of-return regulation of the local telephone service industry, 1984-1996 
 





But leaving traditional ratebase rate-of-return regulation did not mean that a state 
immediately began employing a full-blown incentive structure.  States sometimes took 
mere “baby steps” toward incentive-based regulation.  For instance, some states switched 
to “banded rate-of-return regulation.”  Rather than set one specific earnings target for a 
utility, the commission would set prices to fall within a range (or band) of earnings.  The 
narrower the range, the more this regulation operated just like traditional ratebase rate-of-
return (Abel & Clements, 1998).  For the purposes of this dissertation, I consider a state’s 
regulation to be incentive-based if it is accompanied by a noticeable shift away from the 
rate-of-return framework of regulators setting utility prices to correspond with target 
utility earnings.  This includes indexed price caps (commission sets a maximum price that 
utilities can charge), rate freezes (agreements by the commission to not adjust prices for a 
specified period of time; formalized “regulatory lag”), pricing flexibility for competitive 
services (commission greatly relaxes its regulation for aspects of a utility’s service if 
sufficient competition for such services is present), or full deregulation.  (See Abel & 
Clements, 1998; Sappington & Weisman, 1996 for more details.) 
Together, Figure 4 and Figure 5 provide an illustration of how incentive-based 
regulation had spread and was being practiced when the federal Telecommunications Act 
was passed in 1996.  Figure 4 shows that 22 of the 48 continental United States were still 
using a variant of traditional rate-of-return regulation in 1996.  Figure 5 shows that 28 of 
the 48 continental United States had some experience with incentive-based regulation as 
well as how much experience each state had.  On average, states in 1996 had 2.19 years 
of experience with incentive-based regulation (σ2 = 7.65).  Because some states had 
experimented with incentive-based regulation before switching back to rate-of-return 
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regulation before 1996, the two maps are not complementary.  For example, Arkansas (2 
years), Washington (5 years) and Vermont (6 years) each used incentive-based regulation 
after 1984 but had reverted back to a variant of rate-of-return regulation by 1996. 
Figure 4. Type of local telephone regulation used by states in 1996 
 
Black: state used variant of rate-of-
return regulation in 1996 
 
White: state used incentive-based 
regulation in 1996 
 
Figure 5. State experience with incentive-based regulation as of 1996 
 
Darker colors represent more 
years of experience with 
incentive-based regulation 
The federal 1996 Telecommunications Act once again pre-empted individual state 
policy, but unlike the period between 1934 and 1984, states continued to wield 
substantial influence on the local service industry.  States had responsibility for setting 
parameters of the federal act and for its implementation.  They licensed new providers, 
set retail and wholesale rates, determined the prices CLECs would pay to lease unbundled 
elements of the ILECs’ networks, and mediated disputes between CLECs and ILECs.  
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Since 1996, states have varied substantially along almost each of these dimensions 
(Perez-Chavolla, 2007). 
States, therefore, have played and continue to play a large role in the development 
of the competitive local telephony sector.  That alone is at odds with the typical 
impression of deregulation.  But how easy was that transition from regulation to 
deregulation?  After all, enacting policy is like following the directions for ready-to-
assemble furniture … when the directions are written in a foreign language, the parts are 
not labeled, and the only way to know if it has been assembled correctly is if a directions 
judge rules that it is correct or if nobody complains about what has been done. 
On top of this is the fact that the state actors tasked with enacting such policy, to 
again draw from Vogel, “do not interpret or arbitrate in a neutral fashion.  They bring to 
this role specific ideological biases and institutional capabilities” (Vogel, 1996: 268).  
The people responsible for this transition—state commissioners and the regulatory 
staff—were, for the more part, enculturated in the monopoly era.  Either their mental 
models of the local telephony industry had to change, or the people themselves had to be 
replaced with those not locked into seeing the industry through lenses of monopoly. 
Therefore, could the transition from monopoly to competition have been easier for 
those states whose officials embraced market solutions?  Was a state’s experience with 
incentive-based regulation prior to 1996 helpful in creating the policies, procedures, and 
overall culture that would encourage potential entrepreneurs to start CLECs in the state?  
Or were new state actors who were unencumbered by the mental schemas of monopoly 
regulation the necessary catalysts for CLEC industry growth?  In the next chapter, I will 
explore each of these questions, as well as other aspects of a state’s political environment, 
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as I develop my theory for how state-level political environments influenced the rate at 
which the CLEC industry developed across states. 
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CHAPTER IV:  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I develop my theory and hypotheses regarding the growth of the 
competitive local telephone service industry.  I examine growth at two different levels of 
analysis:  the state-level and the firm-level.  At the state-level of analysis, I consider 
aspects of a state’s political environment—its political ideology and regulatory history as 
well as changes within its government officials—that theory suggests would make the 
state more attractive or less attractive to potential CLEC entrants.  The same is true for 
the firm-level of analysis, where I examine certain characteristics of a state’s political 
environment—again, its political ideology, regulatory history, and political regime 
stability as well as which incumbent local carrier it is served by—that make the state a 
desirable expansion target for an existing CLEC.  Due to the high degree of overlap 
between the predictors in my studies, I choose to develop hypotheses for both levels in 
this chapter.  This simultaneous look at state-level founding rates and firm-level growth 
rates is consistent with what Carroll and Hannan have noted:  “Any process that makes it 
easier for entrepreneurs to mobilize resources ought also to make it easier for existing 
organizations to grow” (2000: 218). 
Yet theorizing about foundings and expansions is not as simple as stating that 
each desirable characteristic of a state’s political environment should yield higher 
founding rates and a higher likelihood that CLECs will expand into the state.  The two 
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analyses have a subtle but fundamental difference in the set of firms known to be at risk 
of market entry.  At the state-level, the set of CLECs making a decision to enter the state 
are unknown.  Foundings, therefore, become properties of the population, the unit of 
analysis becomes the state, and variance in founding rates must be explained by 
properties of the population of CLECs or the state environment.  At the firm-level, the 
analysis is different.  When investigating the states into which a CLEC expands its 
service, it implies that the firm has already begun operations.  This limits the risk set of 
entry to only those firms that are already in existence, and firm-level predictors can be 
added to the model.  Doing so allows a researcher to conduct a more refined and 
organization-specific analysis of why firms choose to expand into certain states but not 
others.  While there may be something about a state per se that makes it attractive to 
CLECs, it may instead be something about the firm with respect to a state that makes that 
state an attractive expansion target. 
To facilitate comprehension, I will now outline the structure this chapter: 
• First, I will discuss state political ideology and present my theory for how I 
believe the ideology of a state’s elected officials and citizens will be related to 
state-level founding rates of CLECs. 
• Next, I will introduce a concept I call the institutional endowment of a state, 
which in this case refers to a state’s regulatory history of the local telephone 
industry.  I theorize about the relationship between a state’s institutional 
endowment and its founding rates. 
• Following this, I develop my first hypotheses at the firm-level.  Using the 
previous concepts, I argue that CLECs will be more likely to expand into states 
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whose political ideology and institutional endowment is similar to that of its 
founding state.  The basis of my argument is Stinchcombe’s imprinting hypothesis 
(1965). 
• Next, I continue theorizing at the firm-level by discussing a concept that is unique 
to that perspective of growth.  The breakup of AT&T in 1984 structured the local 
telephone service industry such that residents and businesses within each state 
were served by one of seven dominant incumbent providers.  Even though 
deregulation did away with geographical restrictions on where local carriers could 
offer service, I hypothesize about how this “legacy policy” may have shaped 
CLEC expansion decisions due to where a CLEC initially began offering service. 
• I then consider how changes in the government officials that oversee the local 
telephone service industry and changes in the gubernatorial office can affect 
market entry decisions at both levels of analysis. 
• The last topic I consider is how the effects discussed above may diminish over 
time as the industry gained legitimacy. 
Hypotheses that are related to the state-level analysis conducted in Chapter V are 
prefixed with “H1.”.  Firm-level hypotheses, analyzed in Chapter VI are prefixed with 
“H2.”. 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
An ideology is “is a set of beliefs about how the social world operates, including 
ideas about what outcomes are desirable and how they best can be achieved” (Simons & 
Ingram, 1997: 784).  Ideologies ultimately yield specific actions (Apter, 1964: 17).  A 
political ideology, then, is a coherent set of beliefs about the functioning of a society and 
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the role of government.  With respect to the domain of business, one’s political ideology 
typically refers to whether one believes that market forces or government actors are the 
most efficient distributors of goods and services. 
Organization researchers have demonstrated a number of ways that political 
ideology shapes organizational behavior.  With few exceptions, such studies involve 
ideologies held by the organization and its members.  The most overt examples are those 
organizations created with the express purpose of promoting a political ideology and 
enacting political and social change, such as political parties and social movement 
organizations.  Political ideologies have been shown to have effects on the design and 
functioning of individual organizations, such as the level of bureaucracy, or as 
Rothschild-Whitt (1979) documents in her research on collectivist organizations, the lack 
thereof.  At the population-level, researchers have examined the ecology of ideologically-
driven organizations as it pertains to changes in organization form (Simons & Ingram, 
1997), founding rates (Simons & Ingram, 2003), competition (Barnett & Woywode, 
2004), and mutualism (Ingram & Simons, 2000). 
My interest lies not in the political ideologies held by the organizations 
themselves whose behavior is being studied but in the political ideologies of other actors 
in their field.  One example of this is how the political ideology of Progressivism 
influenced the founding rate of thrifts in California in the early 20th century (Haveman, 
Rao, & Paruchuri, 2007).  Initially thrifts had been established as mutual organizations of 
“friendly cooperation among neighbors.”  By the end of the 1920s, the thrift industry in 
California became dominated instead by thrifts that looked like “bureaucratized 
cooperation among strangers.”  Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri argue that this 
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transformation was caused by the echoes of the Progressive movement and its ideology 
of bureaucracy with centralized power.  In California, the extent to which Progressivism 
ideals were supported varied greatly across regions.  Counties in which the ideals of this 
movement had become entrenched, as reflected by whether any municipalities within the 
county had adopted a city-manager form of government, saw an increase in the founding 
rate of this new bureaucratized form of thrifts. 
For competitive local telephony, I theorize a similar relationship between the 
political ideology of a state’s elected government officials and citizens and the founding 
rate of CLECs within the state.  The 1996 Telecommunications Act was passed because 
federal legislators believed that even regulated competition was preferable to a 
monopoly.  But because the federal act required state implementation and oversight, the 
extent to which a state’s officials embraced the ideals of such competition should 
contribute to whether regulators set parameters that would encourage new entrants, keep 
incumbents from anti-competitive practices, and promote the industry to would-be 
entrepreneurs.  The political ideology of a state’s citizens should also contribute to the 
development of the CLEC industry.  As an electorate, citizens would be more likely to 
push their officials for more competition, and as consumers, they would be more aware of 
and more attentive to competitive services. 
Federal deregulation may suggest a degree of nationwide agreement in the 
appropriateness of transforming the local telephone industry from monopoly to markets.  
Yet as with any political process, the passage of the telecom act in no way constitutes 
uniform agreement over its goals or processes.  One of the distinguishing characteristics 
of the United States is that individual states exhibit widespread diversity in a variety of 
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social areas (e.g., Putnam, 2000).  This includes their opinions in business-government 
relations.  Examples of these differences include a traditionalistic culture in Southern 
states (Elazar, 1984), a frontier independence in Western states (Yardley, 2007), and 
Progressivism in states like Wisconsin (Conant, 2006). 
A penchant for free market control is associated with conservative ideology (i.e., 
Republicans), thus I theorize that states with a more conservative government ideology 
will be more likely to set the appropriate parameters of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act that would encourage entrepreneurs to become CLECs.  This leads to the hypothesis 
that a conservative government ideology should be associated with more competitors 
offering local telephone service. 
H1.1a: States with a more conservative government ideology will have 
higher founding rates of CLECs. 
Likewise, a state whose citizens exhibit a conservative ideology should be more 
likely to elect officials that would promote the industry, and such citizens would be more 
demanding of and receptive to competition.  I therefore hypothesize that a conservative 
citizen ideology should be associated with more competitors offering local telephone 
service. 
H1.1b: States with a more conservative citizen ideology will have higher 
founding rates of CLECs. 
INSTITUTIONAL ENDOWMENT 
Organizational research on the effects of policy tends to focus on how present 
conditions influence present and future outcomes:  a new law is passed, the slate is wiped 
clean, and the actions subsequently taken by state actors or the changes in environmental 
conditions are all that matter to shaping entrepreneurship and competition.  An historical 
view suggests otherwise (Weir & Skocpol, 1985).  David Stark (1996) provides a vivid 
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illustration of how history matters with his study of the development of capitalism in 
post-socialist Hungary after the fall of communism.  Stark concluded that it was only 
natural that capitalism in Eastern Europe would look different than capitalism elsewhere.  
Why?  Because “organizations and institutions [are rebuilt] not on the ruins but with the 
ruins of [previous conditions]” (1996: 995).  The starting point for capitalism in Eastern 
Europe was not the same was in Western Europe or in Asia, thus leading to different 
outcomes.  Or in the macabre words of Marx, 
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances 
directly found, given and transmitted from the past.  The tradition of all the dead 
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (1852/1978). 
 
In other words, social processes, including institutionalization, are endowed by past 
conditions, decisions, and processes. 
The same can be said for the development of competitive local telephony.  When 
federal legislation was passed in 1996 to open local telephony to competition, many 
states had already been trying to accomplish the same effect for up to 12 years.  These 
state initiatives resulted in policies, procedures, and even pro-competition cultures that 
could be used as starting points for implementing new federal prescriptions or that could 
serve as a proxy for how motivated states were to enact policy that would attract 
competitors to their states.  I therefore anticipate that the actions taken by states before 
the federal 1996 Telecommunications Act will help explain how the industry evolves 
after 1996. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, scholars of utility regulation typically 
classify the myriad regulatory programs into two classes:  traditional ratebase rate-of-
return regulation and incentive-based regulation (e.g., Ai & Sappington, 2002; Donald & 
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Sappington, 1995; Sappington & Weisman, 1996).  Rate-of-return regulation all but 
guarantees a fixed return for the utility based on its costs.  Yet under rate-of-return 
regulation, a utility has little to no incentive to lower its costs or to innovate.  Regulators 
introduced incentive-based regulation such as price caps and pricing flexibility to address 
these short comings.  In doing so, regulators tried to encourage utilities to lower costs, 
improve quality, and introduce new services.  This transformation from traditional rate-
of-return regulation to incentive regulation is accompanied by less direct input on the part 
of the regulator in setting the providers’ rates.  Taken to the limit, then, incentive 
regulation becomes deregulation, competitors replace monopolies, and firms become 
regulated by markets as opposed to state actors.  Hence, the use of the rate-of-return 
model yields the greatest “policy distance” from deregulation; states employing rate-of-
return regulation would have the largest gap to close in both regulation details and in 
regulatory mindset. 
In the previous chapter, I described how the divestiture of AT&T in 1984 led 
many states to abandon the traditional regulatory approach and to begin experimenting 
with incentive-based regulation.  Yet 22 of the 48 continental United States were still 
using a variant of rate-of-return regulation when the federal deregulation was passed in 
1996.  If policy distance from deregulation is indeed proportional to the efforts state 
actors took to implement prescriptions from the federal telecommunications act, then I 
anticipate that states still using rate-of-return regulation in 1996 will lag behind in 
creating regulatory environments conducive to CLEC entry relative to states that were 
using incentive-based regulation and should have lower CLEC founding rates. 
H1.2a: States that in 1996 were still using a variant of traditional rate-of-
return regulation will have lower founding rates of CLECs. 
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While the consideration of initial conditions is an important part of institutional 
theory, looking at one snapshot of time can be misleading.  For instance, it should not be 
assumed that all states passed legislation with equal enthusiasm or because it fit the needs 
of each state’s economy and society.  States often emulate other states’ decisions to 
establish policy (Ingram & Rao, 2004; Pavalko, 1989; Soule & Zylan, 1997; Zhou, 1993).  
Thus some states may have been more ideologically committed to the change than others.  
Also, states that passed incentive regulation and even pro-competition legislation earlier 
would have had more time to develop the processes and culture that could be leveraged 
with the legitimacy of federal legislation. 
An early and important finding within the institutional theory literature is that 
early adopters enact change for technical reasons while later adopters tend to do so only 
after the practice has become legitimated.  For example, when the practice of civil service 
reform spread across cities, a strong predictor at the beginning of the diffusion process of 
whether a city would adopt civil service procedures was the internal characteristics of the 
city.  Once the practice had become institutionalized, such technical characteristics no 
longer predicted adoption (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  Furthermore, early adopters can 
differ from late adopters in how they apply new practices.  A study of TQM adoption 
across more than 2,700 U.S. hospitals finds that early adopters are more likely to apply 
only select aspects of TQM while late adopters apply conventional forms of the standard, 
thus fitting with the idea that early adopters are more likely to adopt for reasons of 
efficiency rather than legitimacy (Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). 
In the case of the local telephone service industry, it may be that early adoption of 
incentive-based regulation reflects an underlying sense of pro-competition commitment 
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on the part of those states’ legislators and regulators that is missing among late adopters.  
As described in the previous chapter, states varied greatly both in whether and in how 
long they had been using incentive-based regulation.  By 1996, states had, on average, 
2.19 years (σ2 = 7.65) of incentive-based regulation experience as 28 of the 48 
continental United States had at some time shifted away from traditional rate-of-return 
regulation.  In line with institutional theory, I therefore anticipate that states with more 
experience using incentive-based regulation not only had more time to develop policies 
and cultures that moved away from monopoly regulation but were also the states most 
committed to developing competition within local telephony.  These states should 
therefore have higher CLEC founding rates. 
H1.2b: States with more experience with incentive regulation before 1996 
will have higher founding rates of CLECs. 
FOUNDING CONDITIONS 
Although aspects of a state’s political environment may make the state more 
attractive or less attractive when compared with other states on average, for individual 
CLECs the question of what makes a state an attractive market opportunity may be more 
complicated..  Firms making decisions on how to grow their business may be guided—or 
constrained—by where and when they were founded, a condition referred to in the 
organization literature as imprinting.  According to Stinchcombe, organizations are 
constructed with the “social technology” available at the time of founding (p. 153).  An 
example of where this can be seen is in the evolution of the retail industry:  department 
stores of the mid-19th century reflected a concentration of population in urban areas as 
well as the development of public transportation, mail order catalogs in the late-19th 
century emerged with the introduction of long-haul transportation, the indoor shopping 
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malls developed in the mid-20th century as people moved to the suburbs and the auto 
became king, and now online retailers are everywhere thanks to the Internet.  Whether the 
founding structures remain the most efficient option for an organization or whether 
institutionalizing forces are instead the cause, an organization’s original structures and 
strategies often remain in place and create “a correlation between the time in history an 
organization was founded and its organizational structure, even decades later” (Scott & 
Davis, 2006: 319). 
I extend these arguments of Stinchcombe here to consider how the founding 
conditions of a CLEC may have shaped its future decisions to expand its operations.  
Although some CLECs were founded with the purpose of immediately serving much of 
the country, most others started in one state and then expanded elsewhere as the resources 
and opportunities permitted (McDermott, 2002).  For many entrepreneurs, this first state 
was likely their home state or a state in which they understood the market very well and 
was what they had in mind when constructing their firm.  A CLEC would acquire specific 
knowledge and resources and choose an appropriate organizational structure, all of which 
would ultimately bear the imprint of its founding state. 
What I argue here is that these organizational characteristics subsequently affect 
which markets a firm decides to enter.  States that match a firm’s founding state should 
appear as better opportunities than other states where a firm’s skill sets will not apply as 
well.  In particular, I consider a state’s political ideology and regulatory conditions.  I 
have suggested in previous sections that the ideology of a state likely represents how 
receptive the idea of a competitive telephony industry is within the state.  As such, the 
ideology of a CLEC’s founding state could subsequently determine the type of climate in 
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which a CLEC was suited to operate—i.e., one in which the CLEC battled for its slice of 
a growing and demanding market or one in which the CLEC itself had to work to 
demonstrate the need for its services to potential consumers.  Regulatory conditions are 
also very important as they could influence the uncertainty of the environment and the 
degree of flexibility a CLEC had for acting.  How a CLEC was allowed to set its prices, 
whether costs for leasing elements from an ILEC were set permanently or allowed to 
fluctuate, and whether a regulatory agency played an active or passive role in helping 
CLECs reach agreements with ILECs were all crucial elements for firms deciding 
whether a state was worth entering.  It follows from this that given a choice between two 
otherwise equivalent states, a CLEC should be more likely to expand into the state that 
matches the ideology and regulatory conditions of its founding state. 
H2.1a: A CLEC will be more likely to expand into a state with a 
government ideology similar to its founding state. 
H2.1b: A CLEC will be more likely to expand into a state with a citizen 
ideology similar to its founding state. 
H2.2a: A CLEC will be more likely to expand into a state that in 1996 had 
similar local telephone regulation as its founding state. 
H2.2b: A CLEC will be more likely to expand into a state that has similar 
pre-1996 experience with incentive regulation as its founding state. 
LEGACY POLICY 
As I have argued before, one cannot understand how the competitive telephone 
service industry developed based solely on the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  One must 
also take into account the effects of the 1984 divestiture of AT&T as that set in motion 
both state regulatory activity as well as set the boundaries of the new, dominant 
incumbent carriers.  The geographic boundaries used to create the RBOCs in 1984 were 
essentially arbitrary.  The objective of creating the RBOCs was to divide the 22 Bell 
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operating companies into 7 holding companies that were of essentially equal size, with 
each RBOC covering a contiguous geographic area.  Thus the fact that Ohio and 
Pennsylvania fell under the control of different RBOCs reflects nothing about inherent 
similarities or differences between the markets of the two states.  Aside from any 
economic differences, a competitive service provider that began in Ohio should have 
been equally likely to extend its service into Pennsylvania as it was to extend into, say, 
Michigan, a state within the same RBOC territory as Ohio. 
Yet previous RBOC boundaries remain curiously adhered to by many CLECs.  
For example, consider the history of Sage Telecom, a CLEC founded in Allen, Texas in 
1997.  At the time, Texas was the territory of RBOC SBC, whose territory also covered 
Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma.  Sage remained exclusively in Texas 
through 2001.  Over the next year, they expanded into those four—and only those four—
states.  Sage has since expanded into six additional states, but only after SBC had 
acquired its peer RBOCs Pacific Telesis (California) and Ameritech (Illinois, Michigan, 
Ohio, and Wisconsin) as well as independent provider Southern New England Telephone 
(Connecticut).  The only state in SBC—now AT&T—territory in which Sage did not 
operate at the time of AT&T’s acquisition of BellSouth is Nevada. 
There are two ways in which I believe that the 1984 settlement remained 
important in influencing CLECs’ decisions after 1996:  reduced transaction costs and 
cognitive inertia.  First, interacting with the same partner repeatedly (provided that 
previous relationships have been positive) reduces many non-operating costs, such as 
search costs and legal costs (Williamson, 1985).  Furthermore, the RBOCs themselves 
seemed to be encouraging such behavior.  Shortly after the passage of the 1996 act, the 
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RBOCs began to offer multi-state agreements to the CLECs.  Instead of an agreement 
that covered a relationship between a CLEC and BellSouth in Georgia, the agreement 
would also hold for other states in BellSouth’s territory (Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee).  The CLEC 
would still need to become a licensed carrier within each of these states before being 
allowed to provide service, but the multi-state agreements represented a substantial 
savings in legal costs to both the CLECs and the RBOCs. 
But more than just a matter of cost, I believe that the RBOC boundaries were a 
psychological barrier to expansion.  Here I extend the argument by Barnett and Carroll 
(1993) in explaining why states that had more local political units (e.g., number of 
incorporated towns and cities, counties) such as Iowa and New York, also had more 
independent telephone companies in the early 1900s.  One explanation Barnett and 
Carroll give is that more political units meant more steps to be taken before one could 
offer service throughout a state:  more charters, more rights-of-way, etc.  Yet Barnett and 
Carroll also suggest that boundaries of this sort came to be the taken-for-granted 
conceptions of markets.  When deciding where to offer service, telephone entrepreneurs 
of the day simply accepted these political boundaries as definitions of markets. 
In a similar way, I believe that this cognitive inertia played a role in determining 
where CLECs chose to operate after 1996.  In other words, it was not that an Ohio service 
provider always explicitly chose Michigan over Pennsylvania in a head-to-head decision 
simply because the costs of going to Michigan were cheaper, but that the mere thought of 
expanding service from Ohio to elsewhere led the CLEC to think about entering 
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Michigan before it thought about entering Pennsylvania because Michigan and Ohio were 
in the same higher-level market. 
This reasoning leads me to hypothesize that the pattern of expansion among 
CLECs will not flow freely with the tides of profit opportunities as the 1996 
Telecommunications Act might predict but will instead cluster according to the RBOC 
boundaries, a remnant of policy from 1984. 
H2.3: A CLEC will be more likely to expand into a state when it has a pre-
existing relationship with the RBOC of that state. 
POLITICAL REGIME CHANGE 
A consistent criticism of institutional theory is that its proponents tend to take an 
oversocialized approach that is devoid of agency and often people (Davis & Powell, 
1992; DiMaggio, 1988; Perrow, 1986).  Early work on institutions was not always that 
way.  One of the founding statements on what is often referred to as ‘old’ 
institutionalism, Selznick’s Leadership in Administration (1957), provides a theoretical 
and normative look at leadership’s role in organizations and institutions.  According to 
Selznick, leaders help define an organization’s mission with distinctive values and then 
“create a social structure which embodies them” (1957: 60).  As changes in leadership 
occur, so too can changes in institutional values. 
Evolutionary theorists also point to the singular ability of executive leadership to 
enact change.  Even in periods such as regulatory upheaval, “[e]nvironments do not cause 
reorientations.  Rather, direct responsive activity which intervenes on prior activity 
patterns and establishes new patterns is required for reorientations to occur” (Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985: 210).  If not punctuating events themselves, then new leaders bring 
with them fresh perspectives that enable them to initiate strategic reorientations. 
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Kraatz and Moore’s (2002) study on American liberal arts colleges demonstrates 
the impact that new leadership can have on changing institutionalized organizations.  The 
rise of professional programs within liberal arts colleges coincided with these colleges 
hiring new presidents, particularly presidents with previous experience with professional 
programs or who came from lower status schools.  Fligstein (1990), too, points to the role 
that leadership changes play in enacting institutional change.  Anti-trust legislation alone 
did not directly lead to, say, the rise of the multidivisional form among large corporations 
but was mediated by the hiring of leaders who had a finance background.  For such 
leaders, it was natural to think of unrelated companies as a portfolio of assets that they 
could manage. 
This focus on leadership and institutional change can be applied to the political 
environments faced by organizations both individually and collectively.  An 
underappreciated point in Stinchcombe’s far-ranging essay on the relationship between 
social structure and organizations (1965) is that change in a political environment can act 
as a punctuating moment that may disrupt the status quo enjoyed by older, existing 
organizations and provide opportunities for new entrants to emerge.  Or as Aldrich and 
Ruef note, “Changes in governance structures and political regimes may benefit younger, 
less-well-established organizations by weakening connections between older 
organizations and the political elite” (2006: 174).  Similar arguments have been made that 
call for more attention to ways in which a changing political environment influences 
organizational behavior and population dynamics (Carroll et al., 1988). 
To date, most of the research on the relationships between political change and 
foundings of organizations has focused on the impact of political upheaval (e.g., 
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Delacroix & Carroll, 1983) or of the adoption of new policy (e.g., Dobbin & Dowd, 
1997) while little has considered the actual role of state actors.  One notable exception is 
Russo’s (2001) study of the independent power production industry, which I first 
reviewed in Chapter II.  Independent power production has several similar characteristics 
to competitive local telephony.  Federal legislation created the industry in 1978 by 
requiring the existing electric utilities to purchase power from independent producers.  
States, however, were responsible for setting many of the details of the federal act.  Russo 
found that the governmental bodies responsible for this process—state regulatory 
commissions—were influential in how the industry developed across states.  Some of this 
involved specific actions taken by the commissions.  For instance, the founding rates of 
independent power producers were higher when state regulatory bodies standardized the 
terms of exchange between the independents and the utilities.  Yet the relationship 
between the commission and the incumbent utility was also pivotal for the independent 
power producers’ life chances.  Long-standing, collegial relationships between state 
commissions and incumbents could lead the commission to favor the incumbents, thus 
delaying and suppressing competitive entry.  Indeed, Russo found that founding rates 
were lower in states where there was an accommodative pre-existing relationship 
between the regulators and the utilities.  One could therefore theorize that if these 
accommodating regulators were replaced, the environment would become more favorable 
for the independent producers thereby leading to an increase in founding rates. 
Broader changes in political leadership also can have an influence on 
corporations.  New political leaders can be elected with promises to promote particular 
types of policies, including legislation that encourages new entrants in a given industry.  
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And following Aldrich and Ruef’s comment above, in a situation such as the deregulation 
of an existing monopoly, new political leaders can also be important to potential 
entrepreneurs because this turnover in leadership levels the playing field with respect to 
the relationships between the competing organizations and the political elite. 
Here I test this theory of political regime change in the competitive local 
telephony industry.  My general proposition is that a change in the political power 
structure will break any pre-existing link between incumbent service providers and state 
actors to the benefit of entrepreneurs.  This change should be perceptible at both the state-
level and firm-level of analysis.  The two bodies of government that I consider are the 
ones with the most power to influence the industry’s development:  the public utilities 
commission office and the governor’s office. 
State public utilities commissions have the final responsibility for implementing 
the provisions of the federal act.  This includes setting the wholesale rates at which 
CLECs can obtain a product from the ILECs, arbitrating any difficulties CLECs have in 
securing their necessary agreements with the ILECs, and, ultimately, issuing certificates 
of public convenience and necessity that allow CLECs to legally operate.  As part of their 
decision to enter business in a particular state, operators of CLECs had to assess the 
extent to which the state’s commission had eased barriers to entry.  Kraatz and Moore 
(2002) point out two ways that new commissioners may benefit CLECs in this context.  
First, new leaders may bring with them new mental models and assumptions.  This helps 
overcome the ingrained, institutionalized beliefs that often remain resistant to change 
even when viable alternatives exist (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2001).  Second, 
new leaders may attenuate or even replace institutionalized values of an organization.  As 
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these values are often put forward and upheld by leadership (Selznick, 1957), it follows 
that new leadership brings with it the potential for new values.  Within public utility 
commissions, then, new commissioners could be the necessary catalyst for transforming a 
commission’s approach away from a model of traditional regulation and toward one of 
competition, all to the benefit of CLECs. 
H1.3a: States with at least one new public utilities commissioner will have 
higher founding rates of CLECs. 
H2.4a: A CLEC will be more likely to expand into a state that has at least 
one new public utilities commissioner. 
Though individual commissioners play an important role in regulating utilities, 
commissions are groups ranging from 3 to 7 commissioners.  While a new commissioner 
may bring with him/her a new idea on the issue of local telephony, he/she may not be 
able to convince the rest of the commission of its merits or may simply not feel 
comfortable attempting to do so.  The question of when and how an individual might 
influence a group is a long-studied topic within social psychology.  Though those holding 
a minority opinion can change the opinions of other group members (Moscovici, Lage, & 
Naffrechoux, 1969), quite often minorities comply with or conform to the group’s 
dominant position (Asch, 1955; Sherif, 1936).  Creating change in a commission may, 
therefore, require change in a group-level characteristic of the commission.  One such 
instance of change is when the replacement of commissioners leads to a change in which 
political party is in control of the commission.  Such a change in the commission’s power 
structure may be necessary for the commission to put forth new values and agendas, 
including the embrace of local telephone competition. 
H1.3b: States with a new political party in control of its commission will 
have higher founding rates of CLECs. 
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H2.4b: A CLEC will be more likely to expand into a state with a new 
political party in control of its commission. 
In addition to considering binary “new/not new” measures of change, it may be 
more appropriate to view change on a continuum at both the individual and group levels.  
At the individual level, I consider the average tenure of a commissioner.  Almost by 
definition, commissioners that have served longer are more likely to have developed 
working relationships with incumbents.  Furthermore, they are also more likely to have 
become enculturated into the commission during the monopoly era.  Lower average 
tenure increases the chances of breaking old political ties and of introducing new 
approaches that support the new paradigm of competition. 
H1.3c: States with longer tenured commissioners will have lower founding 
rates of CLECs. 
H2.4c: A CLEC will be more likely to expand into a state with shorter 
tenured commissioners. 
Likewise, if new commissioners can be successful in gaining support for their 
ideas, then the amount of time that a commission has been intact as a unit could be a 
meaningful measure of a commission’s ability to accept change and of weakening 
relations with incumbents. 
H1.3d: States with longer tenured commissions will have lower founding 
rates of CLECs. 
H2.4d: A CLEC will be more likely to expand into a state with shorter 
tenured commissions. 
The governor’s office has also played an important role in the development of 
telecommunications policy and industry.  One indirect influence is via the regulatory 
commission in states where commissioners are governor appointmees.  Yet many 
governors also took a strong interest in the telecommunications industry because of its 
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state-level benefits.  Bonnett (1996) notes that state leaders saw telecommunications as a 
means to more efficiently disseminate information to citizens, to improve the 
management of state agencies, and to stimulate a state’s economic development.  
Especially as concerns for the economy and unemployment rose, this last reason became 
particularly important.  An improved telecommunications infrastructure could lead to 
economic development by (1) attracting firms to the state, (2) making firms already in the 
area more productive, and (3) reducing the regional economic stratification between a 
state’s urban and rural areas (Read & Youtie, 1996). 
By 1996, governors had begun acting in a way that showed their belief in the 
causality between telecommunications and an improved economy.  Assuming that a 
superior telecommunications infrastructure would attract call centers, telemarketers, and 
data processing centers, Nebraska’s leaders deregulated its local telephone service rates 
in the mid-1980s to encourage telecom providers to build more capacity and introduce 
more services (Mueller, 1993).  Though rates themselves did not fall as predicted by 
economic theory, companies did flock to Nebraska making Omaha the “1-800 capital of 
the world” (Maney, 2004). 
Wisconsin’s Governor Tommy Thompson likewise recognized the economic 
importance being placed on telecommunications.  In the early 1990’s he created a Blue 
Ribbon Telecommunications Infrastructure Task Force.  The purpose of doing so was 
stated very clearly:  “Nearly every aspect of our lives is being revolutionized by 
telecommunications.  And the only way to maintain Wisconsin’s competitiveness for the 
21st Century is to make sure that we have a first-rate telecommunications network in 
place” (Bonnett, 1996). 
60 
 
And in 1992, in the midst of an economic crisis, the New Jersey state legislature 
relaxed the regulation of local provider New Jersey Bell in exchange for the company’s 
commitment to replace copper wires throughout the state with fiber.  The program, called 
“Opportunity New Jersey,” was championed by Governor James Florio in an effort to 
benefit New Jersey in its competition with New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut for 
businesses and the jobs they could bring to the state (Read & Youtie, 1996). 
Governors, therefore, had sufficient reason to be concerned with their states’ 
telecommunications policy, and they had shown willingness to take action.  As with 
previous discussion of leadership change, new governors had the ability to be the change 
agents that propelled their states away from a mindset of traditional regulation toward 
one of competition, which would have benefited CLECs. 
H1.4: States with a new governor will have higher founding rates of 
CLECs. 
H2.5: A CLEC will be more likely to expand into a state that has a new 
governor. 
TEMPORAL EFFECTS 
To this point, discussion has proceeded with the assumption that each factor that 
shapes the development of the CLEC industry within a state works with constant force 
through the time period.  Institutions, after all, endure as sources of stability and order 
(Clemens & Cook, 1999; Scott, 2001).  Yet there is something a bit ironic about a study 
of institutional change—even one over a short, approximately 10-year period—that does 
not consider the possibility of an ebb and flow of institutionalizing and 
deinstitutionalizing agents.  In fact, amidst this changing period it is likely that certain 
factors that lubricated the frictions of transformation from the era of monopoly to the era 
of competition began to play a diminishing role as the industry became established.  Such 
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a process occurred in the development of the biotechnology industry.  Although regions 
located closer to sources of venture capital firms initially had higher founding rates of 
CLECs, this effect dissipated as the industry matured (Stuart & Sorenson, 2003). 
I would therefore like to consider the possibility that the institutional forces I have 
considered thus far are contingent upon time.  Several reasons form the basis of this 
thinking.  For one, the first few years following the federal Telecommunications Act saw 
battles taking place not only in the marketplace but also in the courtroom.  ILECs 
defended their territories and objected to the idea of being forced to provide their product 
and open their resources to their competitors while the FCC and the states debated over 
issues of interpretation and jurisdiction.  Over time, though, many of these issues were 
resolved or withered and the CLEC industry matured and developed both cognitive and 
sociopolitical legitimacy.  Another stabilizing factor was the gradual transformation of 
state commissions.  As more of the commissions became populated with individuals who 
had never served during the era of regulated monopolies, it became less likely that new 
commissioners would hold vastly different mental models from those presently serving 
on the commissions.  In fact, over two-thirds of state commissioners serving in 1996 had 
been replaced by 2001. 
Not every change in the CLEC landscape was a stabilizing force, however.  While 
some sources of uncertainty had been reduced on the part of CLECs, ILECs, regulators, 
and customers, others were emerging.  Certain FCC rules took away popular—and 
profitable—methods for entrepreneurs to offer service, and the dot-com boom of the late-
1990s, which had fueled growth of the CLEC industry with telecommunications-
dependent customers and readily available financing, passed.  Yet because the particular 
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factors that I consider in this paper are those most likely to help the transition from 
regulated monopolies to regulated competition, I would ultimately expect these forces to 
play a diminishing role in make a region attractive to CLECs.  This diminishing effect 
should be apparent in both state-level founding rate analysis and firm-level expansion 
pattern analysis. 
H1.5a: The effect that a conservative government ideology has on founding 
rates will decrease over time. 
H1.5b: The effect that a conservative citizen ideology has on founding rates 
will decrease over time. 
H1.6a: The effect that using traditional rate-of-return regulation in 1996 
has on founding rates will decrease over time. 
H1.6b: The effect that pre-1996 experience with incentive-based regulation 
has on founding rates will decrease over time. 
H1.7a: The effect that a new commissioner has on founding rates will 
decrease over time. 
H1.7b: The effect that a change in political party control of a commission 
has on founding rates will decrease over time. 
H1.7c: The effect that commissioner tenure has on founding rates will 
decrease over time. 
H1.7d: The effect that commission tenure has on founding rates will 
decrease over time. 
H1.8: The effect that a new governor has on founding rates will decrease 
over time. 
H2.6a: The effect that a similar government ideology has on a state’s 
attractiveness as a CLEC expansion target will decrease over time. 
H2.6b: The effect that a similar citizen ideology has on a state’s 
attractiveness as a CLEC expansion target will decrease over time. 
H2.7a: The effect that similar 1996 local telephone regulation has on a 




H2.7b: The effect that a similar pre-1996 experience with incentive-based 
regulation has on a state’s attractiveness as a CLEC expansion 
target will decrease over time. 
H2.8: The effect that a pre-existing relationship with an RBOC has on a 
state’s attractiveness as a CLEC expansion target will decrease over 
time. 
H2.9a: The effect that a new commissioner has on a state’s attractiveness as 
a CLEC expansion target will decrease over time. 
H2.9b: The effect that a change in political party control of a commission 
has on a state’s attractiveness as a CLEC expansion target will 
decrease over time. 
H2.9c: The effect that commissioner tenure has on a state’s attractiveness 
as a CLEC expansion target will decrease over time. 
H2.9d: The effect that commission tenure has on a state’s attractiveness as a 
CLEC expansion target will decrease over time. 
H2.10: The effect that a new governor has on a state’s attractiveness as a 




CHAPTER V:  STATE-LEVEL FOUNDING RATES 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I present analysis that tests my hypotheses about state-level 
founding rates of CLECs following the deregulation of the local telephone service 
industry in 1996.  I first describe my sample of states and data along with all variables 
and their data sources.  Subsequently, I provide a detailed specification of the regression 
model I use.  Next, I present descriptive statistics of my data followed by results from the 
regression analyses.  After conducting some diagnostic checks of the model, I conclude 
with a discussion of my results, including a summary of which hypotheses received 
support. 
METHOD 
To test my hypotheses, I analyzed time series data on the founding of competitive 
local exchange carriers between 1997 and 2006.  Competition nationwide was allowed by 
the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Because I include the dependent variable 
as a control, data analysis begins in 1997.  Data analysis ends in 2006 as that is the last 
year for which I have complete founding data for the states in my sample. 
Defining markets with geopolitical boundaries is often problematic.  In the CLEC 
industry, many studies have been conducted on finer-grained areas than the state 
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including the local access and transport area (LATA)4 (Abel & Clements, 2001; 
Alexander & Feinberg, 2004; Zolnierek, Eisner, & Burton, 2001), city (Greenstein & 
Mazzeo, 2006), and even census block (Foreman, 2002).  Yet previous research has been 
conducted at the state-level (Brown & Zimmerman, 2004), and states are a natural 
boundary to use for my study.  My primary concern is with institutional forces that are 
related to barriers to entry and entrepreneurial opportunities.  As explained in Chapter III, 
the local telephone industry historically has been regulated at the state-level, and I have 
posited a theory that state-level actors, policies, and beliefs continued to influence rates 
of entry in the era of federal deregulation.  Furthermore, analysis at the state level allows 
me to build on recent research on federal deregulation (Russo, 2001; Sine et al., 2005). 
Sample and Data 
I contacted each public utility commission of the 48 continental United States to 
request its CLEC certification data since 1996.  The method by which I received the data 
varied by state.  Many states sent me a spreadsheet (e.g., Michigan, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Wisconsin) or hard copies (e.g, Colorado, Delaware, Minnesota) of their offline 
records.  Other states had their complete records available online.  Such data rarely 
existed in a single downloadable file but could be obtained by writing computer programs 
to crawl through the commission’s webpages (e.g., Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Louisiana) or 
by manually searching through the site and entering information by hand (e.g., Arizona, 
Idaho).  I obtained data on CLEC activity in Texas with an open-records request.  In all, I 
                                                 
4 LATAs are geographical areas that define where local carriers can provide telecommunications services.  
They were created with the divestiture of AT&T in 1984 as a means for establishing horizontal boundaries 
between the spun-off RBOCs and vertical boundaries between the RBOCs and AT&T.  RBOCs were 
allowed to offer intra-LATA long distance service but not inter-LATA service.  The latter were the domain 




received data for 35 states (see Figure 6).  The remaining 13 states did not require 
certification of all CLECs (e.g., New Jersey), changed their procedures for certifying 
CLECs during the study period (e.g., North Dakota), or simply kept incomplete records 
(e.g., Massachusetts, New York, etc.).  A Mann-Whitney U-test comparing the 
population of states in the sample versus those not in the sample was not significant, 
U(35, 13) = 282, p=.21.  A total of 9,180 certificates were issued between 1996 and 2006 
across all 35 states in my sample (see Figure 7). 
 
 
- included in the sample (N=35) 
Figure 6. Cartographical representation of states in the state-level analysis sample 
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Figure 7. Total number of CLEC certificates issued across the sample of 35 states, 1996-2006 






















Foundings.  I consider a CLEC to be founded within a state when the state issues 
it a certificate to provide local telephone service.  Though the process varies slightly from 
state to state, generally firms apply for a CLEC certificate by demonstrating managerial 
expertise, technical expertise, and appropriate financial resources.  Certificates are an 
imperfect measure for foundings insofar as having a certificate does not mean that the 
CLEC ever actually provided service within the state.  Yet acquiring a certificate was not 
something that any firm would do.  Even in states where there is no application fee for a 
CLEC certificate, firms usually hire attorneys or third-party firms to facilitate the process.  
Representatives of regulatory commissioners in Michigan and Georgia estimated that a 
CLEC spends approximately $5000 to obtain a license in each of their states.  On the 
entrepreneurial process spectrum that ranges from “discovering an opportunity” to 
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“performing” (Shane, 2003) this study could then be interpreted as an analysis of firms in 
the category “acquiring resources.” 
For each state in my sample I have information on the exact date that the 
certificate was issued.  Yet because regulatory commissions differed in how quickly they 
processed applications and sometimes whether they process them on an ongoing basis or 
in weekly or monthly batches, I aggregate the data by years.  The dependent variable is 
therefore the number of certificates granted by the state public utility commission each 
year.  The 35 states in my sample over 10 years yield a total N of 350. 
Independent Variables 
Institutional Endowment.  The two measures I calculate of a state’s institutional 
endowment are based on the catalog developed by Abel and Clements (1998) of all state 
regulations of local telephone service, 1984-1998.  The first measure, rate-of-return 
regulation, is a dummy variable indicating whether a state had been using a variant of 
traditional rate-of-return regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no).  The second, incentive 
regulation experience, measures how many years a state had been using incentive 
regulation (e.g., indexed price caps, rate freezes) prior to 1996.  As discussed in Chapter 
III, these measures may appear to be mutually exclusive (that is, a state that was using 
rate-of-return regulation could not have had any experience with incentive-based 
regulation), but are not.  Several states that had experimented with incentive-based 
regulation reverted back to rate-of-return regulation before 1996. 
Political Ideology.  I measure a state’s political ideology using the citizen 
ideology and government ideology measures developed by Berry and colleagues (Berry, 
Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998).  Traditionally, views of state-level ideologies have 
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been that they are stable and enduring (Elazar, 1984; Wright, Erikson, & McIver, 1987).  
Recent studies, though, question this assumption (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Stimson, 1999).  
Changes in state-wide ideologies can be seen in popular press case studies such as 
Frank’s (2004) account of the transformation of political ideology in Kansas from 
Progressivism to staunch conservatism.  More generally, Berry and his colleagues (Berry 
et al., 1998) have developed two different, annual measures of ideology—citizen 
ideology and government ideology—to demonstrate that a state’s ideologies can not only 
be dynamic but that differences can exist in the beliefs held by the citizens of a state and 
its elected government officials. 
To compute a state’s citizen ideology in a given year, Berry et al use ratings from 
the interest groups Americans for Democratic Action and the AFL-CIO’s Committee on 
Political Education to identify the ideological position of each member of Congress.  The 
citizen ideology score of each congressional district is computed as a weighted average of 
the ideological position of the district’s incumbent and the estimated ideological position 
of the challenger to the incumbent.  Weights are based on election results.  The state’s 
citizen ideology score is then computed as an unweighted average of its district ideology 
scores. 
Berry et al also use those same interest group ratings of congressional members as 
the basis of the computation of a state’s government ideology.  The interest group ratings 
are used to calculate the average ideological orientation for each major party in the state 
in a given year, which are then assigned to five major state political actors:  the governor 
and the two major parties in each of the state’s two legislative chambers.  The state’s 
government ideology score is computed as a weighted average of these five actors’ 
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ideological positions, where the weights are based on assumptions about the relative 
power that these five actors hold and the distribution of power between parties within a 
single legislative chamber.5 
The data I use come from the revised 1960-2006 citizen and government ideology 
series, downloaded April 15, 2008, from the website of one of the original study’s co-
authors (http://www.uky.edu/~rford/Home_files/page0005.htm).  Ideology scores are 
constructed such that they are bounded below by 0 (the most conservative value) and 
above by 100 (the most liberal value).  For the years in this study, citizen ideology scores 
range from 9.25 to 95.97.  Government ideology scores range from 0 to 96.37.  The two 
measures are correlated at r = 0.55 for the states and years of this study.  Though this 
correlation is somewhat strong, it should still be possible to observe differences between 
the scores in the same state and the same year. 
Political Regime Change.  I measure political regime change within two different 
areas of state government:  public utility commissions and gubernatorial offices.  I 
developed four measures for change in public utility commissions corresponding to my 
hypotheses.  The first measure is a dummy variable indicating whether at least one new 
commissioner replaced an outgoing commissioner on the state’s public utility 
commission in a given year (1=yes, 0=no).  The second measure is also a dummy 
variable, this one indicating whether a new political party controls the commission 
(1=yes, 0=no).  I determine which party controls a commission by measuring the political 
sentiment of a state’s regulatory commission in each year (Abel & Clements, 2001).  
Political sentiment is computed by first assigning each commissioner a score according to 
                                                 
5 See the authors’ original paper (Berry et al., 1998) for more details on their assumptions and calculations 
and for reliability and validity discussions. 
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his or her political party affiliation:  1=Republican, 0.5=Independent, and 0=Democrat.  
The sum of these scores divided by the total number of commissioners yields the 
commission’s political sentiment, a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1.  
Commissions with scores less than 0.5 are considered Democratic, equal to 0.5 are 
considered Independent, and greater than 0.5 are considered Republican.  The third and 
fourth measures are different indicators for commissioner entrenchment.  I compute both 
the average tenure of each commissioner on the commission (years) as well as the unit 
tenure of the complete commission (years).  The former measure sums each 
commissioner’s individual tenure and divides by the total number of commissioners.  The 
latter measure tracks how many years of experience the commission has working as a 
single group; it resets to 0 every time a commissioner is replaced.  The complete 
commissioner history for each state including each commissioner’s years of service and 
political party affiliation comes from “The All Commissioners List” compiled by Janice 
Beecher of the Institute of Public Utilities at Michigan State University 
(http://www.ipu.msu.edu/research/pdfs/All%20Commissioners%20List%20-%2007.pdf) 
(Beecher, 2007).  Information on commissioners’ political affiliations was supplemented 
with searches in the Dow Jones Factiva database of news sources. 
To measure change within a gubernatorial office, I use a dummy variable to 
indicate whether a new governor took office in the state in a given year (1=yes, 0=no).  





I controlled for a number of alternative explanations for state-level variance in 
CLEC foundings. 
Economic Environment 
Business Establishments.  Many telephony and regulatory experts suggested that 
CLECs would be more interested in serving businesses than residential customers 
because (a) revenue per business access line tends to be higher than revenue per 
residential access line and (b) a CLEC can grow more efficiently by serving businesses 
rather than residential customers.  I therefore include the number of business 
establishments within a state.  Annual data on the number of business establishments 
within a state comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistics of U.S. Businesses 
(http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susb.htm). 
Population Density.  Another common explanation for CLEC location is that 
CLECs would be attracted to densely-populated areas.  Because telephone networks are 
physical networks, more densely populated areas could be served more efficiently, thus 
resulting in higher profit opportunity.  I include an annual measure of population density, 
which I compute as the population within a state divided by the land area of a state.  Data 
on the average estimated state population come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Population Estimates Program (http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.php). 
Median Household Income.  ILECs and opponents of competitive telephony 
legislation argued that CLECs choosing to serve residential customers would be “cream-
skimmers”; that is, they would target only the most affluent neighborhoods as customers.  
I control for this by including the median household income of each state.  Annual data 
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comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey 
(http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h08a.html). 
Households without Telephone Service.  Although telephone service seemed 
ubiquitous by 1996, over 6% of U.S. households did not have a telephone.  This ranged 
significantly across states, from a low of 2.4% in Utah to a high of 14.6% in New 
Mexico.  States with more households lacking telephone service could be seen as 
attractive to some entrepreneurs because such households represent an opportunity to 
gain customers without having to take them away from the incumbent.  I therefore 
include percentage of households in a state without telephone service.  Annual data for 
this measure come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey and are 
available from the Federal Communications Commission (http://www.fcc.gov). 
Dot-Com Boom.  The passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act coincided 
with the meteoric rise in the dot-com/e-commerce industry.  Demand for telephony 
services subsequently increased, and it was also easier to obtain financing to become a 
CLEC.  This changed with the 2000 stock market crash as many dot-coms went bankrupt 
and financing sources dwindled, though telecom experts claim that the telecom industry 
did not begin to see a severe downturn until 2001 (Crandall, 2005).  To account for this, I 
include a dummy variable set to “1” for 1997-2001 and “0” for 2002 -2005. 
Dominant Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier.  CLEC activity within a state was 
greatly influenced by the state’s incumbent carriers.  ILECs were the CLECs’ source to 
the public switched telephone network via interconnection and/or resale agreements but 
were also the CLECs’ main competitors.  Upon the passage of the federal 
Telecommunications Act, the dominant ILEC in each state was one of the seven Baby 
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Bells (Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, SBC, and US 
West), except for Connecticut, which was served by Southern New England Telephone 
(SNET).  These ILECs did not all respond the same to the federal Telecommunications 
Act.  As multi-state providers, each Bell, though, likely behaved consistently across states 
in their territory.  This may have introduced autocorrelation across states.  I control for 
this with a set of orthogonal dummy variables representing which ILEC provided service 
within a state.  The variables are updated in each year according to when acquisition 
deals were announced.  Because Bell Atlantic and SBC announced their acquisitions of 
NYNEX and Pacific Telesis in April 1996, respectively—and because my analysis does 
not begin until 1997—variables are not included for NYNEX and Pacific Telesis.  US 
West (now known as Qwest) is the reference category because that is the one Baby Bell 
that did not acquire another Baby Bell nor was acquired by another Baby Bell during the 
study period. 
Ecological Environment 
Prior Year Foundings.  Previous research in population ecology has shown that 
prior year foundings (i.e., rate dependence; Hannan & Freeman, 1989) tend to have an 
inverted U-shaped effect on current foundings (Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989).  Common arguments are that foundings from one year can serve as a 
signal to potential entrepreneurs of the legitimacy and opportunity for entry in the 
subsequent year, yet too many foundings can exhaust available resources necessary for 
entry (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Baum, 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1989).  I therefore 
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include both the number of certificates and number of certificates squared, lagged by one 
year.6 
Political Environment7 
Commission Political Party.  Republicans are often labeled as the party of free 
markets and competition.  This suggests that a commission with Republican leanings 
would be more likely to create conditions to encourage CLEC entry.  To control for this, I 
include the political sentiment of the regulatory commissioners in each state.  I previously 
described the computation for this measure when explaining my measure for new 
political party controls the commission. 
Governor Political Party.  Likewise, I control for whether the governor is 
Republican with a dummy variable noting whether the governor of a state is a Republican 
(1=yes, 0=no).  Data come from the National Governors Association 
(http://www.nga.org/). 
Elected Commissioners.  States differ with respect to whether their public utility 
commissioners are elected or appointed.  Though some states have changed their method 
in the past, over the course of this study the measure remained constant (11 states elected; 
                                                 
6 The literature in organizational ecology typically suggests the dominance of density over prior foundings 
(Carroll & Hannan, 2000).  I do not include the density of existing CLECs in my models because such a 
measure is not available.  Governments at both the state and federal levels have taken a laissez faire 
approach to telephone competition and only collect information when necessary.  Using a running count of 
all actively-issued certificates would not be a valid proxy for density.  As previously mentioned, having a 
CLEC certificate did not mean that a company was actually providing service.  Furthermore, certificates are 
cancelled at a rate well below the rate at which firms stopped providing service.  In theory states are 
supposed to revoke certificates from those not actively serving customers, but states are not eager to do so 
for political reasons; doing so might look like an attempt to squelch competition.  I have reason to believe, 
though, that the inclusion of prior foundings is likely sufficient to capture ecological influences.  Carroll 
and Hannan’s (1989: 528) review of the literature on density dependence finds that the effect tends to hold 
only over extended periods of time (e.g., 100 years or more).  My study of a 10-year period falls far short.  
Also, prior year foundings and density were likely correlated for this study.  CLEC failures did not start en 
masse until 2000—about the time when foundings reached their peak.  Several states did, though, collect 
extensive information from their CLECs on which firms were actively providing service along with their 
number of customers.  In future work I will analyze founding rates on this subset of states using density. 
7 Only included in models that test political regime change variables. 
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24 appointed).  I control for any potential difference in states’ methods of commissioner 
selection by including a dummy variable for whether the state’s commissioners were 
elected (1=yes, 0=no).  Data come from (Beecher, 2007). 
Number of Commissioners.  States vary in the size of their commission (3 to 7).   
Some intrastate variation exists as certain states passed legislation to change the size of 
their commission (e.g., Arizona) while others took lengthy periods of time to replace 
commissioners who resigned.  I include this measure to control for any potential impact 
commission size may have.  Data come from (Beecher, 2007). 
I lag all explanatory variables that vary with time by one year to account for the 
time that would be necessary for the organizational structures, processes, and climate to 
be changed and for that change to be recognized by potential entrepreneurs. 
Interaction Variables 
To test the hypotheses about possible temporal effects of institutional forces 
(H1.5a-H1.8), I create interaction terms for each of the independent variables as well as 
the political regime change control variables (commission political party, Republican 
governor, number of commissioners, and elected commissioners).  I multiply each 
variable by the variable boom in order to assess whether certain institutional effects apply 
only in the early stages of industry development.  I follow recommendations by first 
centering all variables before computing the interaction term.  This allows coefficients of 




In this study, the unit of analysis is the state, and the unit of observation is the 
state-year.  My dependent variable is a count.  Count variables have several unique 
qualities:  they take on values that are discrete, not continuous; they are bounded below 
by 0; and often they are not normally distributed.  Attempts to model count data with 
ordinary least squares can result in estimates that are inefficient, inconsistent, and biased 
(Long, 1997: 217). 
The standard model for count data is Poisson regression.  For a set of panel data 














Poisson regression assumes that the conditional mean, μit = E(yit | xit), is 
equivalent to the conditional variance, Var(yit | xit).  The problem with Poisson regression 
is that count data tend to be overdispersed.  That is, the conditional variance tends to be 
greater than the conditional mean.  This is a common problem in founding rate analysis 
(e.g., Dobbin & Dowd, 1997; Russo, 2001; Swaminathan, 1995; Wade et al., 1998), and 
my data are no exception ( 1.405;3.25 == σx
it
2 ).  Overdispersion in Poisson regression 
leads to standard errors that are biased downward.  A standard technique for handling 
overdispersion is to add an error term, ε , to the estimate of the conditional mean that is 
independent of xit and allows the conditional variance to exceed the mean: 
ititx
i e
εβμ +=~  
78 
 
Assuming that E[ itε ] = 0 (or, equivalently, E[ ] = 1) allows for E[ite ε itμ~ ] = 
E[ itμ ].  Letting δit =  and assuming that δit has a gamma distribution with parameter 


































This model is referred to as the negative binomial regression model.  The 
conditional mean remains the same ( itμ ) and the conditional variance is now 










μμ 1 . 
The typical assumption is that the υ’s are constant (1/α), and the conditional 
variance reduces to 
Var(yit | xit) = . 
2
itit αμμ +
(See Long, 1997, for a detailed derivation of this model as it pertains to cross-
sectional data.)  Rather than being equal to the condition mean, the conditional variance 
in this model is quadratic in the mean.  The negative binomial regression model can be 
estimated with maximum likelihood. 
A second modeling issue stems from the fact that my data include multiple 
observations for each state.  This violates the assumption of independence among the 
observation and introduces unobserved heterogeneity.  Common methods for handling 
this unobserved heterogeneity are to include fixed effects or random effects.  Both 
involve adding a parameter to the model to reflect that observations within states are not 
independent.  The models differ in the representation of that parameter.  Fixed effects 
modeling treats it just as the name suggests—as fixed.  All variability on the dependent 
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variable is due only to the random sampling error of the individual values ( itε ).  Using 
fixed effects would assume that the states included in the study are exactly the ones that I 
am interested in applying the findings.  A fixed-effect model is the same as including one 
dummy variable for each state in the study.  Random effects, on the other hand, imply 
that variance on the dependent variable may not only be due to the noise in the values.  
The random effects model assumes that the sample of states contribute to the error, too, 
because they have been drawn from a population of states.  The most common approach 
is to assume that the added parameter for states is drawn from a Beta distribution.  (See 
Hilbe, 2007, for more information on negative binomial regression models with 
longitudinal data.) 
I chose to model my data with random effects as opposed to fixed effects for four 
reasons.  First, the fixed effects model assumes that unobserved heterogeneity across 
units is constant over the period of study.  Because I have theorized that certain effects 
change over time, such an assumption seems unlikely.  Second, some of my explanatory 
variables (e.g., the number of establishments, median household income, etc.) have little 
within-state temporal variation, and this gets overwhelmed when fixed effects are 
included.  Third, I view the states in my sample as having been drawn from the larger 
population of states, and I wish to generalize my results to the entire population 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 1998: 298; Greene, 2000: 567).  Finally, recent research suggests 
that unconditional fixed effects in negative binomial regression with a large number of 
groups (e.g., more than 20) can yield underestimated standard errors of the parameters.  
In such cases, “negative binomial predictors appear to enter the model as significant 
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when in fact they do not” (Hilbe, 2007: 203).  This problem does not occur when treating 
the effects as random. 
I estimate parameters using xtnbreg in Stata 8.0. 
Summary of State-Level Hypotheses 
I summarize my hypotheses and model in Table 1.  For each hypothesis, I have 
listed the variable I use to test it along with the predicted direction of its coefficient. 
Table 1. Summary of hypotheses for the state-level CLEC founding rate analysis 










Ideology H1.1a Government ideology − H1.1b Citizen ideology − 
Institutional 
Endowment 
H1.2a Rate-based rate-of-return local telephone regulation in 1996 − 
H1.2b Years of experience with incentive-based local telephone regulation before 1996 + 
Political Regime 
Change 
H1.3a New commissioner + 
H1.3b New party in control of commission + 
H1.3c Avg tenure of commissioners − 
H1.3d Unit tenure of commission − 









Ideology H1.5a Government ideology × Boom − H1.5b Citizen ideology × Boom − 
Institutional 
Endowment 
H1.6a Rate-based rate-of-return local telephone regulation in 1996 × Boom − 
H1.6b Years of experience with incentive-based local telephone regulation before 1996 × Boom + 
Political Regime 
Change 
H1.7a New commissioner × Boom + 
H1.7b New party in control of commission × Boom + 
H1.7c Avg tenure of commissioners × Boom − 
H1.7d Unit tenure of commission × Boom − 




Table 2 reports the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, and range) for 
the dependent variable, independent variables, and control variables.  (Note that several 
variables have been scaled to allow for more readable coefficients in the regression 
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output.)  Table 3 reports the correlation matrix for all variables.  Correlations among the 
variables of theoretical interest (i.e., (14) through (26)) tend to be small in magnitude (|r| 
< .30; less than 10 percent shared variance).  Those variables that exhibit moderate levels 
of correlation tend to be related conceptually.  As previously mentioned, the two ideology 
measures are correlated at r = .55.  Yet as evidence that the two measure distinct 
constructs, government ideology is much more strongly correlated with states having 
Republican governors (r = -.75) and Republican-controlled utility commissions (r = -.44) 
than is citizen ideology.8  This provides a nice validity check for government ideology.  
The institutional endowment variables, rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation 
experience, have a similar level of correlation (r = -.55).  Certain variables related to 
change in the public utility commission also appear moderately correlated. 
                                                 
8 Negative correlations are expected here because Berry et al’s ideology score ranges from 0 (pure 
conservatism) to 100 (pure liberalism) whereas in the other variables Republicans are coded as 1, 





Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the state-level CLEC founding rate analysis 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CLEC foundings [DV] 25.337 20.126 1 127
No. of business establishments in state / 
1,000,000 
0.130 0.113 0.018 0.505
State population density / 1000 0.122 0.136 0.005 0.723
% households in state without phone service 5.747 2.246 1.733 13.133
State median household income / 1000 46.549 6.456 32.495 61.757
Era of dot-com boom (1 = 1996-2001,  
0 = 2002-2006) 
0.500 0.501 0 1
CLEC certificates in state / 100 (t-1) 0.251 0.205 0 1.270
CLEC certificates in state / 100, squared (t-1) 0.105 0.202 0 1.613
State served by Ameritech 0.023 0.150 0 1
State served by Bell Atlantic/Verizon 0.200 0.401 0 1
State served by BellSouth 0.200 0.401 0 1
State served by SBC/AT&T 0.286 0.452 0 1
State served by SNET 0.006 0.075 0 1
Government ideology / 100 0.412 0.256 0.000 0.964
Citizen ideology / 100 0.458 0.133 0.093 0.960
State had variant of rate-of-return regulation in 
1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.486 0.501 0 1
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 2.000 2.708 0 9
New commissioner 0.420 0.494 0 1
New political party controls PUC 0.120 0.325 0 1
Avg tenure of commissioners 4.803 2.839 0.667 14.667
Unit tenure of current commission 1.309 1.697 0 8
New governor 0.151 0.359 0 1
Avg political sentiment on PUC 0.576 0.251 0 1
Republican governor 0.606 0.489 0 1
No. of commissioners 3.883 1.200 3 7
Elected commissioners 0.314 0.465 0 1
 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix for the state-level CLEC founding rate analysis 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) No. of certificates issued in state [DV] — 
(2) No. of business establishments in state / 1,000,000 .61 — 
(3) State population density / 1000 .15 .31 — 
(4) % households in state without phone service .18 .14 -.12 — 
(5) State median household income / 1000 .03 .06 .37 -.61 — 
(6) Era of dot-com boom (1 = 1996-2001, 0 = 2002-2006) .42 -.03 -.03 .09 -.08 — 
(7) CLEC certificates in state / 100 (t-1) .77 .63 .17 .16 .09 .19 — 
(8) CLEC certificates in state / 100, squared (t-1) .61 .47 .09 .12 -.04 .20 .73 — 
(9) State served by Ameritech .00 .14 .08 -.02 .06 .15 -.06 -.02 — 
(10) State served by Bell Atlantic/Verizon -.15 -.17 .17 -.34 .13 .00 -.15 -.07 -.08 — 
(11) State served by BellSouth .23 .19 .07 .46 -.39 .00 .23 .14 -.08 -.25 — 
(12) State served by SBC/AT&T .17 .24 .13 .22 .05 -.06 .20 .05 -.10 -.32 -.32 — 
(13) State served by SNET -.01 -.03 .31 -.05 .09 .08 -.04 -.02 -.01 -.04 -.04 -.05 — 
(14) Government Ideology / 100 -.03 -.12 .17 .00 -.03 -.11 -.04 -.11 -.10 .32 .16 -.07 .03 
(15) Citizen Ideology / 100 .01 .08 .36 -.30 .23 -.14 .01 -.02 .07 .43 -.23 .03 .10 
(16) Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 .23 .24 .04 -.06 -.16 .00 .23 .29 .00 .24 -.11 .06 -.06 
(17) State had variant of rate-of-return regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) -.28 -.41 -.14 .09 .00 .00 -.28 -.19 -.15 -.20 .09 -.13 .08 
(18) New commissioner .07 .14 .02 -.06 .09 -.08 .08 .00 -.01 -.01 -.06 .13 .01 
(19) New party controls regulatory commission .02 -.03 -.07 .00 .05 .04 .05 .01 -.06 -.01 .04 .04 -.03 
(20) Avg tenure of commissioners -.15 -.30 -.02 .21 -.23 .02 -.15 -.07 -.07 .15 .25 -.31 -.09 
(21) Yrs that current commission has been together as unit -.07 -.19 -.06 .08 -.11 .01 -.07 -.04 -.05 .00 .09 -.15 -.04 
(22) New governor .03 -.01 -.01 .01 .04 -.10 .02 .06 -.06 .05 .03 -.02 -.03 
(23) Avg political sentiment on regulatory commission (1=Repub., 0=Dem.) .04 .17 -.07 .03 .03 -.01 .07 .05 .12 -.21 -.25 .28 .02 
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(24) Republican governor .06 .11 .02 .12 -.04 .09 .05 .08 .12 -.24 -.09 .16 .06 
(25) No. of commissioners .18 .29 .45 .01 .08 .00 .17 .06 .02 -.14 .47 -.08 .07 
(26) Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no) -.11 -.20 -.22 .34 -.26 .00 -.11 -.11 -.10 -.18 .43 -.29 -.05 
 
Variable (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
(14) Government Ideology / 100 — 
(15) Citizen Ideology / 100 .55 — 
(16) Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 .10 .22 — 
(17) State had variant of rate-of-return regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) -.03 -.13 -.55 — 
(18) New commissioner .07 .14 .01 .00 — 
(19) New party controls regulatory commission .07 .06 -.08 .06 .42 — 
(20) Avg tenure of commissioners .01 -.19 .02 -.02 -.46 -.17 — 
(21) Yrs that current commission has been together as unit -.07 -.18 -.04 -.04 -.66 -.28 .67 — 
(22) New governor .06 .04 .00 -.01 .21 .16 .00 -.09 — 
(23) Avg political sentiment on regulatory commission (1=Repub., 0=Dem.) -.44 -.20 .04 -.06 .00 -.13 -.15 -.08 -.06 — 
(24) Republican governor -.75 -.21 -.09 .12 -.02 -.08 .02 .05 -.05 .48 — 
(25) No. of commissioners .17 .08 -.04 .00 .10 .07 -.08 -.18 .01 -.23 -.15 — 






Table 4 reports the results of the regression analyses.  I ran 11 models in all.  First 
I examined a baseline model, model 1, with only economic and ecological control 
variables.  I examined the main effects for the ideology (H1.1a-H1.1b), institutional 
endowment (H1.2a-H1.2b), and political regime change hypotheses (H1.3a-H1.4) by 
entering their corresponding variables as separate blocks in models 2-4, respectively, 
before including all variables from models 1-4 in model 5.  In model 6, I test for potential 
multicollinearity effects in model 5 by removing the control variables associated with the 
political environment.  Several of these are moderately correlated with the ideology 
variables (|r| > .40) and are themselves not statistically significant. 
With models 7-9 I add interaction terms to test the temporal effects hypotheses for 
ideology (H1.5a-H1.5b), institutional endowment (H1.6a-H1.6b), and political regime 
change (H1.7a-H1.8), respectively.  Model 10 contains all variables.  In model 11, I again 





Table 4. Negative binomial regression results for the state-level CLEC founding rate analysis 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Constant 1.161** 1.000** 0.969** 1.248** 0.871* 0.814* 1.047** 0.955** 1.461** 1.135** 0.948** 
(0.313) (0.318) (0.329) (0.326) (0.358) (0.328) (0.322) (0.330) (0.331) (0.368) (0.332) 
No. of business establishments in state 
/ 1,000,000 
2.063** 2.071** 1.892** 2.124** 2.001** 1.969** 2.094** 2.073** 2.258** 2.125** 2.014** 
(0.238) (0.237) (0.243) (0.240) (0.260) (0.253) (0.240) (0.255) (0.246) (0.262) (0.254) 
State population density / 1000 -0.414+ -0.519* -0.405+ -0.355 -0.485* -0.468* -0.534* -0.441* -0.290 -0.414+ -0.464* 
(0.230) (0.233) (0.220) (0.226) (0.227) (0.211) (0.237) (0.223) (0.227) (0.224) (0.210) 
% households in state without phone 
service 
-0.009 -0.006 -0.002 -0.007 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.013 -0.003 0.003 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
State median household income / 1000 0.012* 0.011* 0.015** 0.011* 0.014** 0.014** 0.011* 0.016** 0.011* 0.015** 0.016** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Era of dot-com boom (1 = 1996-2001, 
0 = 2002-2006) 
0.611** 0.628** 0.614** 0.620** 0.641** 0.646** 0.630** 0.613** 0.619** 0.626** 0.638** 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
CLEC certificates in state / 100 (t-1) 1.401** 1.404** 1.397** 1.483** 1.420** 1.404** 1.382** 1.371** 1.456** 1.414** 1.403** 
(0.182) (0.180) (0.187) (0.166) (0.165) (0.164) (0.175) (0.183) (0.168) (0.165) (0.164) 
CLEC certificates in state / 100, 
squared (t-1) 
-1.040** -1.047** -1.081** -1.181** -1.174** -1.157** -1.077** -1.228** -1.275** -1.408** -1.361** 
(0.201) (0.199) (0.207) (0.197) (0.198) (0.196) (0.197) (0.208) (0.200) (0.205) (0.204) 
State served by Ameritech -0.115 -0.156 -0.141 -0.113 -0.170 -0.169 -0.199 -0.159 -0.162 -0.238+ -0.204+ 
(0.144) (0.144) (0.145) (0.140) (0.144) (0.142) (0.143) (0.145) (0.140) (0.142) (0.141) 
State served by Bell Atlantic/Verizon 0.093 0.036 0.059 0.068 0.009 0.019 0.043 0.061 0.061 0.020 0.055 
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(0.078) (0.080) (0.077) (0.072) (0.077) (0.075) (0.081) (0.078) (0.072) (0.076) (0.074) 
State served by BellSouth 0.388** 0.387** 0.390** 0.370** 0.374** 0.393** 0.414** 0.406** 0.428** 0.438** 0.444** 
(0.096) (0.100) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.088) (0.103) (0.095) (0.096) (0.097) (0.089) 
State served by SBC/AT&T 0.253** 0.229** 0.226** 0.223** 0.200** 0.204** 0.237** 0.229** 0.225** 0.177* 0.204* 
(0.084) (0.083) (0.083) (0.071) (0.075) (0.071) (0.083) (0.083) (0.071) (0.074) (0.070) 
State served by SNET 0.284 0.246 0.285 0.271 0.234 0.242 0.193 0.339 0.217 0.113 0.232 
(0.291) (0.289) (0.290) (0.290) (0.288) (0.285) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.283) (0.282) 
Government Ideology / 100 0.023 0.102 0.005 0.048 0.150 0.005 
(0.100) (0.159) (0.096) (0.100) (0.163) (0.096) 
Government ideology / 100 X Boom  -0.313+ 0.087 -0.318+ 
 (0.179) (0.291) (0.177) 
Citizen Ideology / 100 0.463+ 0.347 0.433+ 0.373 0.142 0.261 
(0.243) (0.255) (0.229) (0.251) (0.262) (0.236) 
Citizen ideology / 100 X Boom  1.037** 0.718 0.925* 
 (0.372) (0.457) (0.389) 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-
1996 
0.015 0.016+ 0.016+ 0.011 0.015 0.014 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-
1996 X Boom 
 0.044* 0.051** 0.046** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
State had variant of rate-of-return 
regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.030 -0.033 -0.021 -0.015 -0.021 -0.016 







Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
State had variant of ROR regulation in 
1996 X Boom 
 -0.034 0.028 0.009 
 (0.097) (0.101) (0.097) 
New commissioner 0.047 0.037 0.044 0.004 -0.003 0.011 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) 
New commissioner X Boom  0.233* 0.220* 0.195+ 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.110) 
New party controls regulatory 
commission 
-0.006 -0.004 -0.001 -0.021 -0.035 -0.028 
(0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.068) (0.067) (0.066) 
New party controls regulatory 
commission X Boom 
 0.060 0.062 0.028 
 (0.137) (0.135) (0.132) 
Avg tenure of commissioners -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.020 -0.020 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Avg tenure of commissioners X Boom  0.025 0.011 0.007 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) 
Yrs that current commission has been 
together as unit 
0.033+ 0.035+ 0.038* 0.028 0.029 0.033 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Unit tenure of commission X Boom  0.049 0.056 0.039 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) 
New governor 0.132* 0.130* 0.132* 0.133* 0.134* 0.137* 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) 
New governor X Boom  0.106 0.119 0.112 
 (0.110) (0.107) (0.107) 
Avg political sentiment on regulatory 
commission (1=Repub., 0=Dem.) 
-0.105 -0.102  -0.148 -0.105  
(0.099) (0.099)  (0.108) (0.107)  
Avg political sentiment on commission 
X Boom 
 0.360+ 0.291  
 (0.204) (0.204)  
Republican governor 0.010 0.073  0.018 0.104  
(0.048) (0.077)  (0.051) (0.078)  
Republican governor X Boom  0.066 0.166  
 (0.105) (0.150)  
No. of commissioners -0.010 -0.003  -0.032 -0.023  
(0.022) (0.022)  (0.023) (0.023)  
No. of commissioners X Boom  0.063+ 0.062+  
 (0.035) (0.035)  
Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no) -0.030 0.014  0.003 0.004  
(0.063) (0.066)  (0.067) (0.068)  
Elected commissioners X Boom  -0.208+ -0.038  
 (0.110) (0.122)  
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 
Number of group(state) 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Standard errors in parentheses   
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The effects of some of the control variables merit attention.  Consistent with 
previous findings (e.g., Abel & Clements, 2001; Alexander & Feinberg, 2004; Foreman, 
2002), CLEC foundings were higher in states with more businesses and with higher 
median household incomes.  Population density, though, had a consistently—and in most 
models significantly—negative affect on a state’s CLEC founding rate.  I would expect 
that this is because this study is at the state level of analysis.  Population density likely 
plays a role at more granular levels of analysis, such as the Metropolitan Statistical Area 
or Local Access and Transport Area (LATA).  In light of the distribution of certification 
dates (Figure 7), it is not surprising that prior foundings follow an inverted-U shape.  
Estimates for the coefficients of all controls remained quite stable across all models. 
Main Effects 
Model 2 examines the effect that a state’s political ideology, among both its 
elected officials (H1.1a) and its citizens (H1.1b), had on making the state attractive to 
CLEC entrepreneurs.  The estimated coefficient for citizen ideology was significant, but 
neither it nor the estimated coefficient for government ideology was in the expected 
direction.  This indicates that founding rates of CLECs were higher in states with more 
liberal government officials and a more liberal electorate and fails to support H1.1a and 
H1.1b. 
Model 3 tests H1.2a and H1.2b—whether a state’s regulatory experience leading 
up to federally-mandated competition had any influence on the rate at which CLECs 
enter the state.  Results are in the predicted direction (states with more incentive 
regulation experience had higher founding rates while those transitioning to competition 




Model 4 tests the impact that changes in the political order had on a state’s CLEC 
founding rate, H1.3a-H1.4.  Changes within the public utility commission had little effect 
on a state’s founding rate.  The effect that a new commissioner (H1.3a) had was, as 
predicted, positive but was not significant.  Contrary to my hypothesis, when a new 
political party took control of the commission (H1.3b), the founding rate subsequently 
decreased, albeit a very small, non-significant amount.  The two measures of commission 
tenure had opposite effects.  States with longer serving commissioners (H1.3c) saw a 
non-significant decrease their founding rates.  States whose commissions had more 
experience serving together (H1.3d), though, had subsequently higher founding rates—
the opposite of what I had hypothesized. 
In contrast to my hypotheses about the commission, my hypothesis about a 
change in governorship (H1.4) is supported.  Following a change in governor, the 
founding rate within the state increased significantly. 
Model 5 is the full model that includes all explanatory variables, both control and 
substantive.  All coefficients remained the same sign, and most were of the same 
magnitude as before.  One difference was with years of incentive-based regulation 
experience.  In the presence of other variables its coefficient and its standard error change 
just enough for the coefficient to be statistically significant at α = .10.  This provides 
some support for H1.2b.  The other difference worth noting was the change in 
coefficients for the ideology variables.  Government ideology remained non-significant 
but with a much larger coefficient.  The coefficient for citizen ideology, on the hand, fell 
by 25% and below statistical significance.  Although neither coefficient is in my 




As I mentioned previously, my first test for multicollinearity was to remove the 
political environment control variables.  The result is model 6.  Most coefficients 
remained stable relative to their previous estimates.  The coefficient for years of 
incentive-based regulation experience is still significant, providing further support for 
H1.2b.  The coefficients for the ideology variables are much closer to their original model 
2 estimates.  Citizen ideology is once again significantly positive, and government 
ideology is closer to 0.  This suggests that at least slight levels of multicollinearity were 
present in model 5, although it does not appear to have had any bearing on tests of my 
main effects hypotheses.9 
Temporal Effects 
Model 7 tests whether the effect of ideology varied with time (H1.5a-H1.5b).  In 
support of these hypotheses, I expected negative coefficients on my ideology interaction 
terms because the lower conservative scores are associated with more conservative 
ideologies and because the boom variable is coded as “1” in the early years of the study 
and “0” in the later years.  The interaction of government ideology and boom is 
significant and is in the hypothesized direction.  During the dot-com boom, CLECs were 
started more often in states with conservative elected officials than they were after the 
boom.  This supports H1.5a.  The interaction for citizen ideology is also significant but is 
in the opposite direction as the hypothesis.  Entrepreneurs started more CLECs in states 
with liberal electorates during the early years of the study.  Thus, the data fail to support 
H1.5b. 
                                                 
9 I analyzed one more model where in addition to removing the political environment controls, I also 
removed the variable for percent of households without telephone service.  This variable, whose 
coefficients were not significant in any model, is a potential source of collinearity because it is correlated 
with citizen ideology at r = -.30.  Removing the variable, though, produced estimated coefficients that were 




Model 8 shows mixed results for the impact of time on institutional endowment.  
As before, the type of regulation from which states were transitioning had little effect on 
CLEC development.  States that were using rate-of-return regulation when the federal 
Telecommunications Act was passed did have lower founding rates during the first half 
of the study (the rate-of-return regulation in 1996 × boom coefficient is negative), 
though the effect is not significant.  H1.6a is not supported.  The amount of time, though, 
that states had been experimenting away from traditional regulation was period-
contingent.  States that had more experience with incentive-based regulation leading up 
to 1996 had subsequently higher founding rates during the first half of this study.  This 
supports H6b. 
Model 9 includes measures of the political environment and their interactions 
with boom.  The strongest finding among the commission variables is that the effect of 
getting a new commissioner is period-specific.  States with new commissioners had 
significantly higher CLEC founding rates in the first half of the study period relative to 
the second half, which supports H1.7a.  None of the other measures of commission 
change were significantly conditional upon the boom period effect (H1.7b-H1.7d are not 
supported).  In contrast to getting a new commissioner, the main effect that a new 
governor has on a state’s CLEC founding rate remains strong but is not contingent upon 
time.  The new governor × boom coefficient is positive but not significant.  H1.8 is 
therefore not supported. 
Model 10 is the full model with all main effects and interactions included.  Most 
findings hold, but the ideology variables once again show the greatest change in their 




ideology coefficients increased.  Especially of concern is that the government ideology × 
boom interaction went from a significant, negative coefficient (and in support of H1.5a) 
to a positive coefficient.  As with the main effects analysis, this hints of multicollinearity.  
I therefore investigated this by removing the political environment controls and re-
running the model.  The result is model 11.  Most coefficients remained unchanged, and 
the ideology coefficients returned to the level of their model 7 estimates.  This includes 
the time-contingent effect of government ideology, in support of H1.5a. 
Diagnostics 
When discussing the correlation matrix, I pointed out several instances where 
variables were moderately to highly correlated.  These were especially prevalent among 
the conceptually-related variables of ideology, institutional endowment, and political 
regime change.  Other variables with strong linear associations include government 
ideology and the political party measures for the state commission and governor.  One 
reason to be concerned about correlated variables is that they can lead to 
multicollinearity.  Symptoms of multicollinearity include wild swings in coefficients in 
both magnitude and sign across similar models.  Although multicollinearity does not 
affect the overall model fit, it does hamper a researcher’s ability to detect significant 
effects in individual coefficients, which is typically the main goal of hypothesis testing. 
As I mentioned in the preceding analysis, there were some mild signs of 
multicollinearity in the regression models, most involving the ideology variables.  The 
ideology coefficients—both main effects and interactions—changed noticeably from the 




control variables that were correlated with the ideology variables yielded ideology 
coefficients that were much closer to the initial estimates. 
Here I take another approach to looking for hints of collinearity as I compute 
variance inflation factors (VIF).  VIFs are one measure for assessing how much the 
variances of individual coefficients are inflated by collinearity as compared to the 
situation where the variables are linearly independent.  If Ri2 represents the proportion of 
variance in variable i that is attributable to the other explanatory variables in the model, 








If variable i is strongly correlated with other variables in the model, Ri2 will 
approach 1, the denominator of the above expression will approach 0, and VIFi will be a 
large number.  How large is too large?  The most common rule-of-thumb is that a VIF of 
greater than 10 suggests evidence of multicollinearity (see Neter, Kutner, Nachtscheim, 
& Wasserman, 1996; StataCorp, 2001; but see O’Brien, 2007 for a cautionary discussion 
about the potential pitfalls of blindly following this rule).(Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996; O'Brien, 2007; StataCorp, 2001) 
Table 5 reports the VIFs for all variables in the regression models from Table 4.  
The table reports four VIF scores—two each for the analysis of main effects and of 
temporal effects.  Each set of VIFs includes those for the full model and again for the 
model in which the political environment controls were removed.  (Columns have been 
labeled to match the appropriate model in Table 4.)  According to the rule-of-thumb, 
multicollinearity should not be a problem.  The largest VIF in both full models was well 
less than 10 (5.44 and 6.09), and VIFmean was 2.53 in the main effects analysis and 2.58 




sharing a substantial amount of variance.  Removing just those four controls does lower 
the VIFs considerably.  The largest VIF falls to 3.66 and 3.77 for the main effects and 
temporal effects, respectively.  VIFmean (2.21 and 2.17) also decreases rather 
substantially. 
A closer look at the variables that were symptomatic of multicollinearity and that 
were removed from the analysis reveals a plausible explanation.  What I have reported 
here was not simply the act of taking away any variables whose high correlations may 
have been due to chance.  The fluctuating coefficients had been only with ideology 
variables, and in each of the full models government ideology had the largest VIF.  
Government ideology measures elected officials on a conservative-to-liberal continuum, 
and two of the variables removed were measures of the political affiliation of government 
officials.  It is not surprising that these variables would be strongly correlated with 
government ideology, which in turn is moderately correlated with citizen ideology.  
Removing the control variables attenuated the collinearity problem.  Thus, this analysis, 
in conjunction with the regression analysis I reported previously, leads me to conclude 
that some (slight) multicollinearity issues contributed to the abrupt changes in the 
coefficients of the ideology variables when estimated in the presence of other variables.  I 
am confident that I have taken the appropriate steps to illustrate the support that these 




Table 5. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the state-level CLEC founding rate analysis 
Variable  Model 5  Model 6  Model 10  Model 11 
No. of business establishments in state / 1,000,000  2.91  2.76  3.13  2.89 
State population density / 1000  2.61  2.18  2.75  2.23 
% households in state without phone service  2.97  2.71  3.14  2.83 
State median household income / 1000  2.75  2.69  3.05  2.94 
Era of dot‐com boom (1 = 1996‐2001, 0 = 2002‐2006)  1.29  1.26  1.31  1.28 
CLEC certificates in state / 100 (t‐1)  3.68  3.66  3.88  3.77 
CLEC certificates in state / 100, squared (t‐1)  2.55  2.50  2.85  2.76 
State served by Ameritech  1.34  1.30  1.48  1.41 
State served by Bell Atlantic/Verizon  2.26  2.16  2.35  2.22 
State served by BellSouth  4.02  3.26  4.37  3.53 
State served by SBC/AT&T  2.81  2.59  2.92  2.69 
State served by SNET  1.29  1.27  1.40  1.34 
Government Ideology / 100  5.44  1.95  6.09  2.03 
Government ideology / 100 X Boom    4.51  1.64 
Citizen Ideology / 100  3.02  2.34  3.20  2.45 
Citizen ideology / 100 X Boom    2.38  1.74 
State had variant of rate‐of‐return reg. in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no)  2.04  1.95  2.12  1.99 
State had variant of ROR regulation in 1996 X Boom    1.73  1.62 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre‐1996  1.86  1.84  1.99  1.95 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre‐1996 X Boom    1.79  1.74 
New commissioner  2.12  2.08  2.17  2.10 
New commissioner X Boom    2.18  2.10 
New party controls regulatory commission  1.31  1.29  1.37  1.34 
New party controls regulatory commission X Boom    1.39  1.34 
Avg tenure of commissioners  2.94  2.73  3.40  3.04 
Avg tenure of commissioners X Boom    3.02  2.23 
Yrs that current commission has been together as unit  2.88  2.75  3.03  2.83 
Unit tenure of commission X Boom    3.02  2.78 
New governor  1.11  1.10  1.18  1.17 
New governor X Boom    1.19  1.18 
Avg political sentiment on reg. commission (1=Rep., 0=Dem.)  1.85    1.98   
Avg political sentiment on commission X Boom    1.86   
Republican governor  3.88    4.31   
Republican governor X Boom    3.74   
No. of commissioners  2.10    2.22   
No. of commissioners X Boom    1.26   
Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no)  2.18    2.34   
Elected commissioners X Boom    1.89   
Mean VIF  2.53  2.21  2.58  2.17 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to examine how certain institutional conditions of 
the political environment—namely political ideology of a state’s elected officials and its 
electorate; a state’s regulatory history, which endowed the state with certain capabilities 
for adapting to federal deregulation; and changes in a state’s political regime—affected 




development of the competitive local telephone service industry following the federal 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Findings from this study support the idea that such 
institutional conditions can indeed matter, though support for certain predictions was 
somewhat mixed.  A summary of the results and their support for the hypotheses is 
presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Summary of results for the state-level CLEC founding rate analysis 










Ideology H1.1a Government ideology − Not supported H1.1b Citizen ideology − Not supported 
Institutional 
Endowment 
H1.2a Rate-based rate-of-return local telephone regulation in 1996 − Not supported 
Partially 
supported H1.2b 
Years of experience with incentive-based 
local telephone regulation before 1996 + 
Political Regime 
Change 
H1.3a New commissioner + Not supported 
H1.3b New party in control of commission + Not supported 
H1.3c Avg tenure of commissioners − Not supported 
H1.3d Unit tenure of commission − Not supported 











Ideology H1.5a Government ideology × Boom − 
H1.5b Citizen ideology × Boom − Not supported 
Institutional 
Endowment 
H1.6a Rate-based rate-of-return local telephone regulation in 1996 × Boom − Not supported 
H1.6b 
Years of experience with incentive-based 






H1.7a New commissioner × Boom + 
H1.7b New party in control of commission × Boom + Not supported 
H1.7c Avg tenure of commissioners × Boom − Not supported 
H1.7d Unit tenure of commission × Boom − Not supported 
H1.8 New governor × Boom + Not supported 
My predictions about the effect of political ideology on CLEC founding rates 
received the least support.  I had theorized that states with more conservative ideologies 
would have been more likely to support free market approaches and would therefore have 
been more likely to see higher rates of CLEC foundings.  The results, though, suggest 
that the opposite tended to occur.  In the main effect analysis, states with more liberal 
ideologies—both government officials and citizens—had higher CLEC founding rates.  




effects over time shows that liberal citizen ideology had an even stronger effect during 
the dot-com boom period.  The only evidence in support of my hypotheses about political 
ideology was the finding that in the first half of the study period, CLEC founding rates 
were marginally higher in states whose government officials held more conservative 
ideologies. 
Rather than consider an explanation for how these findings can be simultaneously 
true, the findings may be indicating something else.  One possibility is that the 
relationship between political sentiment and the effects of deregulation was more 
complicated than I initially thought.  Although Republicans (that is, those that hold a 
conservative ideology) are often labeled as the party of free markets and competition, 
they are also known to support big business, and businesses do not get much bigger than 
the Baby Bells.  Simple party affiliations may therefore be poor predictors of the actions 
that politicians will take when competing interests are stake.10  A second reason to 
interpret these ideology results with caution is more methodological in nature.  The 
results suggested some signs of multicollinearity, all of which appeared to be related to 
the ideology variables.  Although I attempted to address this by dropping certain 
variables from the full model, I would need to investigate this more before stating any 
conclusive results for the ideology hypotheses.  Better measures, and ones that address 
my previous comment about the complexity of political party affilitations, would be those 
that tap directly into a free market ideology.  The political ideology variables in this study 
are likely mixing economic conservatism with social conservatism.  Such free market 
                                                 
10 An excellent example of this is the within-party divide on how to proceed with the antitrust lawsuit 
against AT&T that eventually led to its divestiture.  Early in the Reagan administration, tensions were high 
between William Baxter, the head of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, and members of 




ideology measures were not readily available otherwise I would have used them in this 
study, yet it will be something to consider for future work. 
For institutional endowment, the results show that the initial conditions under 
which policy is applied did make a difference, but the specific starting point did not.  
States that were using traditional rate-of-return regulation—which experts on regulatory 
policy claimed was the furthest from deregulation—exhibited no statistical difference 
from states that were using incentive regulation.  Yet the more experience states had with 
incentive-based regulation, the higher their CLEC founding rates, particularly in the early 
years of competition.  At least two reasons could explain this.  One explanation is that the 
experience of using incentive-based regulation did indeed endow a state with the 
institutional necessities (structures, processes, cultures, etc.) for transitioning from 
regulated monopolies to regulated competition.  The more time a state had to develop 
these necessities, the more prepared it was for implementing pro-competition policy and 
the higher its CLEC founding rates.  A different explanation is that the differences were 
the result of the institutionalization of incentive regulation across states.  Much like the 
non-mandated adoption of civil service procedures by cities (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) or 
the spread of TQM in U.S. hospitals (Westphal et al., 1997), states that were the first to 
adopt incentive-based regulation may simply have been making different decisions from 
those who adopted such regulation later and those that did not adopt it at all.  The states 
that were early adopters may have still been institutionally endowed with qualities that 
led them to create conditions for CLEC opportunities more quickly than other states, but 
perhaps it was not the incentive-based regulation experience per se that provided the 




may be possible to answer it by collecting data on specific actions that states were taking 
before 1996.  Nevertheless, the findings here relate to our understanding of the role that 
institutions and starting conditions play in transitioning economies (e.g., Nee, 1996; 
Stark, 1996). 
Policy, of course, does not create itself.  Politicians and bureaucrats write, 
interpret, and enforce legislation.  I had argued that change in a state’s political regime 
would increase opportunities for CLEC entrepreneurs within that state because new 
leaders might bring with them new ideas and might also weaken relationships between 
state actors and incumbent providers.  The findings support this notion.  New governors 
had a significant, positive effect on CLEC founding rates throughout the study period.  
CLEC founding rates also were higher in states that had elected or appointed a new 
commissioner, but only in the early period of deregulation.  Together the findings support 
the idea that that policy—even deregulatory policy—is developed and implemented by 
state actors with ideological interests (Vogel, 1996) and that new leaders can serve as a 
punctuating moment in industry development (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).  As for 
why the two types of leadership change differ in their effect over time, I believe that it is 
due in part to differences in the objectives that each type of leader had.  As the direct 
overseers of the telecommunications industry, the objectives of commissioners were to 
create conditions to allow for competition, not necessarily with any of competition’s 
broader economic effects.  A successful mission for them was to fulfill the federal 
mandates and create the opportunities for competition to arise.  Doing so should be 
facilitated by an ability to conceive of competitive local telephony.  For longtime 




telephone service had to be regulated as a monopoly, this transition was likely difficult.  
Relative to commissioners of this era, new commissioners were bringing with them more 
pro-competition insights.  As more and more commissioners were replaced, however, the 
effect of adding new commissioners diminished.  The main effect I find with governors, 
on the other hand, is in line with the notion that their concerns about the industry related 
to state economic development.  Because governors had not been involved with the day-
to-day oversight of the telecommunications industry, whatever mental models they had of 
the industry likely were irrelevant to their aims.  Compared with commissioners, 
governors were concerned solely with issues of the economy and entrepreneurship.  If 
anything, governors have become more attuned to economic and entrepreneurial issues 
since 1996, which is one possible explanation for why this effect has not abated.  In all, 
the findings on political regime change support Selznick’s (1957) belief that leaders play 




CHAPTER VI:  FIRM-LEVEL GROWTH ACROSS STATES 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I present analysis that tests my hypotheses about CLECs’ 
decisions to expand their service into additional states.  I first describe my sample of 
CLECs and data along with all variables and their data sources.  Subsequently, I provide 
a detailed specification of the regression model I use.  Next, I present descriptive 
statistics of my data followed by results from the regression analyses.  Following some 
diagnostic checks of the model, I then run a second set of analyses to distinguish between 
legacy policy and geographic proximity.  I conclude with a discussion of my results, 
including a summary of which hypotheses received support. 
METHOD 
To test my hypotheses, I analyzed time-series data on the expansion of facilities-
based CLECs into new markets between 1997 and 2005.  Competition across the U.S. 
was allowed by the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Because expansion must 
be measured relative to a firm’s initial market, data analysis begins one year later in 
1997.  The end year is determined by the availability of my dependent variable. 
As with the previous study, I define markets as states.  I believe that this is the 
most appropriate level to test my theoretical questions, all of which are related to state-




Dependent Variable Data Source 
The data for this study come from market reports11 on the CLEC industry 
authored by New Paradigm Resources Group (NPRG).  NPRG’s reports are recognized 
within the telecommunications industry as the most comprehensive source of information 
on facilities-based CLECs and have served as a data source for several academic studies 
of the CLEC industry (Greenstein & Mazzeo, 2006; Hauge, Jamison, & Gentry, 2008; Hu 
& Huang, 2006).  NPRG has produced reports since its founding in 1993.  For the 
duration of my study the reports were released annually except from 2000 to 2002 when 
they were released semi-annually.  Data for this study come from reports listed in Table 
7.  Reports are based on information from the previous calendar year.  For example, the 
1997 report covers CLEC activity in 1996. 
Table 7. Market research reports from New Paradigm Resources Group (NPRG) comprising the 
data for this study 
Year Published Edition Year Covered 
1997 8 1996 
1998 9 1997 
1999 10 1998 
2000 11 1999 
2001 13 2000 
2002 15 2001 
2003 17 2002 
2004 18 2003 
2005 19 2004 
2006 20 2005 
CLECs vary by type of ownership.  Some are, or were, publicly traded, but the 
majority of CLECs have been privately held.  Information that CLECs make publicly 
available thus varies widely, and such variation is reflected in the NPRG reports.  At a 
minimum, the reports include each CLEC’s name, contact information (physical address, 
                                                 
11 The reports have appeared under a variety of titles:  Annual Report on Local Telephone Competition 
(1997 to 1999), CLEC Report (2000 to 2001), CLEC Report:  Competitive Last Mile Providers (2002 to 




phone number, e-mail address, and website address), and areas served (cities and states) 
along with a brief summary of the CLEC’s history.  When available, the reports include 
the CLEC’s officers, directors, revenues (past and projected), number of employees, 
services offered, individual network information (e.g., size of network, type of equipment 
used and where equipment is located, etc.), state certifications, interconnection 
agreements, strategy, and NPRG’s analysis of the CLEC.  For the purposes of this study, 
I use the information reported on states served by each CLEC. 
Sample and Data 
Cumulatively, the NPRG reports covered 281 CLECs.  Assessing geographic 
growth requires that I have data from at least two reports:  one report to establish an 
initial geographic footprint, and at least one additional report to measure any market 
expansion.  I therefore exclude from analysis 93 CLECs that only appeared in one report.  
I further exclude two companies that were not headquartered in the continental United 
States:  Global Crossed Ltd. (Bermuda) and General Communications, Inc. (Alaska).  
This yields a total sample of 186 firms.  Of these, 150 firms (81%) eventually operated in 
multiple states while the remaining 36 firms only operated within their headquarters state.  
(A complete list of CLECs in this study appears in the Appendix.) 
Left-censoring is present within this sample.  Of the 150 multi-state firms, 117 
(78%) were reported as operating in multiple states during the first year that they 
appeared in an NPRG report.12  This, however, does not appear to be a consequence of 
the fact that I begin this study with the 1997 report.  Of the 32 multi-state firms that first 
                                                 
12 This level of censoring is similar to the study of international expansion of Japanese manufacturers by 
Hensiz and Delios (2001: 450), who report that 77% of their sample had already made at least one 




appeared in the 1997 report, 24 (75.0%) were listed as operating in multiple states in 
1997.  Similarly, 89 of the 118 firms (75.4%) whose profiles began after 1997 also were 
listed as operating in multiple states the very first time they were profiled.  Another 
possible explanation is that NPRG did not begin to cover firms until they were 
sufficiently large.  I believe that this is unlikely.  The reports include many small, nascent 
firms, and NPRG’s incentives are to include every firm possible.  Large firms are already 
well-known by many within the industry, so much of the value of NPRG’s information to 
its customers comes from reporting on companies of all sizes. 
The most plausible explanation is that these particular firms likely had an initial 
plan to launch their service in multiple markets.  In future work I can attempt to find 
more fine-grained data on when such firms entered each specific market.  In this 
dissertation I will control for each CLEC’s initial market size as well as its market size at 
each decision point in its history. 
Though the level of initial multi-state entry was high, most initial footprints were 
small.  Table 8 displays a frequency table of initial market size.  Among the 186 CLECs 
in my sample the median initial market size is 2, and nearly three-fourths of the sample 
started in five or fewer states.  Less than 10% of the CLECs were operating in 10 or more 
states the first time they were profiled by NPRG.13 
                                                 
13 The majority of the CLECs that began with large initial markets already had a national infrastructure or 
sales force that allowed them to offer local telephone service to a widespread area.  This included long 
distance carriers (AT&T , 29 states; MCI, 25 states), competitive access providers (Teleport 
Communications Group, 26 states), and cellular providers (WinStar, 28 states)..  The largest firms had 
other reasons for getting so big, so fast.  Advanced Radio Telecom Corp. (43 states) offered its services 
wirelessly using point-to-point microwave transmissions.  This service did not have the capacity nor the 
robustness that fiber networks provide, but they were faster and cheaper to deploy.  Advanced Radio 
Telecom eventually ran out of financing and filed for bankruptcy 2001.  NETtel (46 states) entered the 
industry at its peak with a plan to deploy service nationwide.  Like many other facilities-based CLECs, the 




Table 8. Frequency distribution of the initial market sizes for the CLECs in the sample 
Initial Market Size 
(# of states) 
# of 
CLECs 
Pct of all 
CLECs 
Cumulative 
# of CLECs 
Cumulative 
Pct 
1 68 36.6% 68 36.6% 
2 29 15.6% 97 52.2% 
3 15 8.1% 112 60.2% 
4 13 7.0% 125 67.2% 
5 13 7.0% 138 74.2% 
6 10 5.4% 148 79.6% 
7 10 5.4% 158 84.9% 
8 3 1.6% 161 86.6% 
9 4 2.2% 165 88.7% 
10 4 2.2% 169 90.9% 
11 1 0.5% 170 91.4% 
12 1 0.5% 171 91.9% 
13 1 0.5% 172 92.5% 
15 1 0.5% 173 93.0% 
16 1 0.5% 174 93.5% 
17 1 0.5% 175 94.1% 
19 1 0.5% 176 94.6% 
23 1 0.5% 177 95.2% 
24 1 0.5% 178 95.7% 
25 1 0.5% 179 96.2% 
26 2 1.1% 181 97.3% 
28 1 0.5% 182 97.8% 
29 1 0.5% 183 98.4% 
32 1 0.5% 184 98.9% 
43 1 0.5% 185 99.5% 
46 1 0.5% 186 100.0% 
Unlike other studies on market expansion which treat entry as a repeatable event 
(Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Henisz & Delios, 2001), I treat it as a non-repeatable 
event.  I do this in part for practical reasons.  Seldom did a CLEC begin operating in a 
state, leave the state, and then re-enter the state.14  There are also theoretical reasons for 
treating entry as non-repeatable.  My concern is with how state-level institutional forces 
raised or lowered barriers to entry.  This is best answered by looking at a CLEC’s initial 
entry into a state.  Though it is true that entry into a particular state does not constitute 
                                                                                                                                                 
woes reached the breaking point.  Within a span of mere months, it withdrew its IPO, filed for bankruptcy, 
and liquidated its assets. 
14 To use a gaming analogy, the thrifts in Haveman’s study are like chess players, constantly shuffling their 
(relatively) fixed assets as they defend against and attack their competitors.  CLECs in the era of this study 
were more akin to Texas Hold ’Em poker players.  As soon as CLEC owners saw an advantage, they 




complete coverage of that state by the CLEC—and thus a firm could enter Cleveland one 
year, Columbus the next, and Cincinnati some time after that—examining such entry 
patterns would answer a research question different from mine. 
By defining market entry as a non-repeatable event, I can now define a CLEC’s 
risk set in a given year as those states into which the CLEC had not already entered at the 
beginning of the year. 
As stated previously, my sample consists of 186 firms.  My unit of analysis is the 
firm-state, and there are 8,005 distinct firm-states in my data.  The data take the form of 
one observation per CLEC per state-at-risk-of-entry per year, thus making the firm-state-
year my unit of observation.  My data consist of N = 26,267 observations, of which 936 
correspond to market entries. 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the conditional probability—or hazard—that a CLEC 
entered a state in a given year given that it had not already entered the state prior to that 
year.  For CLEC i, state j, and year k, this can be stated mathematically: 
)|Pr()( kTkTth ≥ijijijk ==  
CLEC i’s decision regarding entry into state j in year k is measured with an 
indicator variable, Eijk.  Eijk equals 1 if i entered j in k; otherwise it equals 0. 
Independent Variables 
Several of the independent variables in this chapter were described in the previous 
chapter on state-level founding rates.  When appropriate, I make reference to my 




Founding Conditions.  I constructed variables for measuring a target state’s 
similarity to the focal CLEC’s headquarter state on two dimensions:  regulatory history 
and political ideology.  Both are derived from measures used in the previous chapter on 
state-level founding rates.  For regulatory history, I calculate: 
| incentive regulation experiencei – incentive regulation experiencej | 
| rate-of-return regulationi – rate-of-return regulationj | 
where incentive regulation experience is the number of years a state had been 
using incentive regulation (e.g., indexed price caps, rate freezes) prior to 1996, rate-of-
return regulation is a dummy variable indicating whether a state had been using a variant 
of traditional rate-of-return regulation (often referred to as cost-plus regulation) in 1996 
(1=yes, 0=no), i is the headquarter state of the focal CLEC, and j is the target state.  I 
include the actual measures for the target state j’s incentive regulation experience and 
rate-of-return regulation as controls. 
For political ideology, I calculate: 
| government ideologyik – government ideologyjk | 
| citizen ideologyik – citizen ideologyjk | 
where government ideology is a measure of a state’s political leaders on a 
conservative-to-liberal continuum, citizen ideology is a measure of a state’s electorate on 
a conservative-to-liberal continuum, i is the headquarter state of the focal CLEC, j is the 
target state, and k is the year being studied.  I include the actual measures for the target 




Please see the previous chapter for more details on the computation and data 
sources of incentive regulation experience, rate-of-return regulation, citizen ideology, 
and government ideology. 
Legacy Policy.  I measure whether a CLEC had a pre-existing relationship with 
the RBOC territory of a target state in two different ways.  The first measure indicates 
whether the state is in the same RBOC territory as the focal CLEC’s headquarters state.  
The second indicates whether the state is not in the same RBOC territory as the focal 
CLEC’s headquarter state but is in the same RBOC territory as a different state in the 
CLEC’s service area.  The two measures are included as dummy variables. 
Political Regime Change.  As in the previous chapter, I measure political regime 
change within two different areas of state government:  public utility commissions and 
gubernatorial offices.  I include the same four variables for change in public utility 
commissions: (1) whether at least one new commissioner replaced an outgoing 
commissioner on the state’s public utility commission (1=yes, 0=no); (2) whether a new 
political party controls the commission (1=yes, 0=no); (3) the average tenure of each 
commissioner on the commission (years); and (4) the unit tenure of the complete 
commission (years).  Data on public utility commissions come from “The All 
Commissioners List” compiled by Janice Beecher of the Institute of Public Utilities at 
Michigan State University 
(http://www.ipu.msu.edu/research/pdfs/All%20Commissioners%20List%20-%2007.pdf) 
(Beecher, 2007).  Information on commissioners’ political affiliations was supplemented 




My measure for change within a gubernatorial office remains the same:  whether 
a new governor took office in the state in a given year (1=yes, 0=no).  Data on the 
gubernatorial history of each state come from the National Governors Association 
(http://www.nga.org/). 
Control Variables 
I controlled for a number of alternative explanations for state-level variance in 
CLEC foundings.  Many of them were described in the previous chapter on state-level 
founding rates.  I describe them again here for completeness. 
Firm Expansion History 
States in Home RBOC Territory.  Though I posit a theory for why a CLEC is 
likely to expand into states within its home RBOC territory, that can only be true if the 
CLEC has not already expanded into those states.  I therefore include the number of 
states in the focal CLEC’s home RBOC territory that remain in the CLEC’s risk set. 
Number of States Already Entered.  The likelihood that a CLEC enters any state 
could vary according to the number of states the CLEC has already entered.  For 
example, it is plausible that the smaller a CLEC’s risk set, the more likely it is that a 
CLEC has established its market base and will not expand further.  I therefore include a 
count of the number of states the focal CLEC has already entered prior to the current 
period of analysis. 
Physical Proximity 
Adjacency.  Common sense would suggest that firms are more likely to expand to 




networks, such as the telephone system.  I consider physical proximity with three 
different levels of adjacency:  (1) states that are directly adjacent to the focal CLEC’s 
headquarters state, (2) states that are not adjacent to the focal CLEC’s headquarter state 
but that are adjacent to at least one state in which the CLEC is presently operating, and 
(3) all other states (i.e., non-adjacency).  I include dummy variables for the first two 
conditions:  adjacency to the focal CLEC’s headquarter state and adjacency to any non-
headquarter state that is already in the focal CLEC’s service area. 
Economic Environment 
Business Establishments.  Many telephony and regulatory experts suggested that 
CLECs would be more interested in serving businesses than residential customers 
because (a) revenue per business access line tends to be higher than revenue per 
residential access line and (b) a CLEC can grow more efficiently by serving businesses 
rather than residential customers.  I therefore include the number of business 
establishments within a state.  Annual data on the number of business establishments 
within a state comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistics of U.S. Businesses 
(http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susb.htm). 
Population Density.  Another common explanation for CLEC location is that 
CLECs would be attracted to densely-populated areas.  Because telephone networks are 
physical networks, more densely populated areas could be served more efficiently, thus 
resulting in higher profit opportunity.  I include an annual measure of population density, 
which I compute as the population within a state divided by the land area of a state.  Data 
on the average estimated state population come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 




Median Household Income.  ILECs and opponents of competitive telephony 
legislation argued that CLECs choosing to serve residential customers would be “cream-
skimmers”; that is, they would target only the most affluent neighborhoods as customers.  
I control for this by including the median household income of each state.  Annual data 
comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey 
(http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h08a.html). 
Dot-Com Boom.  The passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act coincided 
with the meteoric rise in the dot-com/e-commerce industry.  Demand for telephony 
services subsequently increased, and it was also easier to obtain financing to become a 
CLEC.  This changed with the 2000 stock market crash as many dot-coms went bankrupt 
and financing sources dwindled, though telecom experts claim that the telecom industry 
did not begin to see a severe downturn until 2001 (Crandall, 2005).  To account for this, I 
include a dummy variable set to “1” for 1997-2001 and “0” for 2002 -2005. 
Ecological Environment 
CLEC Density.  Organizational ecologists commonly model population dynamics 
with density dependence (Hannan & Freeman, 1989).  The argument for including a 
quadratic representation of density—that is, the lagged number of firms in the population 
and its square—in one’s model is that a population’s vital rates are related to the size of 
the population by two processes:  legitimation and competition (Carroll & Hannan, 
1989).  When an industry is in its nascent state, more firms within it provide the industry 
with greater legitimacy.  Increased legitimacy, in turn, attracts even more firms and the 
industry grows.  A point is eventually reached, however, when too many firms have 




resources leads to the failure of some firms and discourages new firms from entering the 
industry.  Critics may question the interpretation of the mechanisms behind the 
phenomenon (cf. Zucker, 1989), but the effect itself has received strong empirical support 
(for a review, see Carroll & Hannan, 2000). 
The initial formulation of density dependence concerned founding and failure 
rates.  Since then it has been extended to the growth of firms entering new niches 
(Barron, West, & Hannan, 1994; Greve, 2000; Haveman, 1993).  As Carroll and Hannan 
note, “Any process that makes it easier for entrepreneurs to mobilize resources ought also 
to make it easier for existing organizations to grow” (2000: 218).  I control for density 
dependence in my model by including the number of CLECs operating within the target 
state and its square, both lagged one year. 
Political Environment15 
Commission Political Party.  Republicans are often labeled as the party of free 
markets and competition.  This suggests that a commission with Republican leanings 
would be more likely to create conditions to encourage CLEC entry.  To control for this, 
include the political sentiment of the regulatory commissioners in each state.  I previously 
described the computation for this measure when explaining my measure for new 
political party controls the commission. 
Governor Political Party.  Likewise, I control for whether the governor is 
Republican with a dummy variable noting whether the governor of a state is a Republican 
(1=yes, 0=no).  Data come from the National Governors Association 
(http://www.nga.org/). 
                                                 




Elected Commissioners.  States differ with respect to whether their public utility 
commissioners are elected or appointed.  Though some states have changed their method 
in the past, over the course of this study the measure remained constant (11 states elected; 
24 appointed).  I control for any potential difference in states’ methods of commissioner 
selection by including a dummy variable for whether the state’s commissioners were 
elected (1=yes, 0=no).  Data come from (Beecher, 2007). 
Number of Commissioners.  States vary in the size of their commission (3 to 7).   
Some intrastate variation exists as certain states passed legislation to change the size of 
their commission (e.g., Arizona) while others took lengthy periods of time to replace 
commissioners who resigned.  I include this measure to control for any potential impact 
commission size may have.  Data come from (Beecher, 2007). 
I lag all explanatory variables that vary with time by one year to account for the 
time that would be necessary for the organizational structures, processes, and climate to 
be changed and for that change to be recognized by potential entrepreneurs. 
 Interaction Variables 
To test the hypotheses about possible temporal effects of institutional forces 
(H2.6a-H2.10), I create interaction terms for each of the independent variables as well as 
the political regime change control variables (commission political party, Republican 
governor, number of commissioners, and elected commissioners).  I multiply each 
variable by the variable boom in order to assess whether certain institutional effects apply 
only in the early stages of industry development.  I decided to use boom rather than the 
firm-specific “event time” (described in the Model Specification and Estimation, below) 




how well an event time clock captures a firm’s true history.  For some firms, the clock 
may start when the first begins operations.  For others, it may be their second or even 
third year as a CLEC, though their first year being covered by NPRG.  Second, and 
equally important, I believe that any conditional effects on my argument will be due to 
historical time, not individual firm time.  That is, the bigger conditional effect will be 
contextual (e.g., Was venture capital widely available?  Were pressures high to file for 
IPO?) rather than firm-specific (e.g., Is the firm in its third year of operation or its sixth?).  
In future studies I can attempt to tease out the differences, but for now I just use the 
dummy variable for the dot-com boom and maintain consistency with the previous 
chapter.  It is worth noting that the two measures are strongly correlated (r=-.74) because 
most CLECs were started during the dot-com boom. 
As in the previous chapter, I center all variables before computing the interaction 
term.  This allows coefficients of both the main effects and the interactions to be 
interpretable (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Model Specification 
I analyze my data with a discrete-time event history model16 (Allison, 1984; Cox, 
1972; Singer & Willett, 2003).  Event history analysis is appropriate when the object 
studied is when an event occurred, not just that an event occurred.  In other words, event 
history models analyze duration.  These models are extremely useful because they handle 
right-censoring.  Right-censoring occurs when the duration for an event is unknown 
because the event never occurs.  For this study, all states that were not entered by a 
                                                 
16 Event history analysis is a term commonly used in the social and behavioral sciences.  Other disciplines 
refer to these models as survival analysis (medicine) and failure time analysis (engineering), among other 
names (e.g., duration analysis, reliability analysis).  Hazard modeling is a general term used across many 




CLEC when the CLEC was removed from the sample due to bankruptcy or acquisition or 
at the end of the study are right-censored. 
Discrete Time vs. Continuous Time 
Although social scientists rarely work with continuous-time data, continuous-time 
methods can be used to model event history data provided that time is measured with 
sufficient granularity and there are few ties in the data (Allison, 1982; Yamaguchi, 1991).  
That is not the case for this study.  I have chosen a discrete-time model because the 
information I have on CLEC market entries comes from annual market reports.  And 
because of the discrete nature in which time is measured, ties are pervasive; CLECs can 
enter states at one of only nine different times.  Discrete-time models are very powerful 
because they can easily accommodate time-varying covariates and can be analyzed with 
standard statistical functions. 
Link Function 
As with standard regression, discrete-time event history models involve 
regressing a dependent variable onto a linear function of explanatory variables.  Problems 
arise when trying to regress the hazard itself onto the covariates.  Assuming we have 
time-invariant covariates x1 and time-varying covariates x2, we would have 
)()()( 2211 txxtth α +β +β=  
where β1 is the vector of coefficients for x1, β2 is the vector of coefficients for x2, 
and α is a function only of time.  The hazard, or probability of event occurrence, must lie 
between 0 and 1, but the right-hand side of the equation is not held to these same 
constraints.  A common solution is to transform the hazard into its log-odds, commonly 










In a logit model, each coefficient estimates the change in the log-odds for a one-
unit increase of its respective covariate.  Exponentiating the coefficient provides the 
estimated odds for that one-unit increase.  For example, a dummy variable with a 
coefficient of 0.324 would indicate that the odds of an event occurring are estimated to be  
 times higher for instances where the variable equals 1 than when it equals 0. 383.1324.0 =e
Logistic regression is not the only method available for transforming the hazard 
into an unbounded variable.  Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) proposed an alternative 
transformation of the probability, the complementary log-log (clog-log) link function: 
)()())(1ln(ln( 2211 txxtth− =α +β +β−  
Whereas exponentiating the coefficient from a logit model provides an odds ratio, 
exponentiating a coefficient of a clog-log model yields a hazard ratio.  A coefficient of 
0.324 would indicate that the hazard, or probability, of an event occurring are estimated 
to be  times higher for instances where the variable equals 1 than when it 
equals 0. 
383.1324.0 =e
When the hazard rate is low, as it is in this study, hazard and odds are very 
similar.  For example, a hazard of 0.20 is equivalent to an odds of 0.25.  A hazard of .10 








.  Logit models 
and clog-log models therefore tend to be similar for small hazards. 
Some analysts prefer to use clog-log regression because it is the discrete-time 
analog to the Cox proportional hazard model, the most popular technique for continuous-




basis of time is truly continuous and measurement is the only reason the values are 
discrete.  Otherwise, neither holds an advantage over the other (Singer & Willett, 2003). 
In this dissertation I report results from both models for the sake of completeness.  
Results are substantively similar across the methods.  Except where there are differences, 
I will typically discuss estimates only from the logit model because that method is more 
commonly found within the organization theory literature.  Both models are estimated 
with maximum likelihood using standard statistical functions.  My analyses are all 
conducted within Stata 8.0 using xtlogit for logistic regression and xtcloglog for 
complementary-log-log regression. 
Treatment of Time 
The discrete-time model includes one observation per unit of time that a CLEC is 
at risk of entering a particular state.  This “event time” starts at 0 and ends with entry or 
right-censoring.  How to incorporate event time into a discrete-time model is an analytic 
decision each researcher must make and reflects one’s assumptions, theoretical or 
empirical, about how the baseline hazard function will vary with time.  Time can be 
omitted from the model if one believes that the baseline hazard remains constant.  (That 
is, at any given point in the study, a CLEC is equally likely to enter a state.)  Yet typically 
the hazard that an event occurs will vary the longer it is at risk.  For the discrete-time 
model, Allison (1984) suggests modeling time with a series of dummy variables, one for 
each time period.  This creates the best fitting model, but not necessarily the one that is 





To determine the best representation of time for this analysis, I followed Singer 
and Willett (2003) and estimated the hazard function at each point in time across all data.  
This is equivalent to constructing a life-table with no substantive predictors.  Figure 8 
plots the estimated hazard, odds, logit, and clog-log.  Except for jumps in years 6 and 9, 
both the logit and the clog-log of the hazard appear to be decreasing in roughly linear 
fashion. 
Figure 8. Estimated hazard, odds, logit, and clog-log functions 



















































As an additional check, I estimated within-group hazard functions for two of my 
independent variables:  (1) whether a state received a new governor and (2) whether a 
state resides in the same RBOC territory as the focal CLEC’s headquarter state.  The 
results are graphed in Figure 9.  As with the estimated baseline, the hazards appear to be 
decreasing linearly for both groups. 
 
Figure 9. Estimated hazard functions for the effect of two predictor variables 
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A decreasing hazard makes sense within this context.  Many CLECs followed the 




market dominance and take advantage of economies of scale.  In some cases, companies 
grew as quickly as possible because large customer bases made them attractive 
acquisition targets. 
For these reasons, I choose to treat year linearly. 
Unobserved Heterogeneity 
A typical discrete-time event history model studies a social actor under 
observation; recidivism, survival after cancer diagnosis, and business failure are all 
focused on persons or individual organizations.  My study is different.  My unit of 
analysis is the CLEC-state dyad.  That means that each CLEC and each state are 
appearing multiple times for each time period in the study.  This poses an estimation 
problem:  unobserved heterogeneity, or “frailty.”17 
I assume that all target-state-level heterogeneity is observed because I am 
including many state-level independent and control variables.  I address firm-level 
unobserved heterogeneity with random effects, which is the typical method for 
addressing unobserved heterogeneity in event history analysis (Cleves et al., 2002; 
Therneau & Grambsch, 2000).  I do not use fixed effects because fixed effects models 
can only be applied when there is variance across the predictor variables within each 
fixed group.  For CLECs, this would require each CLEC to appear in a minimum of three 
reports and would reduce my sample of CLECs from 186 to 112.  As a check, however, I 
ran my final model with firm fixed effects and then ran a random-effects model on the 
same subsample of 112 firms.  The results were substantively similar. 
                                                 
17 The term “frailty” is most often used in the biostatistics and engineering literatures, where the event 
studied is typically death or failure.  Researchers there are concerned that some individuals or components 
are inherently more frail –and thus more susceptible to death or failure –than others in the study.  





One additional concern is that CLECs founded in the same state may behave 
similarly.  In other words, perhaps all New York-based CLECs expand to the same set of 
states, all New Mexico-based CLECs expand to the same set of states, etc.  To test for 
this, I ran a my final model with fixed effects on CLEC founding state.  The results were 
substantively similar to the models I will present in the next section. 
Summary of Firm-Level Hypotheses 
I summarize my hypotheses and model in Table 9.  For each hypothesis, I have 
listed the variable(s) I use to test it along with the predicted direction of its coefficient. 
Table 9. Summary of hypotheses for the firm-level expansion analysis 












H2.1a Distance from HDQ state on government ideology − 




H2.2a Same 1996 local telephone regulation as HDQ state + 
H2.2b Distance from HDQ state on incentive-based regulation experience − 
Legacy Policy 
H2.3-1 Same RBOC as HDQ state + 
H2.3-2 Same RBOC as other state(s) in CLEC’s market + 
Political Regime 
Change 
H2.4a New commissioner + 
H2.4b New party in control of commission + 
H2.4c Avg tenure of commissioners − 
H2.4d Unit tenure of commission − 











H2.6a Distance from HDQ state on government ideology × Boom − 




H2.7a Same 1996 local telephone regulation as HDQ state × Boom + 
H2.7b Distance from HDQ state on incentive-based regulation experience × Boom − 
Legacy Policy 
H2.8-1 Same RBOC as HDQ state × Boom + 
H2.8-2 Same RBOC as other state(s) in CLEC’s market × Boom + 
Political Regime 
Change 
H2.9a New commissioner × Boom + 
H2.9b New party in control of commission × Boom + 
H2.9c Avg tenure of commissioners × Boom − 
H2.9d Unit tenure of commission × Boom − 







Table 10 reports the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, and range) for 
the dependent variable, independent variables, and control variables.  (Note that several 
variables have been scaled to allow for more readable coefficients in the regression 
output.)  Table 11 reports the correlation matrix for all variables.  As in the previous 
chapter, correlations among the variables of theoretical interest (i.e., (13) through (31)) 
tend to be small in magnitude (|r| < .30; less than 10 percent shared variance), and once 
again those variables that exhibit moderate levels of correlation tend to be related 
conceptually.  This is especially true for ideology, regulatory history, and changes in the 
public utility commission.  As an additional validity check for government ideology, it 
remains much more strongly correlated with states having Republican governors (r = -
.69) and Republican-controlled utility commissions (r = -.40) when compared with 
citizen ideology.  Overall, it appears unlikely that the estimates in my models will be 
biased due to multicollinearity, especially across subsets of variables.  Still, I will 
estimate coefficients for subsets of theoretically similar variables before estimating all 
variables simultaneously.  I will also revisit potential multicollinearlity issues when 






Table 10. Descriptive statistics for the firm-level expansion analysis 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Market Entry [DV] (1=yes, 0=no) 0.036 0.185 0 1
State is adjacent to CLEC's HDQ state 0.074 0.262 0 1
State is adjacent to non-HDQ state in CLEC's 
market 0.199 0.400 0 1
No. of business establishments in state/ 1,000,000 0.131 0.136 0.018 0.842
State population density / 1000 0.172 0.244 0.005 1.170
State median household income / 1000 46.726 6.898 32.495 63.511
CLECs in state / 100 0.000 0.134 -0.169 0.541
CLECs in state / 100, squared 0.018 0.031 0.000 0.293
No. of states within CLEC's hdq RBOC territory that 
CLEC is not serving 8.213 3.613 0 14
No. of states in which CLEC is operating 6.797 7.445 1 47
Time period (0-indexed to 1) 1.978 2.004 0 8
Era of dot-com boom (1 = Yr <= 2001, 0 = Yr > 
2001) 0.690 0.463 0 1
Government ideology / 100 0.430 0.260 0.000 0.979
Citizen ideology / 100 0.478 0.146 0.084 0.960
Difference between government ideologies of state 
and CLEC's hdq state -3.324 35.003 -95.417 90.500
Difference between citizen ideologies of state and 
CLEC's hdq state -4.085 19.334 -72.465 68.657
State had variant of rate-of-return regulation in 1996 
(1=yes, 0=no) 0.475 0.499 0 1
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 2.176 2.781 0 9
Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of 
state and CLEC's hdq state 2.999 2.664 0 9
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of 
regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 0.500 0.500 0 1
State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq state 0.193 0.394 0 1
State in same RBOC territory as a non-HDQ state in 
CLEC's market 0.227 0.419 0 1
New commissioner 0.407 0.491 0 1
New party controls regulatory commission 0.119 0.324 0 1
Avg tenure of commissioners 4.797 3.310 0 22
Yrs that current commission has been together as 
unit 1.297 1.657 0 8
New governor 0.144 0.351 0 1
Avg political sentiment on regulatory commission 
(1=Repub., 0=Dem.) 0.543 0.265 0 1
Republican governor 0.627 0.483 0 1
No. of commissioners 3.784 1.185 0 7
Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no) 0.325 0.468 0 1
 
 
Table 11. Correlation matrix for the firm-level expansion analysis 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Market Entry [DV] (1=yes, 0=no) —                
(2) State is adjacent to CLEC's HDQ state .07 —               
(3) State is adjacent to non-HDQ state in CLEC's market .09 -.14 —              
(4) No. of business establishments in state/ 1,000,000 .07 -.03 -.08 —             
(5) State population density / 1000 .03 -.02 .00 .21 —            
(6) State median household income / 1000 .03 -.05 -.04 .22 .49 —           
(7) CLECs in state / 100 .07 -.03 -.06 .66 .25 .39 —          
(8) CLECs in state / 100, squared .02 -.02 -.06 .45 .05 .04 .65 —         
(9) No. of states within CLEC's hdq RBOC territory that CLEC is not serving -.01 .06 -.20 .05 .02 .03 .13 .08 —        
(10) No. of states in which CLEC is operating .05 .00 .52 -.14 -.05 -.05 -.14 -.06 -.45 —       
(11) Time period (0-indexed to 1) -.09 -.02 .18 -.02 .00 .05 -.08 -.07 -.12 .37 —      
(12) Era of dot-com boom (1 = Yr <= 2001, 0 = Yr > 2001) .09 .02 -.09 .00 -.01 -.04 .15 .14 .07 -.21 -.74 —     
(13) Government ideology / 100 .01 .00 .03 .08 .31 .19 .10 -.05 .01 -.02 .07 -.08 —    
(14) Citizen ideology / 100 .01 -.03 -.02 .15 .55 .31 .12 .08 .00 .00 .05 -.07 .54 —   
(15) Difference between government ideologies of state and CLEC's hdq state .00 .02 .00 .06 .23 .14 .09 -.02 .06 -.05 .05 -.04 .75 .39 —  
(16) Difference between citizen ideologies of state and CLEC's hdq state .01 .00 -.01 .12 .45 .26 .11 .09 -.07 .00 .02 -.04 .41 .77 .42 — 
(17) State had variant of rate-of-return reg. in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) -.03 .00 -.01 -.34 -.25 -.08 -.19 -.22 -.01 .03 .01 .00 -.04 -.20 -.02 -.16 
(18) Yrs state had incentive reg., pre-1996 .00 .01 -.01 .21 .21 .02 .00 .15 .00 .01 .00 .00 .09 .27 .06 .21 
(19) Difference between yrs of incentive reg. of state and CLEC's hdq state -.01 .00 -.02 .05 .08 .00 -.04 .04 .01 -.02 -.01 .00 -.01 .05 .03 .04 
(20) State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of reg. in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) -.01 -.01 .00 -.15 -.10 -.03 -.08 -.09 -.01 .03 .00 .00 -.02 -.08 -.01 -.05 
(21) State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq state .07 .32 .05 -.02 .02 .02 -.02 .00 .18 .01 .00 .00 .02 .05 .03 .03 
(22) State in same RBOC territory as a non-HDQ state in CLEC's market .06 -.07 .47 -.05 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.05 -.19 .49 .18 -.11 -.02 -.04 -.04 -.04 
124 (23) New commissioner .03 -.01 .00 .17 .06 .07 .14 .06 .02 -.04 -.01 -.05 .09 .12 .07 .09 
(24) New party controls regulatory commission .00 -.01 -.01 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.04 .00 .00 -.02 .03 .04 .01 .03 .01 
(25) Avg tenure of commissioners -.04 -.03 .01 -.29 -.12 -.21 -.29 -.06 -.01 .07 -.01 .04 -.11 -.03 -.08 -.02 
(26) Yrs that current commission has been together as unit -.02 -.01 .01 -.19 -.08 -.08 -.15 -.06 -.01 .04 .00 .03 -.16 -.10 -.11 -.07 
(27) New governor .02 -.02 .00 .06 .01 .06 .06 .05 .04 .01 .12 -.12 .08 .06 .06 .03 
(28) Avg political sentiment on regulatory commission (1=Repub., 0=Dem.) .01 .02 -.02 .11 .00 .03 .11 .12 .01 -.01 .00 .00 -.40 -.05 -.30 -.04 
(29) Republican governor .00 .00 -.03 .03 .08 -.17 .00 .09 .00 -.01 -.07 .07 -.69 -.07 -.52 -.05 
(30) No. of commissioners .03 -.01 -.02 .26 .14 .15 .27 .10 .04 -.06 .00 -.02 .22 .07 .16 .05 
(31) Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no) -.02 .01 -.01 -.26 -.31 -.41 -.17 -.10 .00 .03 .01 -.01 -.29 -.37 -.21 -.30 
                  
Variable (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31)  
(17) State had variant of rate-of-return reg. in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) —                
(18) Yrs state had incentive reg., pre-1996 -.53 —               
(19) Difference between yrs of incentive reg. of state and CLEC's hdq state -.10 .35 —              
(20) State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of reg. in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) .43 -.24 .14 —             
(21) State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq state -.03 .04 .01 -.10 —            
(22) State in same RBOC territory as a non-HDQ state in CLEC's market .00 -.01 .00 .02 -.26 —           
(23) New commissioner -.03 -.04 -.03 -.01 .00 -.01 —          
(24) New party controls regulatory commission .13 -.08 .00 .06 .00 .00 .36 —         
(25) Avg tenure of commissioners -.11 .22 .07 -.06 .01 .02 -.38 -.16 —        
(26) Yrs that current commission has been together as unit -.06 .08 .03 -.03 .00 .01 -.65 -.27 .66 —       
(27) New governor -.03 .01 .01 -.02 .00 .01 .22 .19 .00 -.10 —      
(28) Avg political sentiment on regulatory commission (1=Repub., 0=Dem.) -.16 .13 .05 -.06 .01 .01 .02 -.07 .00 -.01 -.01      
(29) Republican governor .04 -.06 .01 .02 .00 .00 -.04 -.03 .03 .07 -.07 —     
(30) No. of commissioners .01 -.08 -.02 .00 -.03 -.03 .21 .02 -.12 -.23 .06 -.21 —    




CLECs appear, on average, in 4.634 reports (σ=2.481), ranging from 2 reports to 
10.  Because a CLEC’s initial footprint is established by its first appearance in the 
reports, that first appearance is not analyzed.  CLECs therefore are in my dataset for an 
average of 3.634 years.  At their peak, CLECs operated in an average of 10.296 states 
(σ=2.481), with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 47.  Figure 10 displays the average 
CLEC geographic footprint, in terms of number of states, over time.18  The drop between 
1996 and 1997 suggests that many new, small CLECs were started in 1997 and that the 
CLECs launched in 1996 tended to have larger initial market sizes than those starting in 
1997.  The rise in the average market size between 1997 and 2000 is likely due to CLECs 
expanding over time because few CLECs failed during this era.  The plateau in size from 
2000 to 2005 could be because (a) CLECs stopped expanding, (b) a CLEC’s failure was 
not related to its geographic footprint, or (c) few CLECs were started in these years.  
Empirical analysis would be necessary to further investigate these possibilities. 
                                                 
18 For consistency, the graph is created using only the CLECs in the sample, not the entire population of 




Figure 10. Average number of states per CLEC per year, 1996-200519 



















Figure 11 shows density of all CLECs in the NPRG reports (dark bars) and of just 
the CLECs in this study’s sample (light bars).  As a population, CLECs grew steadily 
from 1996 to their peak density in about 2000, then quickly dropped after the dot-com 
bubble burst.  Market entries, shown by year in Figure 12, mirror this trend. 
Figure 11. CLEC density across all states, 1996-2005 
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Figure 12. Number of market entries by all CLECs across all states, 1997-2005 


















Based on this sample, the average number of CLECs per year within a state is 
14.671 (σ=11.594), ranging from 0 to 62.  The average state density per year is displayed 
in Figure 13.  The trend is similar to the overall population density in Figure 11, though 
slightly less skewed.  Thus on average, the typical state experienced peak competition of 
28.688 CLECs in 2000. 
Figure 13. Average state-level CLEC density, 1996-200520 




















                                                 








Table 12 and Table 13 report the results of the regression analyses of the main 
effects.  Table 12 contains the logistic regression estimates; Table 13 contains the 
complementary-log-log estimates.  There are 8 models in each table.  Model 1 presents a 
baseline model with only control variables.  Models 2-4 test the hypotheses for the effect 
of a CLEC’s founding conditions.  Model 2 examines just the ideology variables, model 3 
examines the regulatory variables, and model 4 includes both sets of variables.  Models 5 
and 6 contain blocks of variables for examining the main effects of legacy policy and 
political regime change, respectively.  Model 7 includes variables across the first 6 
models.  In model 8, I test the sensitivity of the analysis in model 7 by removing control 
variables that are possibly collinear with the ideology variables (|r| ≥ .20) and whose 
estimates had not been significantly different from 0 in any of the previous models.  The 
lone exception is “number of commissioners.”  Its coefficient was significant in model 7, 
but I removed it because it was not significant in model 6 and I believed it made sense to 
remove it when removing the rest of the control variables for political regime change. 
 
Table 12. Logistic regression results for the firm-level main effects CLEC expansion analysis 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
State is adjacent to CLEC's HDQ state 1.967** 1.943** 2.034** 1.938** 1.457** 2.044** 1.544** 1.466** 
(0.120) (0.118) (0.120) (0.118) (0.127) (0.120) (0.131) (0.127) 
State is adjacent to non-HDQ state in CLEC's 
market 
1.363** 1.332** 1.355** 1.324** 1.008** 1.351** 1.019** 1.041** 
(0.103) (0.103) (0.105) (0.103) (0.109) (0.105) (0.112) (0.111) 
No. of business establishments in state/ 1,000,000 1.976** 2.035** 1.667** 2.073** 1.772** 1.520** 1.607** 1.666** 
(0.311) (0.308) (0.345) (0.336) (0.319) (0.334) (0.396) (0.359) 
State population density / 1000 -0.016 -0.072 -0.051 -0.062 -0.017 0.000 0.183  
(0.177) (0.208) (0.185) (0.214) (0.179) (0.189) (0.248)  
State median household income / 1000 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.002  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)  
CLECs in state / 100 6.852** 6.871** 8.181** 6.774** 7.618** 7.921** 7.717** 7.358** 
(0.542) (0.536) (0.590) (0.560) (0.558) (0.605) (0.660) (0.546) 
CLECs in state / 100, squared -15.141** -15.554** -17.343** -15.415** -16.668** -17.238** -17.056** -16.649** 
(1.819) (1.846) (1.894) (1.874) (1.875) (1.944) (2.024) (1.867) 
No. of states within CLEC's hdq RBOC territory 
that CLEC is not serving 
0.090** 0.020 0.034* 0.020 -0.014 0.028+ -0.106** -0.030* 129 (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) 
No. of states in which CLEC is operating -0.087** -0.091** -0.080** -0.091** -0.091** -0.081** -0.147** -0.099** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
Time period (0-indexed to 1) -0.026 -0.132** -0.215** -0.131** -0.232** -0.218** -0.020 -0.221** 
(0.044) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.043) (0.044) (0.040) 
Era of dot-com boom (1 = Yr <= 2001, 0 = Yr > 
2001) 
0.626** 0.413** 0.051 0.420** 0.195 0.152 0.932** 0.308+ 
(0.162) (0.154) (0.160) (0.155) (0.160) (0.163) (0.172) (0.169) 
Government ideology / 100  -0.980**  -0.976**   -0.397 -0.754** 
 (0.277)  (0.277)   (0.458) (0.287) 
Citizen ideology / 100  -0.972+  -0.987+   6.641** -0.214 
 (0.554)  (0.557)   (0.836) (0.633) 
Difference between government ideologies of 
state and CLEC's hdq state 
 0.011**  0.011**   0.002 0.008** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.003) (0.002) 
Difference between citizen ideologies of state and 
CLEC's hdq state 
 0.010*  0.010*   -0.068** 0.002 
 (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.007) (0.006) 
State had variant of rate-of-return regulation in 
1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
  0.025 -0.010   -0.053 -0.022 
  (0.102) (0.101)   (0.110) (0.104) 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996   0.004 -0.011   -0.001 -0.009 




Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of 
regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
  -0.121 -0.097   0.031 -0.016 
  (0.084) (0.083)   (0.087) (0.085) 
Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of 
state and CLEC's hdq state 
  -0.018 -0.001   -0.016 0.001 
  (0.017) (0.017)   (0.019) (0.017) 
State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq state     1.307**  1.401** 1.323** 
    (0.112)  (0.117) (0.114) 
State in same RBOC territory as a non-HDQ state 
in CLEC's market 
    0.841**  0.946** 0.844** 
    (0.117)  (0.123) (0.118) 
New commissioner      0.107 0.122 0.165 
     (0.110) (0.114) (0.110) 
New party controls regulatory commission      0.032 0.034 -0.066 
     (0.130) (0.134) (0.130) 
Avg tenure of commissioners      -0.039+ -0.064** -0.055** 
     (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) 
Yrs that current commission has been together as 
unit 
     0.070+ 0.104* 0.080* 
     (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) 
New governor      0.611** 0.538** 0.609** 130      (0.109) (0.112) (0.109) Avg political sentiment on regulatory commission 
(1=Repub., 0=Dem.) 
     0.035 -0.050  
     (0.176) (0.183)  
Republican governor      -0.023 -0.072  
     (0.104) (0.180)  
No. of commissioners      0.055 0.078*  
     (0.036) (0.038)  
Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no)      -0.028 0.038  
     (0.107) (0.120)  
Constant -5.334** -3.977** -4.457** -3.937** -4.610** -4.608** -8.436** -3.829** 
(0.425) (0.449) (0.425) (0.454) (0.424) (0.513) (0.668) (0.363) 
Observations 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 
Number of groups 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 
Standard errors in parentheses         





Table 13. Complementary log-log regression results for the firm-level main effects CLEC expansion analysis 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State is adjacent to CLEC's HDQ state 
1.741** 1.748** 1.741** 1.747** 1.277** 1.743** 1.277** 1.275** 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.111) (0.104) (0.112) (0.111) 
State is adjacent to non-HDQ state in CLEC's 
market 
1.180** 1.186** 1.174** 1.180** 0.875** 1.169** 0.870** 0.869** 
(0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.100) (0.095) (0.101) (0.100) 
No. of business establishments in state/ 1,000,000 
1.662** 1.600** 1.699** 1.630** 1.523** 1.550** 1.430** 1.427** 
(0.289) (0.291) (0.322) (0.323) (0.291) (0.303) (0.348) (0.334) 
State population density / 1000 
-0.081 -0.084 -0.074 -0.075 -0.055 -0.024 0.068  
(0.160) (0.188) (0.167) (0.195) (0.160) (0.169) (0.218)  
State median household income / 1000 
0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.003  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  
CLECs in state / 100 
7.107** 7.094** 6.986** 6.974** 7.805** 6.699** 7.085** 7.429** 
(0.561) (0.559) (0.596) (0.594) (0.572) (0.602) (0.626) (0.583) 
CLECs in state / 100, squared 
-15.235** -14.596** -15.073** -14.422** -16.906** -14.906** -15.389** -16.086** 
(1.732) (1.761) (1.764) (1.792) (1.772) (1.808) (1.860) (1.776) 
No. of states within CLEC's hdq RBOC territory 
that CLEC is not serving 
0.048* 0.031 0.049* 0.032 0.017 0.043+ -0.000 -0.001 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 131 No. of states in which CLEC is operating -0.091** -0.097** -0.090** -0.096** -0.105** -0.088** -0.106** -0.107** (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Time period (0-indexed to 1) 
-0.010 0.003 -0.007 0.006 -0.036 -0.013 -0.025 -0.027 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058) 
Era of dot-com boom (1 = Yr <= 2001, 0 = Yr > 
2001) 
0.613** 0.699** 0.627** 0.711** 0.507* 0.711** 0.689** 0.651** 
(0.216) (0.224) (0.218) (0.225) (0.215) (0.221) (0.227) (0.226) 
Government ideology / 100 
 -0.308  -0.296   -0.718 -0.391 
 (0.355)  (0.355)   (0.443) (0.358) 
Citizen ideology / 100 
 5.412**  5.355**   5.134** 4.877** 
 (1.095)  (1.096)   (1.140) (1.087) 
Difference between government ideologies of 
state and CLEC's hdq state 
 0.005  0.004   0.005 0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) 
Difference between citizen ideologies of state and 
CLEC's hdq state 
 -0.055**  -0.055**   -0.050** -0.050** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)   (0.011) (0.011) 
State had variant of rate-of-return regulation in 
1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
  -0.021 -0.028   -0.083 -0.065 
  (0.092) (0.092)   (0.098) (0.095) 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 
  -0.009 -0.010   -0.005 -0.010 







Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of 
regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
  -0.115 -0.109   0.017 0.011 
  (0.077) (0.077)   (0.079) (0.079) 
Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of 
state and CLEC's hdq state 
  -0.005 -0.003   -0.010 -0.008 
  (0.018) (0.019)   (0.019) (0.019) 
State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq state 
    1.158**  1.169** 1.153** 
    (0.101)  (0.102) (0.102) 
State in same RBOC territory as a non-HDQ state 
in CLEC's market 
    0.752**  0.740** 0.727** 
    (0.112)  (0.113) (0.112) 
New commissioner 
     0.125 0.077 0.091 
     (0.099) (0.101) (0.100) 
New party controls regulatory commission 
     -0.044 -0.034 -0.050 
     (0.116) (0.119) (0.117) 
Avg tenure of commissioners 
     -0.040* -0.053** -0.040* 
     (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
Yrs that current commission has been together as 
unit 
     0.059 0.069+ 0.051 
     (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) 
New governor 
     0.498** 0.411** 0.403** 
     (0.097) (0.097) (0.096) 
Avg political sentiment on regulatory commission 
(1=Repub., 0=Dem.) 
     0.014 -0.082  
     (0.157) (0.162)  
Republican governor 
     -0.037 -0.103  
     (0.092) (0.158)  
No. of commissioners 
     0.054+ 0.079*  
     (0.032) (0.033)  
Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no) 
     -0.017 0.054  
     (0.095) (0.105)  
Constant 
-6.273** -8.907** -6.228** -8.845** -5.964** -6.330** -8.293** -7.933** 
(0.487) (0.737) (0.491) (0.741) (0.489) (0.556) (0.803) (0.681) 
Observations 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 
Number of group(clec_name) 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 
Standard errors in parentheses         
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Many control variables confirm prior research or assumptions.  As with the 
previous study, CLECs consistently were drawn to states with more businesses.  Density 
dependence was also strongly supported.  The model 1 coefficients in both methods 
suggest a similar peak density:  22.627 CLECs for logit and 23.325 CLECs for clog-log.  
These estimates are within the range of CLECs observed in states (0 to 62) and a little 
less than the largest average density recorded:  28.688 CLECs in 2000.  Adjacency 
strongly increases the likelihood of entry.  Relative to states that are not adjacent to the 
focal CLEC’s current service area, the odds of a CLEC entering a state that is adjacent to 
its current market territory are nearly 4 times higher and are over 7 times higher when the 
target state is adjacent to the CLEC’s headquarters state.  These estimates become 
slightly lower when the legacy policy variables are introduced to the model.  This is not 
surprising because there is a bit of overlap between these measures.  I will provide a more 
detailed examination of the effect of adjacency later in this results section.  The 
coefficient for median household income is once again positive, but unlike the previous 
chapter it is not significantly different from 0.  The non-significant coefficient for 
population density is especially striking because I only analyze the behavior of facilities-
based CLECs in this study, and they are the carriers that should benefit the most from a 
dense population. 
The only significant differences between the logit model and the clog-log model 
are with variables related to time.  For the event time (that is, the ordinal year that the 
firm is in the model), both models tend to estimate negative coefficients.  This seems to 
confirm my initial analysis that the hazard of entering a state decreased with time, though 




significantly different from 0 in six of the logit models but in none of the clog-log 
models.  The methods also differed in their estimates of the coefficient for the dummy 
variable capturing the dot-com boom era.  Both models estimated positive coefficients, 
though the logit models varied in magnitude and in significance.  Boom coefficients 
estimated for the clog-log model were consistent in size and significant in each model.  It 
is possible that these time discrepancies signify some fundamental difference between the 
two methods in their ability to model this data.  Yet because the methods seldom differ in 
their estimates of my substantive variables, I do not dwell on this further. 
Model 2 tests H2.1a and H2.1b—whether CLECs are more likely to expand into 
states that are ideologically similar to their headquarters state.  Among all substantive 
variables, the biggest differences between the logit and clog-log models are here.  
According to the logit model, CLECs are likely to expand into states with conservative 
government leaders and a conservative citizen populous.  The difference variables—the 
ones that tests the two hypotheses—are significant.  The positive sign of their 
coefficients, however, means CLECs were significantly more likely to expand into states 
that were different from their founding state.  This is completely opposite the predictions 
of H2.1a and H2.1b. 
The results of the clog-log models are different.  They suggest that CLECs were 
more likely to expand into states with a liberal citizen ideology and that the effect of 
government ideology was not significant.  Of the two difference scores, only the citizen 
ideology measure was significant.  The negative coefficient here suggests that CLECs 
were significantly less likely to expand into states whose citizen ideologies differed from 




This, of course, begs the question:  which method is correct?  Or, perhaps better 
asked, is one method better than the other for this particular dataset?  It is unlikely that I 
can definitively answer this question in this study, yet I will revisit these questions when 
discussing other models that have these ideology variables as well as other substantive 
variables. 
One other point is worth making here.  The high value for citizen ideology in the 
clog-log model could be misleading.  The raw ideology scores have been divided by 100 
to make the estimates more readable in the output (that is, to keep from reporting a 
coefficient of .000 with a standard error of .000 and leaving the reader to guess whether it 
is or is not significant).  Therefore, a 1-unit increase in the variable is actually a 100-point 
increase—the entire range of the ideology scale.  So rather than thinking that a 1-unit 
increase in citizen ideology increases the hazard ratio over 200 times ( ), a 
1-unit increase actually increases it times.  This is still a large increase, 
but it is much more plausible. 
079.224412.5 =e
056.1412.501. =×e
Model 3 tests the other pair of founding condition hypotheses, H2.2a and H2.2b—
whether CLECs are more likely to expand into states with similar regulatory histories as 
their headquarters state.  This time the logit and clog-log methods produce more similar 
results.  There are still some discrepancies.  Specifically, the estimated coefficients for 
whether the target state was using traditional regulation in 1996 and for its years of 
experience with incentive-based regulation have different signs in the two models: 
positive for the logit model, negative for the clog-log.  In neither model are the 
coefficients significant.  The difference variables do have consistent signs.  Both 




whose regulatory signature is similar to its own founding state’s regulatory signature.  
Yet none of the coefficients reach significance, failing to support H2.2a and H2.2b. 
In model 4 both sets of founding condition variables are included.  The only 
difference is that the estimated coefficients for whether the target state was using 
traditional regulation in 1996 and for its years of experience with incentive-based 
regulation are now negative in the logit model, just as they continue to be in the clog-log 
model.  This, then, does little to address the question about between-method differences 
in the ideology variables. 
Model 5 examines H2.3, the effect that legacy policy has had on CLECs’ 
expansion patterns.  Both variables that I include for testing this—whether the target state 
is in the same RBOC territory as the focal CLEC’s headquarters state or whether the 
target state is in a different RBOC territory presently served by the CLEC—have 
estimated coefficients that are positive and significant in the logit and clog-log methods.  
Compared with states that are in an RBOC territory outside the focal CLEC’s current 
service area, the odds of a CLEC entering a state in its home RBOC territory are 
times higher, while the odds of entering a state in a different RBOC territory 
that the CLEC already serves are times higher.  This provides strong 
support for H2.3.  Yet as mentioned previously, these variables are moderately correlated 
with the adjacency variables and, in fact, the presence of the legacy policy variables in 
the model lowers the effect of adjacency.  Later I will revisit this issue to ensure that my 
analysis is indeed capturing the effects of legacy policy and supporting H2.3. 
755.3323.1 =e
326.2=e 844.0
Model 6 tests the political regime change variables, H2.4a-H2.4d and H2.5.  The 




methods.  The only meaningful difference is that the estimated coefficient for unit 
commission tenure is significant in the logit model but not in the clog-log model.  Neither 
model’s coefficient is in the predicted direction, however.  The only two estimated 
coefficients that are significant and in the predicted direction are those for the average 
commissioner tenure and for a state having a new governor.  A one-year decrease in 
average tenure increases the odds of a CLEC entering the state by times 
(4.0%); a one-standard deviation decrease (3.310 years) increases the odds by 13.8%.  
New governors prove to be an even greater attractor of CLECs.  The odds of a CLEC 
entering a state are times (84.2%) higher in the year after the state has 
elected a new governor.  Overall, this model provides no support for H2.4a, H2.4b, and 
H2.4d but strong support for H2.4c and H2.5. 
040.1039.0 =e
842.1e 611.0 =
Model 7 is the full model that includes all explanatory variables, both control and 
substantive.  The coefficients of most substantive variables did not change appreciably in 
this model, and prior interpretations hold.  The exception is the ideology variables in the 
logitistic regression model.  The estimated coefficient for citizen ideology has changed 
signs, and not just slightly.  Whereas the interpretation from model 2 was that CLECs 
expanded into more conservative states, this model suggests that CLECs were much more 
likely to expand into liberal states.  This new coefficient is now similar to the coefficient 
in the clog-log model.  Not surprisingly, this dramatic change is paired with a substantial 
change in the difference variable for citizen ideology.  A significant, positive coefficient 
has given way to a significant, negative coefficient—which is now in the predicted 
direction of H2.1b.  Estimated coefficients for the government ideology variables also 




target state remains negative (CLECs are more likely to enter conservative states) but no 
longer significant.  The coefficient of the government ideology difference variable is also 
no longer significant but remains positive, which is not the predicted direction of H2.1a. 
Wild swings in coefficient estimates (i.e., “bouncing betas”) such as that found in 
the logit model typically suggest the presence of multicollinearity.  I later investigate this 
concern more systematically, but as a first step I discuss model 8.  As explained 
previously, in this model I removed control variables that showed even minimal signs of 
collinearity with the ideology variables (|r| ≥ .20) and whose estimates had not been 
significantly different from 0 in any of the previous models.  Coefficients for the clog-log 
model remain very stable.  For the most part, the coefficients for the logit model 
remained stable, too.  The one exception was, not surprisingly, the ideology variables.  
The estimate for the citizen ideology coefficient swung back to negative, though it was 
not statistically significant.  The coefficient for the citizen ideology difference score 
flipped sign to positive.  This also was not significant, and it was not in the predicted 
direction of H2.1b.  The estimates for the government ideology variables returned to 
levels observed in models 2 and 4. 
Temporal Effects 
Table 14 and Table 15 report the results of the logit and clog-clog regression 
analyses, respectively, of the temporal effects.  Each table contains 6 models.  Model 1 
presents a baseline model with only control variables.  It is the same as model 1 in the 
main effects analyses.  Model 2 tests the hypotheses for the temporal effect of a CLEC’s 
founding conditions.  Model 3 examines just the legacy policy variables as a block, and 




variables simultaneously, while in model 6 I remove the same variables that I did in the 
final model of the main effects analysis.  Although I computed the interaction terms with 
centered main effect variables, I use the non-centered (“raw”) main effect variables in 
these models.  Because centered and raw variables only differ by a constant (specifically, 
the mean of the raw variable), their estimates are exactly the same.  All that is different is 
the coefficient of the intercept. 
Model 2 tests the temporal effect of all the founding condition variables 
simultaneously—the ideology variables (H2.6a and H2.6b) and the regulatory history 
variables (H2.7a and H2.7b).  First, the ideology variables.  With slight differences, the 
logit and clog-log methods produced estimates that were similar in magnitude, size, and 
significance.  The variables that correspond to the hypotheses are the difference between 
the ideology scores of the target state and the focal CLEC’s headquarters state interacted 
with boom for both government ideology (H2.6a) and citizen ideology (H2.6b).  For the 
interaction hypothesis to be supported, the effect of similarity should be stronger during 
the boom period (boom=1) than afterward (boom=0).  Because the difference scores are 
Euclidean distances of similarity—that is, more similar states have lower difference 
scores—support for these hypotheses should be given with significant, negative 
coefficients on the interaction terms.  This is what I find for citizen ideology in both the 
logit and clog-log models (H2.6b supported) but not for government ideology (H2.6a not 
supported).  The interaction between the government ideology difference score and boom 
is significantly positive, meaning that CLECs were more likely to expand into states with 
government ideologies that were different from those of its founding state and that this 




Table 14. Logistic regression results for the firm-level temporal effects CLEC expansion analysis 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State is adjacent to CLEC's HDQ state 1.967** 2.070** 1.458** 1.979** 1.437** 1.440** (0.120) (0.123) (0.132) (0.120) (0.128) (0.127) 
State is adjacent to non-HDQ state in CLEC's 
market 
1.363** 1.415** 1.030** 1.356** 1.033** 1.034** 
(0.103) (0.105) (0.110) (0.103) (0.110) (0.110) 
No. of business establishments in state/ 
1,000,000 
1.976** 2.256** 1.743** 1.808** 1.974** 2.033** 
(0.311) (0.349) (0.323) (0.334) (0.382) (0.363) 
State population density / 1000 -0.016 -0.055 -0.022 0.027 0.042 
(0.177) (0.219) (0.180) (0.191) (0.248) 
State median household income / 1000 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.004 0.003 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
CLECs in state / 100 6.852** 6.570** 7.770** 6.452** 6.450** 6.715** 
(0.542) (0.593) (1.192) (0.578) (0.601) (0.546) 
CLECs in state / 100, squared -15.141** -15.453** -17.075** -14.654** -15.705** -16.188** 
(1.819) (1.899) (3.286) (1.898) (1.973) (1.880) 
No. of states within CLEC's hdq RBOC territory 
that CLEC is not serving 
0.090** -0.034* -0.014 0.087** -0.022 -0.022 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
No. of states in which CLEC is operating -0.087** -0.125** -0.099 -0.085** -0.107** -0.107** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Time period (0-indexed to 1) -0.026 0.033 -0.219** -0.036 -0.116** -0.115** 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) 
Era of dot-com boom (1 = Yr <= 2001, 0 = Yr > 
2001) 
0.626** 1.129** 0.116 0.651** 0.630** 0.635** 
(0.162) (0.195) (0.190) (0.176) (0.214) (0.210) 
Government ideology / 100 -0.525 -0.849+ -0.750* 
(0.342) (0.436) (0.314) 
Government ideology / 100 X Boom -2.453** -3.352** -2.715** 
(0.827) (1.015) (0.795) 
Citizen ideology / 100 3.116** -1.657* -1.734** 
(0.669) (0.720) (0.601) 
Citizen ideology / 100 X Boom 3.699* 5.142** 4.547** 
(1.558) (1.714) (1.541) 
Difference between government ideologies of 
state and CLEC's hdq state 
0.007* 0.008** 0.008** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Difference between government ideologies of 
state and CLEC's hdq state X Boom 
0.022** 0.025** 0.025** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Difference between citizen ideologies of state 
and CLEC's hdq state 
-0.032** 0.015** 0.015** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Difference between citizen ideologies of state 
and CLEC's hdq state X Boom 
-0.028* -0.033** -0.033** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
State had variant of rate-of-return regulation in 
1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.045 0.020 0.061 
(0.121) (0.131) (0.123) 
State had variant of ROR regulation in 1996 X 
Boom 
-0.178 -0.244 -0.287 
(0.310) (0.336) (0.317) 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 X 
Boom 
0.009 0.047 0.030 
(0.059) (0.062) (0.061) 
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of 
regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.288** -0.151 -0.153 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of 
regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) X B 
0.839** 0.917** 0.904** 
(0.284) (0.285) (0.284) 
Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of 
state and CLEC's hdq state 
-0.016 -0.014 -0.012 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of 
state and CLEC's hdq state X B 
0.013 -0.001 0.001 
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) 
State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq 
state 
1.249** 1.225** 1.214** 
(0.131) (0.132) (0.132) 
State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq 
state X Boom 
0.347 0.527 0.502 
(0.321) (0.327) (0.326) 
State in same RBOC territory as a non-HDQ 
state in CLEC's market 
0.809** 0.712** 0.708** 
(0.165) (0.130) (0.130) 
State in same RBOC territory as a non-HDQ 
state in CLEC's market X Boom 
0.209 0.197 0.180 
(0.311) (0.306) (0.305) 
New commissioner 0.152 0.115 0.130 




Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
New commissioner X Boom 0.131 0.228 0.256 
(0.376) (0.390) (0.379) 
New party controls regulatory commission 0.014 -0.020 -0.029 
(0.147) (0.150) (0.148) 
New party controls regulatory commission X 
Boom 
-0.294 -0.369 -0.422 
(0.386) (0.394) (0.385) 
Avg tenure of commissioners -0.033 -0.062* -0.050* 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) 
Avg tenure of commissioners X Boom -0.082 -0.082 -0.075 
(0.071) (0.074) (0.066) 
Yrs that current commission has been together 
as unit 
0.068 0.071 0.064 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.049) 
Unit tenure of commission X Boom 0.104 0.144 0.114 
(0.135) (0.139) (0.134) 
New governor 0.570** 0.636** 0.635** 
(0.115) (0.119) (0.118) 
New governor X Boom -0.018 -0.068 -0.087 
(0.285) (0.299) (0.295) 
Avg political sentiment on regulatory 
commission (1=Repub., 0=Dem.) 
0.010 -0.028 
(0.198) (0.204) 
Avg political sentiment on commission X Boom -0.006 -0.127 
(0.524) (0.537) 
Republican governor 0.004 0.003 (0.117) (0.183) 
Republican governor X Boom -0.035 -0.240 
(0.304) (0.408) 
No. of commissioners 0.057 0.061 
(0.042) (0.044) 
No. of commissioners X Boom 0.019 0.098 (0.110) (0.114) 
Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no) -0.027 0.085 
(0.127) (0.143) 
Elected commissioners X Boom 0.006 0.037 
(0.315) (0.376) 
Constant -5.334** -6.415** -4.471** -5.431** -3.797** -3.484** (0.425) (0.507) (0.424) (0.554) (0.648) (0.410) 
Observations 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 
Number of group(clec_name) 186 186 186 186 186 186 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 15. Complementary log-log regression results for the firm-level temporal effects CLEC 
expansion analysis 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State is adjacent to CLEC's HDQ state 1.967** 2.070** 1.458** 1.979** 1.437** 1.440** (0.120) (0.123) (0.132) (0.120) (0.128) (0.127) 
State is adjacent to non-HDQ state in CLEC's 
market 
1.363** 1.415** 1.030** 1.356** 1.033** 1.034** 
(0.103) (0.105) (0.110) (0.103) (0.110) (0.110) 
No. of business establishments in state/ 
1,000,000 
1.976** 2.256** 1.743** 1.808** 1.974** 2.033** 
(0.311) (0.349) (0.323) (0.334) (0.382) (0.363) 
State population density / 1000 -0.016 -0.055 -0.022 0.027 0.042 
(0.177) (0.219) (0.180) (0.191) (0.248) 
State median household income / 1000 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.004 0.003 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
CLECs in state / 100 6.852** 6.570** 7.770** 6.452** 6.450** 6.715** 
(0.542) (0.593) (1.192) (0.578) (0.601) (0.546) 
CLECs in state / 100, squared -15.141** -15.453** -17.075** -14.654** -15.705** -16.188** 
(1.819) (1.899) (3.286) (1.898) (1.973) (1.880) 
No. of states within CLEC's hdq RBOC territory 
that CLEC is not serving 
0.090** -0.034* -0.014 0.087** -0.022 -0.022 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
No. of states in which CLEC is operating -0.087** -0.125** -0.099 -0.085** -0.107** -0.107** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Time period (0-indexed to 1) -0.026 0.033 -0.219** -0.036 -0.116** -0.115** 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) 
Era of dot-com boom (1 = Yr <= 2001, 0 = Yr > 
2001) 
0.626** 1.129** 0.116 0.651** 0.630** 0.635** 
(0.162) (0.195) (0.190) (0.176) (0.214) (0.210) 
Government ideology / 100 -0.525 -0.849+ -0.750* 
(0.342) (0.436) (0.314) 
Government ideology / 100 X Boom -2.453** -3.352** -2.715** 
(0.827) (1.015) (0.795) 
Citizen ideology / 100 3.116** -1.657* -1.734** 
(0.669) (0.720) (0.601) 
Citizen ideology / 100 X Boom 3.699* 5.142** 4.547** 
(1.558) (1.714) (1.541) 
Difference between government ideologies of 
state and CLEC's hdq state 
0.007* 0.008** 0.008** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Difference between government ideologies of 
state and CLEC's hdq state X Boom 
0.022** 0.025** 0.025** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Difference between citizen ideologies of state 
and CLEC's hdq state 
-0.032** 0.015** 0.015** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Difference between citizen ideologies of state 
and CLEC's hdq state X Boom 
-0.028* -0.033** -0.033** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
State had variant of rate-of-return regulation in 
1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.045 0.020 0.061 
(0.121) (0.131) (0.123) 
State had variant of ROR regulation in 1996 X 
Boom 
-0.178 -0.244 -0.287 
(0.310) (0.336) (0.317) 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 X 
Boom 
0.009 0.047 0.030 
(0.059) (0.062) (0.061) 
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of 
regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.288** -0.151 -0.153 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of 
regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) X B 
0.839** 0.917** 0.904** 
(0.284) (0.285) (0.284) 
Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of 
state and CLEC's hdq state 
-0.016 -0.014 -0.012 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of 
state and CLEC's hdq state X B 
0.013 -0.001 0.001 
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) 
State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq 
state 
1.249** 1.225** 1.214** 
(0.131) (0.132) (0.132) 
State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq 
state X Boom 
0.347 0.527 0.502 
(0.321) (0.327) (0.326) 
State in same RBOC territory as a non-HDQ 
state in CLEC's market 
0.809** 0.712** 0.708** 
(0.165) (0.130) (0.130) 
State in same RBOC territory as a non-HDQ 
state in CLEC's market X Boom 
0.209 0.197 0.180 
(0.311) (0.306) (0.305) 
New commissioner 0.152 0.115 0.130 




Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
New commissioner X Boom 0.131 0.228 0.256 
(0.376) (0.390) (0.379) 
New party controls regulatory commission 0.014 -0.020 -0.029 
(0.147) (0.150) (0.148) 
New party controls regulatory commission X 
Boom 
-0.294 -0.369 -0.422 
(0.386) (0.394) (0.385) 
Avg tenure of commissioners -0.033 -0.062* -0.050* 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) 
Avg tenure of commissioners X Boom -0.082 -0.082 -0.075 
(0.071) (0.074) (0.066) 
Yrs that current commission has been together 
as unit 
0.068 0.071 0.064 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.049) 
Unit tenure of commission X Boom 0.104 0.144 0.114 
(0.135) (0.139) (0.134) 
New governor 0.570** 0.636** 0.635** 
(0.115) (0.119) (0.118) 
New governor X Boom -0.018 -0.068 -0.087 
(0.285) (0.299) (0.295) 
Avg political sentiment on regulatory 
commission (1=Repub., 0=Dem.) 
0.010 -0.028 
(0.198) (0.204) 
Avg political sentiment on commission X Boom -0.006 -0.127 
(0.524) (0.537) 
Republican governor 0.004 0.003 (0.117) (0.183) 
Republican governor X Boom -0.035 -0.240 
(0.304) (0.408) 
No. of commissioners 0.057 0.061 
(0.042) (0.044) 
No. of commissioners X Boom 0.019 0.098 (0.110) (0.114) 
Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no) -0.027 0.085 
(0.127) (0.143) 
Elected commissioners X Boom 0.006 0.037 
(0.315) (0.376) 
Constant -5.334** -6.415** -4.471** -5.431** -3.797** -3.484** (0.425) (0.507) (0.424) (0.554) (0.648) (0.410) 
Observations 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 26267 
Number of groups 186 186 186 186 186 186 
Standard errors in parentheses 





The estimates for the regulatory history coefficients are also similar across the 
logit and clog-log models.  The variables that correspond to the hypotheses are whether 
the target state and the focal CLEC’s headquarters state used the same regulation in 1996 
interacted with boom (H2.7a) and the difference between incentive regulation experience 
of the target state and the focal CLEC’s headquarters state interacted with boom (H2.7b).  
To support H2.7a, the coefficient for the interaction term should be positive as the effect 
of having the same regulation should be amplified during the boom period compared with 
afterward.  This is indeed the case, and H2.7a is supported.  The interaction term for 
similarity of incentive experience, however, is not significant and H2.7b is not supported. 
Model 3 examines H2.8—whether the effect of legacy policy is conditional on 
time.  In both the logit and clog-log models, the main effects of the two legacy policy 
variables remain significant, but their interactions with boom are not.  This fails to 
support H2.8. 
Model 4 tests the political regime change variables for the commission (H2.9a-
H2.9d) and governor (H2.10).  The only significant coefficient in either model is for the 
main effect of states having a new governor.  None of the interaction terms differ 
significantly from 0; H2.9a-H2.9d and H2.10 are not supported. 
Model 5 is the full model with all explanatory variables from the first four 
models.  Results for the variables related to the hypotheses of this section remain 
consistent.  The coefficients for the interaction variables of citizen ideology difference 
scores and same regulation in 1996 remain significant and in their predicted respective 




As with the main effect analysis, I ran one additional analysis—model 6 here—
where I removed several control variables from the full model as one way of assessing 
whether the results were due to multicollinearity.  This had no impact on any of the 
coefficients, let alone the coefficients of interest. 
Diagnostics 
As with the previous study, this study showed signs of potential multicollinearity.  
Overall the estimated coefficients remained stable in the logit and clog-log models, but 
certain variables, particularly those related to ideology, exhibited potential effects of 
multicollinearity (e.g., large changes in value, sign changes).  I addressed this in the 
analysis by re-running the full models after removing several control variables that were 
correlated with substantive predictors.  Yet to be consistent with the previous chapter, I 
examined potential collinearity further by computing variance inflation factors (VIF). 
Table 16 and Table 17 report the VIFs for all variables in the main effects 
analysis and the temporal effects analysis, respectively.  Each table reports two VIF 
scores per variable.  The first is for the full model with all variables (model 7 in Table 12 
and Table 13; model 5 in Table 14 and Table 15), and the second is for the reduced 
model with several control variables removed.  According to the rule-of-thumb that 
multicollinearity is not a problem if the maximum VIF is less than 10, these models 
should be collinearity-free.  In the main effects analysis (Table 16), the largest VIF in the 
full model was 6.18 with VIFmean = 2.26 and the largest VIF in the full model was 6.75 
with VIFmean = 2.29.  Yet once again there are indicators that several variables were 
sharing a substantial amount of variance.  After removing several control variables, the 




similar in the temporal effects models (Table 17).  Removing the control variables 
reduced VIFmean to 2.03 with the citizen ideology × boom variable having the largest VIF, 
3.50. 
The same explanation from the previous chapter for why multicollinearity 
symptoms appeared in the full model but were attenuated in the reduced model applies 
here.  Government ideology was again the variable with the highest VIF in both full 
models, and the control variables that I removed included the political party affiliation of 
the governor and the regulatory commission.  Compared with the full model, the reduced 
model provides a better sense of the degree to which these data can support this study’s 
hypotheses. 
Table 16. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the firm-level main effects expansion analysis 
Variable Model 7 Model 8
State is adjacent to CLEC's HDQ state 1.18 1.17 
State is adjacent to non-HDQ state in CLEC's market 1.63 1.62 
No. of business establishments in state/ 1,000,000 2.27 2.14 
State population density / 1000 2.27  
State median household income / 1000 2.17  
CLECs in state / 100 3.81 2.96 
CLECs in state / 100, squared 2.20 1.94 
No. of states within CLEC's hdq RBOC territory that CLEC is not serving 1.38 1.38 
No. of states in which CLEC is operating 2.14 2.14 
Time period (0-indexed to 1) 2.54 2.54 
Era of dot-com boom (1 = Yr <= 2001, 0 = Yr > 2001) 2.43 2.41 
New commissioner 2.01 1.98 
New party controls regulatory commission 1.23 1.21 
Avg tenure of commissioners 2.46 2.16 
Yrs that current commission has been together as unit 2.84 2.75 
New governor 1.12 1.11 
Avg political sentiment on regulatory commission (1=Repub., 0=Dem.) 1.52  
Republican governor 4.07  
No. of commissioners 1.32  
Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no) 1.76  
State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq state 1.36 1.36 
State in same RBOC territory as a non-HDQ state in CLEC's market 1.66 1.66 
Government ideology / 100 6.18 2.99 
Citizen ideology / 100 4.25 3.26 
Difference between government ideologies of state and CLEC's hdq state 2.57 2.57 
Difference between citizen ideologies of state and CLEC's hdq state 2.80 2.79 
State had variant of rate-of-return regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 1.96 1.87 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 1.99 1.81 
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 1.24 1.23 
Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of state and CLEC's hdq state 1.32 1.31 





Table 17. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the firm-level temporal effects expansion analysis 
Variable Model 5 Model 6
State is adjacent to CLEC's HDQ state  1.18 1.18 
State is adjacent to non‐HDQ state in CLEC's market  1.64 1.63 
No. of business establishments in state/ 1,000,000  2.34 2.19 
State population density / 1000  2.38  
State median household income / 1000  2.37  
CLECs in state / 100  3.87 3.01 
CLECs in state / 100, squared  2.26 1.98 
No. of states within CLEC's hdq RBOC territory that CLEC is not serving  1.38 1.38 
No. of states in which CLEC is operating  2.15 2.15 
Time period (0‐indexed to 1)  2.59 2.58 
Era of dot‐com boom (1 = Yr <= 2001, 0 = Yr > 2001)  2.49 2.45 
Government ideology / 100  6.75 3.04 
Government ideology / 100 X Boom  5.36 2.94 
Citizen ideology / 100  4.55 3.32 
Citizen ideology / 100 X Boom  4.29 3.50 
Difference between government ideologies of state and CLEC's hdq state  2.61 2.61 
Difference between government ideologies of state and CLEC's hdq state X Boom  2.55 2.55 
Difference between citizen ideologies of state and CLEC's hdq state  2.81 2.80 
Difference between citizen ideologies of state and CLEC's hdq state X Boom  2.93 2.92 
State had variant of rate‐of‐return regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no)  2.06 1.85 
State had variant of ROR regulation in 1996 X Boom  1.96 1.81 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre‐1996  2.04 1.93 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre‐1996 X Boom  1.86 1.82 
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no)  1.33 1.33 
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of regulation in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) X Boom  1.40 1.40 
Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of state and CLEC's hdq state  1.25 1.24 
Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of state and CLEC's hdq state X Boom  1.25 1.24 
State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq state  1.37 1.36 
State in same RBOC territory as CLEC's hdq state X Boom  1.12 1.12 
State in same RBOC territory as a non‐HDQ state in CLEC's market  1.69 1.68 
State in same RBOC territory as a non‐HDQ state in CLEC's market X Boom  1.13 1.13 
New commissioner  2.11 2.05 
New commissioner X Boom  2.24 2.18 
New party controls regulatory commission  1.28 1.23 
New party controls regulatory commission X Boom  1.28 1.22 
Avg tenure of commissioners  2.68 2.29 
Avg tenure of commissioners X Boom  2.43 1.92 
Yrs that current commission has been together as unit  2.98 2.81 
Unit tenure of commission X Boom  2.99 2.78 
New governor  1.20 1.18 
New governor X Boom  1.22 1.20 
Avg political sentiment on regulatory commission (1=Repub., 0=Dem.)  1.55  
Avg political sentiment on commission X Boom  1.57  
Republican governor  4.52  
Republican governor X Boom  3.08  
No. of commissioners  1.37  
No. of commissioners X Boom  1.17  
Elected commissioners (1=yes, 0=no)  1.85  
Elected commissioners X Boom  1.67  






Previous analysis noted that coefficients for the legacy policy variables and the 
control variables for adjacency were both significant.  I also noted that the estimated 
effect of adjacency on entry declined only in the presence of the legacy policy variables.  
I mentioned that this was not surprising because the two sets of variables are somewhat 
related.  Specifically, RBOCs were constructed as contiguous blocks of states.  The 
correlations between the measures are far from perfect (correlations between RBOC 
relationship and adjacency are r = .32 and r = .47 with respect to the focal CLEC’s 
headquarter state and the rest of the CLEC’s service area, respectively), but given the 
degree to which I have argued that policy shapes entrepreneurship and industry 
development, I find it prudent to tease out the separate effects of the two arguments. 
To do so, I constructed a set of dummy variables that serve as mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive legacy policy × adjacency categories.  Recall that I created two dummy 
variables for legacy policy:  (1) whether the target state is in the same RBOC territory as 
the focal CLEC’s headquarter state, and (2) whether the target state is in a different 
RBOC territory in the CLEC’s service area.  Implicit, then, is a third possible dummy 
variable:  (3) whether the state is not in any RBOC territory in which the focal CLEC’s 
currently operates.  For the 48 states in the continental U.S., these form a mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive set for determining a target state’s connection to a focal CLEC 
through the CLEC’s pre-existing RBOC relationships.  For adjacency, I consider two 
possibilities:  (1) a state is adjacent to a state in the CLEC’s current market or (2) it is not.  
Cross-multiplying these categories, legacy policy × adjacency, provides a set of six 




1. Target state is in same RBOC as CLEC’s headquarter state and is adjacent to the 
CLEC’s service area 
2. Target state is in same RBOC as CLEC’s headquarter state but is not adjacent to 
the CLEC’s service area 
3. Target state is in same RBOC as a non-headquarter state in CLEC’s market and is 
adjacent to the CLEC’s service area 
4. Target state is in same RBOC as a non-headquarter state in CLEC’s market but is 
not adjacent to the CLEC’s service area 
5. Target state is in RBOC outside the CLEC’s current market but is adjacent to the 
CLEC’s service area 
6. Target state is in RBOC outside the CLEC’s current market and is not adjacent to 
the CLEC’s service area 
Figure 14 provides a tabular representation for this set of variables. 
 
Figure 14. The mutually exclusive and exhaustive legacy policy × adjacency categories 
  Target state 
is adjacent to 
CLEC market 
 
  Yes No 




Headquarter RBOC 1 2 
Other RBOC in focal 
CLEC’s territory 3 4 
 
Target state is not in an RBOC territory 







I can clarify this further with an example.  Suppose that in 1997 a Michigan-based 
CLEC also operated in North Carolina.  At the time, Michigan was in the Ameritech 
territory, and North Carolina was served by BellSouth.  When creating this hypothetical 
CLEC’s risk set for entry in 1998, each target state’s values for these six variables are 
determined by the state’s RBOC and its physical proximity to either Michigan or North 
Carolina.  Table 18 displays the values of these the variables using one representative 
state per variable:  Ohio, Illinois, Georgia, Florida, Virginia, and Iowa. 





as HDQ state; 
adjacent 
Same RBOC as 
HDQ state; 
not adjacent 
Same RBOC as 
non-HDQ state; 
adjacent 
Same RBOC as 
non-HDQ state;
not adjacent 
In RBOC outside 
CLEC’s market; 
adjacent 
In RBOC outside 
CLEC’s market;
not adjacent 
Ohio 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Florida 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Virginia 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Iowa 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ohio is in Michigan’s home RBOC, Ameritech, and is also adjacent to Michigan.  
Illinois is another Ameritech state, but it is not adjacent to Michigan.  Georgia is part of 
BellSouth territory and is adjacent to North Carolina.  Florida is a BellSouth state that is 
not adjacent to North Carolina.  Virginia is not in Ameritech or BellSouth territory.  In 
1997 it was served by Bell Atlantic.  It is, though, adjacent to North Carolina.  Iowa is 
neither in the same RBOC territory as Michigan or North Carolina nor is it adjacent to 
either state. 
I re-ran the main effects analysis—both the logit and clog-log models—by 
replacing the adjacency and legacy policy measures with this set of dummy variables.  
These variables comprise an orthogonal set, so I cannot include all variables 
simultaneously.  I elected to omit the category where the target state is in the focal 




decision was driven by my theory.  I am interested in assessing the extent to which 
expansion decisions are guided by the pre-existing relationships a CLEC has with the 
incumbent carriers.  What happens when the focal CLEC has a pre-existing relationship 
with the RBOC of a target state but does not have a state in its service area presently 
adjacent to that target state?  How does that compare to situations where there is no pre-
existing RBOC relationship and only adjacency applies?  As for the different types of 
relationships, does it make any difference if the state is in the CLEC’s home RBOC 
rather than a different RBOC in the CLEC’s market? 
I ran two models:  one with these variables and the reduced set of controls and 
one where I have added the other substantive variables.  Results are in Table 19.  Results 
for the control variables and the other independent variables are similar to those in the 
main effects analysis.  In regard to the legacy policy × adjacency variables, no major 
between-method differences appear.  The only within-method difference I observed is for 
the category where the target state is adjacent to the focal CLEC’s service area and is 
served by an RBOC with whom the CLEC already has a relationship, albeit not the 
RBOC of the CLEC’s home state.  In model 1 the coefficient for this variable is positive, 
but in model 2 it is negative.  Because it happens with both methods, none of the 
estimated coefficients for this variable are significant, and VIF scores are all very low21, I 
am not concerned with this. 
                                                 
21 VIF analysis shows little sign of multicollinearity.  For the full model, the largest VIF is 3.26 (citizen 




Table 19. Regression results for the secondary analysis of firm-level CLEC expansion 
Logit Cloglog
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2)
No. of business establishments in state/ 1,000,000 1.608** 1.565** 1.131** 1.419** (0.315) (0.355) (0.267) (0.305) 
CLECs in state / 100 8.170** 7.069** 8.320** 6.789** (0.543) (0.537) (0.474) (0.481) 
CLECs in state / 100, squared -18.952** -16.396** -18.102** -15.485** (1.844) (1.875) (1.681) (1.688) 
No. of states within CLEC's hdq RBOC territory that 
CLEC is not serving 
-0.026 -0.015 0.002 0.022 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
No. of states in which CLEC is operating -0.097** -0.088** -0.063** -0.079** (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Time period (0-indexed to 1) -0.078+ -0.138** -0.213** -0.013 (0.044) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) 
Era of dot-com boom (1 = Yr <= 2001, 0 = Yr > 2001) 0.733** 0.493** 0.059 0.707** (0.175) (0.160) (0.149) (0.143) 
In same RBOC as hdq state, adjacent 1.076** 0.988** 0.937** 0.964** (0.151) (0.148) (0.128) (0.126) 
In same RBOC as a non-hdq state, adjacent 0.122 -0.062 0.211 -0.044 (0.314) (0.306) (0.280) (0.276) 
In same RBOC as a non-hdq state, not adjacent -0.260* -0.360** -0.201+ -0.200+ (0.122) (0.115) (0.104) (0.103) 
In RBOC outside CLEC's market, adjacent 0.056 0.058 0.095 0.008 (0.245) (0.242) (0.211) (0.209) 
In RBOC outside CLEC's market, not adjacent -1.587** -1.577** -1.392** -1.374** (0.122) (0.120) (0.106) (0.106) 
Government ideology / 100 -1.014** -0.618* (0.294) (0.268) 
Citizen ideology / 100 -0.616 3.205** (0.535) (0.477) 
Difference between government ideologies of state and 
CLEC's hdq state 
0.012** 0.008** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Difference between citizen ideologies of state and 
CLEC's hdq state 
0.003 -0.033** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Yrs state had incentive regulation, pre-1996 -0.016 -0.012 (0.020) (0.018) 




Difference between yrs of incentive regulation of state 
and CLEC's hdq state 
-0.005 -0.033* 
(0.017) (0.015) 
State and CLEC's hdq state had same type of regulation 
in 1996 (1=yes, 0=no) 
0.014 0.060 
(0.085) (0.077) 
New commissioner 0.229* 0.162 (0.110) (0.098) 
New party controls regulatory commission -0.103 -0.098 (0.129) (0.116) 
Avg tenure of commissioners -0.063** -0.050** (0.020) (0.018) 
Yrs that current commission has been together as unit 0.105** 0.079* (0.040) (0.035) 
New governor 0.549** 0.408** (0.109) (0.095) 
Constant -2.985** -2.063** -2.615** -5.218** (0.273) (0.357) (0.239) (0.369) 
Observations 26267 26267 26267 26267 
Number of groups 186 186 186 186 
Standard errors in parentheses   





The models suggest that while adjacency is important, a pre-existing relationship 
with the RBOC of a state has a strong—and perhaps equal—effect on a CLEC’s 
expansion decision.  As one would expect, among states in their home RBOC territory, 
CLECs were more likely to expand into adjacent states than into non-adjacent states.  
Using coefficients from logit model 2, the odds of expanding into adjacent states were 
times higher.  Also as one would expect, among non-adjacent states, CLECs 
were more likely to expand into states within the RBOC territories that they were 
currently serving.  The effect was strongest for states within a CLEC’s home RBOC 
territory.  Compared with those states, CLECs were 30% ( ) less likely to 
enter a non-adjacent state in a different, non-home RBOC territory and 79% 
( ) less likely to enter a non-adjacent state that is not in an RBOC territory 




Yet the findings suggest that RBOC boundaries may have an even stronger effect 
on a CLEC’s expansion decisions than initially hypothesized.  Interestingly, there is no 
statistical difference between states in the CLEC’s home RBOC territory that are not 
adjacent to any state in the CLEC’s current service area and states that are outside the 
CLEC’s home RBOC territory but are adjacent to at least one state in the CLEC’s 
footprint.  That is, CLECs are as likely to enter states in the RBOC territory of their 
headquarters state despite not being adjacent to them as they are to enter states that are 
adjacent to other states they already serve but that are in other RBOC territories that they 
serve (β = -0.062) or are in RBOC territories entirely outside their market (β = 0.058).  
This suggests that in certain cases the effects of legacy policy are no different from the 





The purpose of this study was to examine how certain institutional conditions of 
the political environment—namely, a firm’s founding conditions with respect to the 
political ideology and regulatory history of its headquarters state; lingering effects of 
legacy policy; and changes in a state’s political regime—affected which states new 
competitive local telephone service providers elected to enter when they decided to 
expand their services beyond their home states.  Findings from this study support the idea 
that such institutional conditions can indeed matter, though as with the state-level 
analysis support for certain predictions was somewhat mixed.  A summary of the results 
and their support for the hypotheses is presented in Table 20. 
Regarding the effect of founding conditions, my theory was that the political 
environment of a CLEC’s founding state would cause the CLEC to develop certain 
qualities or strengths that would make entry into similar states more likely.  I examined 
this on two dimensions:  political ideology and regulatory history.  According to the 
results, a CLEC was more likely to expand into states with citizen ideologies similar to its 
headquarters state, and this effect was attenuated over time.  The similarity between the 
target states’ government ideologies and that of the CLECs’ headquarters state was 
significantly opposite my prediction.  CLECs were more likely to expand into states 
whose government officials held different political ideologies than the government 





Table 20. Summary of results for the firm-level CLEC expansion analysis 













H2.1a Distance from HDQ state on government ideology − Not supported 
Partially 
supported H2.1b 





H2.2a Same 1996 local telephone regulation as HDQ state + Not supported 
H2.2b 
Distance from HDQ state on 
incentive-based regulation 
experience 
− Not supported 
Supported
Legacy Policy 
H2.3-1 Same RBOC as HDQ state + 
H2.3-2 Same RBOC as other state(s) in CLEC’s market + Supported 
Political Regime 
Change 
H2.4a New commissioner + Not supported 
H2.4b New party in control of commission + Not supported 
SupportedH2.4c Avg tenure of commissioners − 
H2.4d Unit tenure of commission − Not supported 












H2.6a Distance from HDQ state on government ideology × Boom − Not supported 




H2.7a Same 1996 local telephone regulation as HDQ state × Boom + Supported 
H2.7b 
Distance from HDQ state on 
incentive-based regulation 
experience × Boom 
− Not supported 
Legacy Policy 
H2.8-1 Same RBOC as HDQ state × Boom + Not supported 
H2.8-2 Same RBOC as other state(s) in CLEC’s market × Boom + Not supported 
Political Regime 
Change 
H2.9a New commissioner × Boom + Not supported 
H2.9b New party in control of commission × Boom + Not supported 
H2.9c Avg tenure of commissioners × Boom − Not supported 
H2.9d Unit tenure of commission × Boom − Not supported 
H2.10 New governor × Boom + Not supported 
Yet as with the state-level study, the results for the ideology variables should be 
interpreted with caution.  The use of similarity scores eliminates the debate over whether 
Republicans or Democrats are more likely to prefer deregulation of the local telephone 
industry provided the preferences remain consistent across the party.  As I discussed with 
the last study, this is likely not the case.  The issue of measurement also remains.  Not 
only are the political ideology variables likely conflating economic conservatism with 




compared to the state-level analysis.  Once again the ideology variables appeared to be 
driving this. 
The regulatory history variables have a similar split finding regarding any 
imprinting effect they may have had.  CLECs were indeed more likely to expand into 
states that were using the same type of local telephone regulation in 1996 as was used in 
the CLECs’ headquarters states, though only early in the industry development.  The 
amount of experience a target state had using incentive-based regulation appears to have 
had no statistical impact on influencing whether a CLEC entered it when considered 
relative to a CLEC’s founding state.  
Perhaps the strongest effects of this study were those for legacy policy.  The 
results show that when CLECs expanded their service territory to other states, they were 
much more likely to choose states that fell within the geographical boundaries of the 
RBOCs, even though those boundaries neither pertain to the CLECs nor remain in effect 
for the RBOCs.  Subsequent analysis showed that this finding held even when separating 
out the effects of legacy policy from those of adjacency.  One could even argue that the 
forces of the RBOC boundaries are substitutable with the effect of adjacency.  CLECs 
were as likely to enter non-adjacent states that were within the same RBOC boundaries as 
their headquarters state as they were to enter states that were adjacent to their current 
geographic footprint but were in an RBOC territory outside their current market.  Though 
I have documented the relationship with this study, I am unable to state the exact 
mechanism for this behavior.  I have, though, raised two possibilities.  One is through 
reduced transaction costs.  Part of the process of beginning operations in a new state 




incumbents’ network.  By expanding into a state whose incumbent carrier is an RBOC 
with whom the CLEC already has done business, the CLEC could save on its search costs 
and legal costs.  A second possibility is that the RBOC boundaries provided implicit 
definition for local telephone markets.  Over the 12-year period between the divestiture of 
AT&T in 1984 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, these boundaries may have 
taken on additional significance than just one way of evenly splitting up AT&T’s local 
telephone business.  As each RBOC came to be seen less as a company and more as a 
market territory, their boundaries may eventually have come to serve as psychological 
barriers to expansion for CLECs.  Additional research would be necessary to distinguish 
between these two possibilities. 
Changes in a state’s political regime once again influenced the growth of its 
CLEC industry.  As with the state-level analysis, new governors had a significant, 
positive effect on the likelihood that a CLEC would expand into a target state.  This 
effect held through the entire study period.  Changes in the regulatory commissions had 
some influence.  As the average tenure of commissioners within a state declined—that is, 
as commissions saw more turnover in their leadership—CLECs became more likely to 
enter.  This effect, too, did not vary over time.   
Finally, a word on model specification.  I analyzed my data with a discrete time 
event history model, and I reported results using both logisitic regression and 
complementary log-log regression.  For the most part, the two models provided extremely 
similar results.  This was not surprising because when the hazard rate of an event is low, 
the odds ratio and the hazard ratio are almost identical.  Yet there were differences.  




stable than the logit results.  This was especially true for the ideology variables, which, as 
I pointed out, exhibited “bouncing betas” in the logit models but not in the clog-log 
models.  Does this mean that the clog-log models are preferable to the logit models?  
Perhaps, though not necessarily.  I would need to conduct more in-depth analysis to 
assess whether the data are on a better fit for the proportional-odds assumption of logistic 





CHAPTER VII:  CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter I, I noted that this dissertation was motivated by a particular question:  
How does deregulation lead to competition?  I pointed out that the popular conception 
that deregulation equates to the lifting of all government influence was typically 
inaccurate because deregulation remained very much under the control of the 
government.  At least until new entrants can be firmly established, deregulation typically 
involves a shift in how regulation takes place:  from monopolies to competition.  
Entrepreneurial opportunities still arise in this type of deregulation, but rather than a Field 
of Dreams notion of deregulation and entrepreneurship (“If you deregulate it, 
entrepreneurs will come!”), I argued that the process remains a political one complete 
with individual state actors, potentially competing interests, and path dependence. 
To study this relationship between deregulation and entrepreneurship, I chose to 
examine the competitive local telephone service industry, which had been created as part 
of the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Regulators within state governments 
had historically played a large role in governing the industry and continued to be the 
primary level of government to oversee and implement the federal deregulatory policy.  
The main purpose of this dissertation, then, was to analyze how the competitive local 
telephone service industry developed differently across states as a function of state 




service industry at two different levels of analysis:  the state and the firm.  Across both 
levels of analysis, I was particularly interested in the effect of a state’s political ideology, 
regulatory history, and turnover among its government leaders.  I also had an interest in 
examining whether these effects, if present, remained constant over time or became 
attenuated as the industry developed and moved closer to a “true” deregulated state. 
I conclude this dissertation by reviewing my findings, highlighting key 
contributions, pointing out the limitations of my analysis, and mentioning future work 
that can fit into this research stream. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
In Chapter V, I examined variation in state-level founding rates of CLECs 
between 1997 and 2006.  I found that states with more experience with incentive-based 
regulation had higher CLEC founding rates and that this effect was stronger in the early 
years of deregulation.  Interestingly, though, the particular policy that states were using at 
the time of deregulation did not matter.  CLEC founding rates were also higher for states 
with new governors throughout the study and for states with new commissioners early in 
the study period.  Though not all hypotheses were supported, these findings do support 
my arguments that a state’s regulatory history provides an institutional endowment upon 
which future policy is built and that a change in political leadership can serve as a 
punctuating moment that can spur deregulation and industry development. 
In Chapter VI, I examined variation in firm-level expansion decisions made by 
CLECs between 1997 and 2005.  I found that over the first part of the study period, 
CLECs were more likely to enter states that were similar to their founding state on 




local telephone regulation in 1996.  This suggests that a firm’s “founding conditions” 
may play a greater role when its industry is still developing and before regional 
experimentation has converged to a more stable equilibrium.  New governors and newer 
commissioners (on average) also significantly contributed to the growth of the CLEC 
industry by making such states more attractive expansion targets.  These results again 
support my argument that political regime change can serve as a punctuating moment by 
disrupting ties between regulators and incumbents or by stimulating a region’s economy 
in general.  Finally, states exhibited a strong tendency to grow within the boundaries of 
the dominant incumbent carrier’s territory.  In many respects, this effect was as strong as 
the effect of adjacency.  Even after one policy has been preempted by a second policy, 
the effects of the first policy can be seen. 
Together the studies support my argument that political environments and 
institutional conditions matter in stimulating entrepreneurship following deregulation.  
Though a number of hypotheses were not supported, the findings provide a basis upon 
which future research on the relationship between political environments and 
entrepreneurship can build. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY 
By focusing on contextual factors that create entrepreneurial opportunities, this 
dissertation contributes to the literatures of organization theory and entrepreneurship.  
One way of doing so was to expand upon the usual conception of political environments 
as simply the effects of current policy.  I have attempted to provide a richer, more 
realistic view of what constitutes the political environment of an industry and its firms.  




studied as a process.  This process starts with the conditions that had been in place and 
can traverse across multiple levels of government (here, the state and federal levels).  
Furthermore, policy does not legislate or implement itself.  State actors, who may have 
been part of the previous policy era, bring with them their own unique histories, 
capabilities, and ideologies.  For this reason, change in the political regime may be the 
necessary punctuating moments to break the links to old conceptions and help 
institutionalize the new policy. 
At a higher level of abstraction, many of these aspects of the political process can 
be generalized to contribute to our understanding of institutional change.  Institutions 
may become endowed by elements from a previous era and, much like pre-deregulation 
policy did in this study, create lingering effects well after the change event has taken 
place.  Transition moments such as new leadership can be helpful in dissolving ties to the 
past.  A separate way that this study explicitly considered institutional change was to 
investigate whether forces driving the change varied over time.  In this way, I placed the 
attention on the dynamic process of institutionalization rather than on static institutions. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLICY 
I opened this dissertation with a discussion about neoliberal policy since 1980 and 
its push toward market-based control of business activity.  Yet this dissertation has 
chronicled how deregulation of the local telephone service industry was not a removal of 
governmental control so much as it was a shift in what the government would be 
controlling.  Deregulation therefore remained very much influenced by state actors in the 




The need for regulator involvement in the deregulation process is typically 
portrayed as a necessity for leveling the playing field between incumbents and new 
entrants.  What this dissertation suggests is that (1) rather than a single playing field, 
there are typically multiple playing fields; and (2) previous policy efforts and state 
regulators themselves may represent bumps on the field that need to be smoothed out.  
These issues are more difficult to address with additional policy.  One alternative would 
be to remove all regulation and oversight entirely—that is, to create “true” deregulation.  
Given the start-up costs for constructing a local telephone network and network 
externalities, it is difficult to imagine new entrants standing a chance against enormous 
incumbents without some third-party intervention.  Yet if our conception of telephone 
service is broadened to include cellular service, which has fewer infrastructure 
requirements and does not require of a physical connection into each residence and 
business, this idea becomes more viable.  A second option that builds on the findings 
from this study is to transition the oversight of deregulation from exclusively the domain 
of the state regulatory agency to a different entity served by multiple interests, such as the 
government, industry, and consumers.  Though this could create political gridlock, it 
should generate an influx of new perspectives that could steer deregulatory effects 
beyond the blind spots of the past. 
LIMITATIONS 
As with any study, this dissertation has its limitations.  Aspects of the context may 
make it difficult to generalize from the findings.  I study only U.S. firms in a single sector 
at a very unique period of business history.  The early part of the industry took place 




course, some of these “limitations” are the very issues that help make this study 
interesting!)  And as a study about deregulation with lots of continuing government 
oversight, it is an open question regarding which findings would still hold in industries 
that are not so closely tied to the government.  Yet even as a study that just applies to 
industries that develop from deregulatory policy, I believe this has much to offer. 
There are methodologically limitations to each study, too.  Though I have data for 
the state-level analysis from almost three-quarters of my population (N=35), it is indeed a 
sample.  And because my states were not selected at random but instead according to data 
availability, one should exercise caution before inferring the findings to the entire United 
States.  Also, I use only one measure (certification) for my dependent variable.  
Triangulation across other measures (e.g., interconnection agreements, billing code 
registrations) could address any unobserved heterogeneity with the certification process, 
though doing so might move this from being a study about nascent entrepreneurship 
(those beginning the process of becoming a CLEC) to one about established 
entrepreneurship (those providing CLEC service). 
The firm-level analysis may be limited by having only examined facilities-based 
carriers.  Facilities-based carriers required more money to start up, making them riskier 
investments than resellers or hybrid carriers.  Financiers, perhaps sensing an opportunity 
early on to gain market share, may have grown facilities-based carriers more rapidly than 
resellers.  And because facilities-based carriers actually build physical telephone 
networks, they would be more likely to construct their networks in an adjacent fashion.  
In some ways, though, that makes the finding that aspects of policy can offset adjacency 




As I addressed in each study’s discussion section, the measures of political 
ideology could be improved with those that tap more directly into each state’s sense of a 
belief in free markets.  Yet despite using different samples for each study and 
acknowledging the limitations of each, it is worth noting that some of the same patterns 
of results, such as the strong effect of new governors and the influence of regulatory 
history, hold across both studies. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
In the course of this dissertation, I have pointed out a number of studies I could 
conduct that would extend or clarify my findings:  more precise measures for free market 
ideology, triangulating across data sources for CLEC foundings and expansions, testing 
whether the effects of political environments hold in different settings, critically testing 
different possible mechanisms for the statistical relationships I have observed, etc.  Yet 
using this same data, I will briefly mention two additional studies that I plan to conduct, 
both of which fall within my established research stream of entrepreneurship, industry 
development, and institutional change. 
On a number of occasions, I have noted that the CLEC industry began amidst a 
very unique period when financing was widely available and when the dot-com industry 
was starting to develop.  In future work, I will examine the role this context played in the 
evolution of CLECs.  Regarding financing, to what extend did the availability of capital 
contribute to geographical heterogeneity of foundings?  Did CLECs grow differently 
according to whether their funding was coming from venture capitalists, IPOs, or 
equipment vendors?  Regarding dot-coms, how did their role as a symbiotic industry 




Internet and hence the demand for telecommunications services) shape where and when 
CLECs appeared?  Finally, there is the likelihood of an interaction between these two 
ideas.  Some media accounts suggest that financiers saw CLECs as the “next dot-coms”?  
Did financiers of CLECs therefore apply business models from the dot-com industry?  If 
so, was this done experientially by those who had had success doing so with dot-coms or 
vicariously by financiers who felt they missed out on dot-com opportunities and did not 
want to miss the next big thing?  Such a study could contribute our knowledge of how 
strategy, financing, and learning influence industry development and entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
My second idea concerns the heterogeneity of headquarters.  As the firm-level 
expansion analysis in this dissertation made clear, CLEC competition within a state came 
both from CLECs whose headquarters were based in the state and from those whose 
headquarters were outside the state.  Firms that are local to a state should have certain 
advantages over those coming from outside the state.  Local firms should have a better 
sense of the market conditions and customer opportunities, and they should understand 
the political environment better because they are likely more deeply embedded into the 
state’s social structure.  Being a “local company” could be an overt marketing ploy for 
firms, too.  Outside firms, though, may be able to bring with them legitimacy and name 
recognition built up in surrounding areas.  They may also bring with them experience that 
enables them to provide better service than the local firms that are just getting into the 
industry.  Among the questions that this raises are:  Did it make a difference whether a 
CLEC added to a population had headquarters inside or outside the state?  Did it matter in 




later?  The purpose of this study would be to draw on aspects of community ecology, 












21ST CENTURY 1998 2000 IL 
2ND CENTURY 1999 2001 FL 
@LINK (f/k/a DAKOTA SERVICES, INC.) 1999 2001 WI 
ACC NATIONAL TELECOM CORP. 1997 1998 NY 
ACTEL INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS 2000 2001 AL 
ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, INC. 1998 2000 MO 
ADVANCED RADIO TELECOM CORP. 1997 2001 WA 
ADVANCED TELCOM GROUP, INC. 1999 2004 CA 
ALLEGIANCE TELECOM, INC. 1998 2004 TX 
ALLTEL COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2001 2002 AR 
AMC COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a AMERICAN METROCOMM 
CORPORATION) 1997 2001 LA 
AMERICAN TELCO, INC. 1997 1998 TX 
AT&T CORP. 1999 2006 NY 
ATLANTIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, INC. (f/k/a ATLANTIC 
TELECOM, INC.) 1998 2000 FL 
ATLANTIC.NET BROADBAND, INC. 2000 2001 FL 
ATS TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2000 2001 TX 
AVANA COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a AVANA INTERNET) 2000 2001 GA 
AVISTA COMMUNICATIONS 1999 2001 WA 
BAYRING COMMUNICATIONS 2001 2006 NH 
BEAVER CREEK COOPERATIVE TELEPHONE COMPANY 1999 2000 OR 
BIRCH TELECOM, INC. 1998 2006 MO 
BLACK HILLS FIBERCOM, L.L.C. 2000 2001 SD 
BLUESTAR COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2000 2001 TN 
BRE COMMUNICATIONS, D/B/A PHONE MICHIGAN 1997 1998 MI 
BRESNAN COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1999 2000 NY 
BRIDGEBAND COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2000 2002 MT 
BROADSLATE NETWORKS, INC. 2001 2002 VA 
BROADVIEW NETWORKS, INC. (f/k/a COMMUNITY NETWORKS, INC.) 1999 2006 NY 
BROADWING COMMUNICATIONS 2005 2006 TX 
BROOKS FIBER PROPERTIES, INC. 1997 1998 MO 
BTI TELECOM CORP. (f/k/a FIBERSOUTH, INC.) 1997 2003 NC 
BUCKEYE TELESYSTEM 1999 2006 OH 
C-SYSTEMS 1999 2001 ID 
CALTECH INTERNATIONAL TELECOM CORP. 1998 2000 CA 
CAPROCK COMMUNICATIONS CORP. 1999 2001 TX 
CAVALIER TELEPHONE CORP. 1999 2006 VA 
CBEYOND COMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C. 2002 2006 GA 
CHOICE ONE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1999 2006 NY 
CINERGY COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a COMMUNITY TELEPHONE) 2001 2006 IN 
COAST TO COAST TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1998 2001 MI 
COLDWATER TELECOMMUNICATIONS UTILITY 1999 2001 MI 
COLUMBIA TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., D/B/A AXESSA 1998 2001 FL 
COMAV TELCO, INC. 1998 2000 MA 
COMCAST BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS 2002 2005 NJ 
COMCAST COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a JONES COMMUNICATIONS, INC.) 1997 2001 CO 











COMPUTER BUSINESS SCIENCES D/B/A CBS 1999 2001 NY 
CONECTIV COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1999 2001 DE 
CONVERGENT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1998 2001 CO 
CONVERSENT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2000 2006 MA 
CORECOMM, LTD. 1999 2005 OH 
COVAD COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY 1998 2002 CA 
COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1998 2006 GA 
CTC COMMUNICATIONS CORP. 1999 2006 MA 
CTC EXCHANGE SERVICES, INC. 2001 2002 NC 
CTS TELECOM D/B/A CLIMAX TELEPHONE CO. 1997 2002 MI 
CTSI, INC. (f/k/a COMMONWEALTH TELEPHONE CO.) 1998 2002 NJ 
DIGITAL TELEPORT, INC. 1997 2001 MO 
DSL.NET, INC. (f/k/a DSLNET COMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C.) 2000 2002 CT 
DURO COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2001 2002 FL 
DYNTEL (DYNAMIC TELCO SERVICES, L.L.C.) 1999 2000 VA 
E.SPIRE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (f/k/a AMERICAN 
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC.) 1997 2002 MD 
EAGLE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1998 2005 NY 
ELECTRIC LIGHTWAVE, INC. 1997 2001 WA 
ESCHELON TELECOM, INC. (f/k/a ADVANCED 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., D/B/A ATI) 2000 2006 MN 
EVEREST CONNECTIONS CORP. 2001 2006 MO 
EXOP OF MISSOURI, INC. 1999 2001 MO 
FAIRPOINT COMMUNICATIONS CORP. 1999 2002 NC 
FDN COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a FLORIDA DIGITAL NETWORK) 1999 2006 FL 
FIBER SERVICES, INC. D/B/A SMART CONNECT 1999 2001 VA 
FIBERNET TELECOM GROUP, INC. (f/k/a LOCAL FIBER, LLC) 1998 2001 NY 
FIRST REGIONAL TELECOM, L.L.C. 1998 2001 VA 
FOCAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP. 1998 2004 IL 
FOREST CITY TELECOM, INC. 1998 2002 IA 
GLOBAL NAPS 1999 2006 MA 
GLOBALCOM, INC. 1999 2006 IL 
GOLDFIELD ACCESS NETWORK (f/k/a GOLDFIELD TELEPHONE 
COMPANY) 1999 2002 IA 
GRANDE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, INC. 2001 2006 TX 
GREAT LAKES COMNET, INC. (f/k/a MICHIGAN INDEPENDENT 
NETWORK INC.) 1998 2000 MI 
GST TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1997 2000 WA 
HARVARDNET 1999 2001 MA 
HICKORYTECH (f/k/a CRYSTAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC.) 1999 2002 MN 
HOMETOWN SOLUTIONS, L.L.C. 2001 2002 MN 
ICG COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1997 2006 CO 
IDT/WINSTAR COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a WINSTAR 
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.) 1997 2004 NY 
INDIGITAL TELECOM 1999 2000 IN 
INFOTEL COMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C. (f/k/a INFOTELCOM, LLC) 1998 1999 MN 
INTEGRA TELECOM 1999 2006 OR 
INTERACCESS CO. 1999 2000 IL 
INTERMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1997 2002 FL 
IONEX TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2001 2003 TX 
IP COMMUNICATIONS CORP. 2001 2002 TX 
ITC^DELTACOM, INC. 1998 2006 GA 
JAGUAR COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2003 2006 MN 
JATO COMMUNICATIONS 1999 2001 CO 
KANSAS CITY FIBERNET 1997 1998 MO 
KMC TELECOM, INC. 1997 2004 NJ 
KNOLOGY BROADBAND (f/k/a KNOLOGY HOLDINGS, INC.) 1998 2006 GA 
LECSTAR COMMUNICATIONS 2001 2002 GA 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS 1999 2001 NE 











LOG ON AMERICA, INC. 2000 2002 RI 
LOGIX COMMUNICATIONS ENTERPRISES, INC. 1998 2006 OK 
MADISON RIVER COMMUNICATIONS 2001 2002 NC 
MARATHON COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (f/k/a MARATHON METRO, INC.) 1998 2000 WA 
MARIETTA FIBERNET 1999 2001 GA 
MCI (f/k/a MCIMETRO ) 1997 2006 VA 
MCLEODUSA, INC. (f/k/a MCLEOD, INC. ) 1997 2006 IA 
MEDIAONE TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. (f/k/a MEDIAONE, INC.) 1997 2000 GA 
METROMEDIA FIBER NETWORK, INC. (f/k/a NATIONAL FIBER 
NETWORK, INC.) 1997 2001 NY 
MFS-WORLDCOM, INC. (f/k/a MFS ) 1997 1998 NE 
MH LIGHTNET, INC. 1997 2001 NJ 
MICHTEL, INC. (f/k/a US MIDTEL CORPORATION) 1999 2002 MI 
MID-MAINE COMMUNICATIONS 2001 2002 ME 
MP TELECOM (f/k/a MINNESOTA POWER TELECOM) 1999 2001 MN 
MPOWER COMMUNICATIONS CORP. (f/k/a NEVTEL ) 1997 2006 NV 
NECLEC, L.L.C. 2001 2002 MA 
NEON OPTICA, INC. (f/k/a FIVECOM, INC. ) 1997 2001 MA 
NET2000 COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1999 2002 VA 
NETSTREAM, INC. (f/k/a FIBER COMMUNICATIONS (D.B.A. NETFONE)) 2000 2001 CA 
NETTEL COMMUNICATIONS 1999 2001 VA 
NETWORK ACCESS SOLUTIONS, INC. 1999 2002 VA 
NETWORK PLUS CORP. 2000 2002 MA 
NETWORK TELEPHONE, INC. 2000 2004 FL 
NEW EDGE NETWORKS, INC. 2001 2002 WA 
NEWSOUTH COMMUNICATIONS CORP. 1998 2004 SC 
NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1999 2001 NY 
NORTHLAND COMMUNICATIONS GROUP (f/k/a NORTHLAND 
NETWORK, LTD.) 2000 2002 NY 
NORTHPOINT COMMUNICATIONS 1998 2001 CA 
NTELOS, INC (f/k/a CFW TELEPHONE INC.) 1998 2002 VA 
NTS COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2000 2006 TX 
NUVOX COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a GABRIEL COMMUNICATIONS, INC.) 1999 2006 MO 
OMNIPLEX COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, L.L.C. 2000 2001 MO 
ONVOY (f/k/a MEANS (MINNESOTA EQUAL ACCESS NETWORK 
SERVICES)) 1998 2001 MN 
OPTEL, INC. (f/k/a OPTEL TELECOM, INC.) 1998 2001 TX 
OPTIMUM LIGHTPATH (f/k/a CABLEVISION LIGHTPATH) 1997 2006 NY 
ORLANDO TELEPHONE COMPANY 1999 2006 FL 
OTTER TAIL, INC. 1999 2002 MN 
OVATION COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a OCI COMMUNICATIONS, INC.) 1998 1999 MN 
P.V. TELECOMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C. 1999 2000 TN 
PAC-WEST TELECOMM, INC. 1999 2006 CA 
PAETEC COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1999 2006 NY 
PARKER FIBERNET, L.L.C. 1999 2001 GA 
POINTE COMMUNICATIONS 1999 2000 TX 
PONTIO COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a WALLER CREEK 
COMMUNICATIONS) 1998 2001 TX 
PRIMARY NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (f/k/a BROADSPAN 
COMMUNICATIONS) 1999 2000 MO 
PRISM COMMUNICATION SERVICES, INC. 2000 2001 NY 
PROSPEED.NET 2001 2002 MA 
QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL (f/k/a QWEST 
COMMUNICATIONS CORP.) 2000 2006 CO 
RCN CORP. 1997 2006 NJ 
REACH COMMUNICATIONS 1999 2002 NY 
RHYTHMS NETCONNECTIONS, INC. 1999 2001 CO 
RIO COMMUNICATIONS 1998 2006 OR 
RNK TELECOM (f/k/a RNK, INC.) 1999 2006 MA 











SHARON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1999 2002 WI 
SIGECOM-CLEC (f/k/a SIGECOM) 2000 2006 IN 
SPHERA OPTICAL NETWORKS, N.A., INC. (f/k/a MILLENNIUM OPTICAL 
NETWORKS, INC.) 2000 2002 NY 
STRATUSWAVE COMMUNICATIONS 2002 2006 WV 
SUNWEST COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a KING'S DEER TELEPHONE 
COMPANY) 1998 2005 CO 
SUPRA TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC. 1998 2001 FL 
TCI TELEPHONY SERVICES, INC. 1997 1998 CO 
TDS METROCOM (f/k/a TDS DATACOM, INC.) 1997 2002 WI 
TELCOVE (f/k/a HYPERION TELECOM) 1997 2006 PA 
TELEPACIFIC COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a U.S. TELEPACIFIC D/B/A 
TELEPACIFIC) 1999 2006 CA 
TELEPHONE PLUS 1999 2000 WA 
TELEPORT COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, INC. 1997 1998 NY 
TELERGY, INC. 2000 2001 NY 
TELIGENT, INC. 1998 2002 VA 
TELNET WORLDWIDE 2000 2006 MI 
TIME WARNER TELECOM, INC. (f/k/a TIME WARNER 
COMMUNICATIONS) 1997 2006 CO 
TRIVERGENT COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a STATE COMMUNICATIONS) 1999 2000 SC 
US LEC CORP. 1998 2006 NC 
US LINK, INC. 1998 2000 MN 
US ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1999 2001 TX 
US XCHANGE, L.L.C. 1998 2000 MI 
USN COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 1997 1998 IL 
VANION, INC. 2001 2003 CO 
VERADO HOLDINGS, INC. (f/k/a SPECTRANET ) 1998 2002 CA 
VERIZON 2002 2006 TX 
VILLAGE TELEPHONE 1998 2000 WA 
VITTS CORPORATIONS D/B/A VITTS NETWORKS, INC. 1998 2001 NH 
XCOM TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 1997 1998 MA 
XIT COMMUNICATIONS 1999 2002 TX 
XO COMMUNICATIONS (f/k/a NEXTLINK ) 1997 2006 WA 
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